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The Resumption of the Doha Round
and the Future of Services Trade
RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS*

I. PROLOGUE

Since the 2006 suspension of the Doha Development Round
of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, we have seen
the obvious weaknesses and deficiencies of the multilateral trading
system.' As a reaction to these weaknesses, we have also seen the
proliferation of regionalism - which has been developing for quite
some time - as well as bilateralism.' The substance and nature of
Lecturer in Law, and Deputy-Director of Graduate Studies, Queen Mary, University of
London, (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, UK); Ph.D. candidate, LL.M. (European
University Institute, Florence, Italy); J.S.M. (Stanford Law School); LL.M. (Columbia
Law School); M.Phil. (London School of Economics and Political Science); B.A., J.D.
(Granada University, Spain). The author is most grateful to Professors Angel SaenzBadillos and David Kennedy for their generosity in providing him with excellent means
for work while he was at the Real Colegio Complutense of Harvard University.
1. For more information on the WTO's function and structure, see generally
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2. See, e.g., Ali M. EI-Agraa, Regional Trade Arrangements Worldwide, in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE 12 (Ali M. EI-Agraa ed., 1997); Victoria Curzon
Price, The European Free Trade Association, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE,
supra at 175; Sidney Weintraub, The North American Free Trade Agreement, in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE, supra at 203; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Regional
Integration in Latin America Before the Debt Crisis: LAFTA, CACM and the Andean
Pact, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE, supra at 230; Victor Bulmer-Thomas,
Regional Integrationin Latin America Since 1985: Open Regionalism and Globalisation,in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE, supra at 253; Ali M. EI-Agraa & Shelton M. A.
Nicholls, The Caribbean Community and Common Market, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
WORLDWIDE, supra at 278; Richard Pomfret, The Association of South-East Asian
Nations, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE, supra at 297; Ali M. El-Agraa,
Integration Amongst Members of the Arab League, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
WORLDWIDE, supra at 320; Peter Robson, Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE, supra at 348; REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS,
MULTILATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY PATHS TO FREE TRADE? (T.
Geiger & D. Kennedy eds., 1996); REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLITICS: REGIONAL
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services negotiations in the Doha Round are quite different from
those of the Uruguay Round; the Uruguay Round laid the ground
rules for trade in services in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS),3 whereas the Doha Round focused on extending
liberalization and complementing those ground rules.' This article
addresses the current WTO negotiations on trade in services
within the framework of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 5
and analyzes the legal implications that these services negotiations
have for the European Community (EC) in the world trading
system.
The integration of the European Union (EU) is an ongoing
process.6 The EU currently faces serious challenges as a result of
the demands of its citizens. This is certainly the case of trade
policy-making. In view of the current state of EC law, as created
by the Nice Treaty, there is a question as to what will happen to
the services trade in the Doha Round. In other words, from an EC
law viewpoint, by the time the Doha Declaration is signed as an
international trade agreement by mid-2007 or later, will it be (1) a
mixed agreement, signed by all EU Member States and the EC; or
ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell eds.,
1995).
3. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS]. "Expansion of the GATS scope and the sectors it covers is now underway in the
so-called 'GATS 2000' negotiations. Currently, the GATS 2000 negotiations are in the
'request/offer' phase, where WTO members engage in bilateral negotiations requesting
that other countries open up service sectors and offering sectors that they themselves will
put on the negotiating table. For example, the EC has requested that WTO countries
liberalize their water service, and the U.S. has requested that Brazil open for ownership by
U.S. corporations elements of public higher education services. Once a sector is
committed to the GATS, it is virtually impossible for the public to reinstall control over it
because the GATS rules require financial compensation to every WTO member to do so."
LORI WALLACH, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, POCKET TRADE LAWYER:

THE ALPHABET SOUP OF GLOBALIZATION 6-7 (2005), available at http://www.citizen.org

/documents/PocketTradeLawyerJanuary_2006_Final.pdf.
4. That said, there are still some controversial issues of the Uruguay Round in the
Doha Round, namely the audiovisual services.
5. Interestingly, rich countries call this agenda of negotiations the "Doha
Development Agenda," whereas poor countries refer to it as the "Everything but
Development Round." It has certainly been a mistake to call this round the "development
round," since the DDA is a trade negotiation with very little input on development.
Chakravarthi Raghavan, An "Everything But Development" Round from Doha, SOUTHNORTH DEV. MONITOR, Nov. 16, 2001, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg
/title/twe268a.htm.
6. See European Comm'n [EC], Overviews of the European Union Activities:
Enlargement, http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/overviewen.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
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(2) a pure Community agreement, signed only by the EC, in the
framework of the Doha Round? 7 The answer depends on two
factors. The first is the interpretation of the Nice Treaty with
respect to services trade. The second is whether there will be a
separate GATS revision or just one global WTO Trade
Agreement. This Article will explore the repercussions that each
option will have on EU citizens in terms of accountability.
The proposals of the failed EU Constitutional Treaty are also
analyzed to see whether they could be, in part, the optimal
solution to the trade-off of efficiency versus accountability in trade
policy decision-making. This article concludes with several
proposals and recommendations to reform the EC's common
commercial policy in search of the optimal position of the EC,
specifically with respect to services trade in the Doha Round, and
in the world trading system more generally.
This Article generally explores the position of the EC in the
WTO, specifically in the DDA, as well as the trade position
adopted by the EC and its member states in the new international
trade services negotiations. This article will also analyze the
consequences of the Nice Treaty reform of EC Treaty Article 133
with regard to changes to and impact upon trade in services.'
Certainly, the collapse of the 2003 talks in Cancun, Mexico,
"illuminates the complexities of the European Union as a unified
actor in international trade relations and more precisely in
multilateral trade negotiations. '
This Article is divided into two parts. Parts II-IV provide a
general overview of the world trading system with respect to trade
in services. It also explores the position of the EC in the WTO
generally, and in the DDA more specifically. Part V analyzes the
treaties of Nice, the EU Constitution and Lisbon in relation to
services trade. This Part also analyzes to what extent the
amendments introduced by the Nice Treaty and the EU

7.

See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C

340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The phenomenon of a pure Community agreement,
whereby only the EC without its member states signs an international trade agreement, is
allowed. EC Treaty art. 133 1 2-3.
8. See Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 133, Oct. 3, 2001,
2001 O.J. (C 80) [hereinafter Nice Treaty].
9. Bart Kerremans, What Went Wrong in Cancun? A Principal-Agent View on the
EU's Rationale Towards the Doha Development Agenda, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 363,
364 (2004).
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Constitutional Treaty are heading toward the eradication of mixed
agreements or shared competence in the European Union.

II. DEFINING

A ROUND AND DETERMINING WHETHER A NEW
ROUND WAS NECESSARY

A. Definition of a Round
"WTO member countries tend to negotiate over several years
on new agreements for a group of subjects. These series of
negotiations are called 'rounds..'' .° They are often lengthy but can
have the advantage of offering a package approach to trade
negotiations, as opposed to negotiations on a single issue, as was
the case in the mid-1990s negotiations on financial services and
telecommunications." The package approach can sometimes be
more fruitful; there is always something beneficial for every
participant in the negotiation, and therefore the ability to trade-off
various issues can make an agreement easier to reach.'2
This has political and economic implications. Concessions (or
commitments to bound tariff rates) 3 can be obtained more easily
in the context of a package because it may contain both politically
and economically attractive benefits." Thus, reforms in politically
sensitive sectors of world trade may be more feasible in the
context of a global package. Examples are the Uruguay Round,
from 1986 to 1994, and the current round of negotiations, the
DDA, which started in 2001." If ultimately successful, the Doha
talks would be the ninth such round since the Second World War.'6

10. The
EU
in
the
United
Kingdom,
Policy
Briefs:
Trade,
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/information/policy-briefsbb40_en.htm
(last visited
Feb. 24, 2007) (emphasis added). See also WTO Agreement art. 3.2 (stating one of the
various functions of the WTO is to provide a forum for negotiations among its members).
11. See WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO], UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 19 (3rd ed.
2005),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/understandingtext-e.pdf
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO]. It is interesting to note the influence of the
EC's Single European Market on the GATS negotiations, such as the deregulation of
financial services and telecommunications.
12. Id.
13. See WTO, Schedules of Concessions on Goods, http://www.wto.org/english
/tratop-e/schedules-e/goods schedulese.htm (last visited March 28, 2005) (noting that
WTO negotiations produce general rules that apply to all members and specific
commitments made by individual member governments).
14. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 11, at 19.
15.

Id.

16. The previous trade rounds, in chronological order, are as follows: Geneva Round
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This does not mean that rounds are the only road to success in the
international trading system; with respect to telecommunications,
financial services, and information technology equipment, singlesector negotiations were successfully concluded in 1997.'"
Services schedules are an integral part of the GATS, just as
tariff schedules are an integral part of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT):'
During and between the multilateral negotiations on the
general trade agreements, members also conduct bilateral, 9
plurilateral, ° or multilateral1 talks that result in (1) agreements
(1947), with 23 countries; Annency Round (1949), with 13 countries; Torquay Round
(1950), with 38 countries; Geneva Round (1956), with 26 countries; Dillon Round (196061), with 26 countries; Kennedy Round (1962-67), with 62 countries; Tokyo Round (197379), with 99 countries; and Uruguay Round (1986-93), with 125 countries. BREAD FOR
THE WORLD, AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HUNGER 2003, at 60-61 (2003),
available at http://www.bread.org/learn/hunger-reports/hunger-report-2003-download
.html.
17. J.H.H. WEILER & SUNGJOON CHO, THE SYNTAX AND GRAMMAR OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 37 (2006) [hereinafter WEILER & CHO, THE SYNTAX AND
LAW],
available at http://www
TRADE
OF
INTERNATIONAL
GRAMMAR
.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wto/Units/documents/WTO_2006_UnitlSyntax-Grammar.pdf.
18. For more information on the GATT, see generally Elisabetta Montaguti &
Maurits Lugard, The GATT 1994 and Other Annex 1A Agreements: Four Different
Relationships?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 473, 473-84 (2000).
19. A bilateral agreement is an agreement between two states which is only legally
binding for these two states with the benefits typically not shared with other (third)
countries. European Commission [EC] External Trade Glossary, http://ec.europa.eu
/trade/gentools/gloss-en.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter EC External Trade
Glossary]. See also Y.S. Lee, Bilateralism Under the World Trade Organization, (Berkeley
Electronic Press [bepress] Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1333, 2005), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3242&context=expresso (expanding on
the recent proliferation of bilateral agreements in the world trading system).
20. "The plurilateral process, akin to the bilateral request and offer, is informal. It
takes place between demandeurs and those from whom they are seeking higher
commitments. There are no formal negotiating sessions. There is no formal Chair. There
are no minutes of these informal negotiations. And importantly, there is no critical mass of
countries representing 80-90% of world trade in that sector, unless the negotiations draw
in such a large number of countries that they effectively make up this 'critical mass' (an
unlikely situation if it were completely voluntary)." Aileen Kwa, "PlurilateralRequestOffer" Approach in GA TS Draft Text: Entry Point for Dangerous Sectoral Negotiations,
FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.focusweb.org/plurilateralSee
request-offer-approach-in-gats-draft-text-entry-point-for-dangerous-sectoral-ne.html.
also PUB. CITIZEN, WTO GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS)
2006) available at http://www.citizen.org/documents
GLOSSARY 4 (Mar. 23,
/glossary-final_03-06.pdf [hereinafter GATS GLOSSARY].
21. In the WTO context, multilateral negotiations, as opposed to plurilateral
negotiations, imply the participation of all WTO Members. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
supra note 11, at 56. The nature of the consequent multilateral agreements from these
multilateral negotiations implies that commitments are made by all WTO Members. Id.
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on maximum tariffs for goods, quotas,22 export subsidies23 and
domestic supports for agriculture, and (2) commitments 2 to
open domestic markets to services" from other members and
exemptions 26 from these commitments.2 7 These agreements are
28
memorialized in schedules. The goods schedules are annexed
29
to the [!ATT], and the services schedules are annexed to the
GATS.
Schedules are thus bound and can be changed only through
subsequent formal negotiations."

The GATT was a multilateral instrument as well, but a series of new agreements were
adopted during the Tokyo Round on a multilateral (selective) basis, which caused a
fragmentation of the multilateral trading system. Id.
22. "Quotas are limits on the amount of a good produced, imported, exported, or
offered for sale." EC External Trade Glossary, supra note 19. "Quantitative restrictions
include quotas, non-automatic licensing, mixing regulations, voluntary export restraints,
and prohibitions or embargos." KAMAL MALHOTRA ET AL., MAKING GLOBAL TRADE
WORK FOR PEOPLE, at xxix (2003). As for voluntary export restraints, these are
"agreement[s] between importing and exporting countries in which the exporting country
restrains exports of a certain product to an agreed maximum within a certain period." Id.
at xxxii.
23. "There are two general types of subsidies: export and domestic. An export
subsidy is a benefit conferred on a firm by the government that is contingent on exports."
MEAT
&
LIVESTOCK
AUSTL.,
TRADE
TALK
GLOSSARY,
available at
http://www.mla.com.au/NR/rdonlyres/64EDD9C7-B2BO-45A5-AF7D-COD2A8E07980/0/
TradeTalk.pdf. In other words, it is "any form of government payment that helps an
exporter or manufacturing concern to lower its export costs." EC External Trade
Glossary, supra note 19. "A domestic subsidy is a benefit not directly linked to exports."
Id.
24. See GATS GLOSSARY, supra note 20; see also UNDERSTANDING
THE
WTO,
supra note 11, at 37; WALLACH, supra note 3, at 9; Andrew L. Stoler, Executive Dir., Inst.
for Int'l Bus., Econ. & Law, Workshop on GATS Negotiations: UNCESO/OECD
Australia Forum on Trade and Educational Services (Oct. 11, 2004).
25. Petros Mavroidis, Highway XVI Re-Visited: The Road from Non-Discrimination
to Market Access in GA TS, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 1 (2007).
26. See GATS GLOSSARY, supra note 20.
27. See Roberto Bouzas & Hernin Soltz, Argentina and GA TS: A Study on the
Domestic Determinants of GATS Commitments, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF
WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES, Case Study 2 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter WTO CASE STUDIES], available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e
/booksp-e/casestudies-e/case2_e.htm.
28. See WTO, Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and
the List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/
guidel e.htm; GATS GLOSSARY, supra note 20.
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter GAIT 1994].
30. New York University School of Law Library, WTO and GATT Research,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/library/wtoguide.html#Schedules (last visited March 26, 2005).
31. Id.
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In these trade liberalization negotiations, WTO members put
on the negotiating table their commitments on market access, i.e.,
the extent to which a country permits imports. A variety of tariff
and non-tariff trade barriers can be used to limit the entry of
products from other countries. 2 The term of art schedules refers, in
general, to a WTO member's list of commitments on market
access (including bound tariff rates and access to services
markets).3 With these schedules, WTO member countries allow
specific foreign products or service-providers access to their
markets, thus making these schedules integral parts of the trade
agreements:" Goods schedules can include commitments on tariffs,
and, for the specific case of agriculture, a combination of tariffs,
quotas, agricultural export subsidies and domestic support." The
provisions for market access and "national treatment ''

are not

general requirements, but function as specific commitments
included in schedules annexed to the GATS.37 "These schedules
32. GATS art. XVI. "The GATS 'market access' rules go well beyond requiring that
governments treat foreign firms the same as domestic firms. Rather, these rules flatly
prohibit governments from placing certain limits on, or applying certain policies to, foreign
service operations in covered service sectors." GATS GLOSSARY, supra note 20. See also
GATS art. XVI (listing limitations on federal, state, and local governments under the
GATS "market access" rules).
33. "A schedule is a WTO member nation's list of service sectors or sub-sectors that it
has committed or is offering to submit to the rules of the GATS. A nation's schedule is
listed in a table format with four columns labeled: 1) sector/subsector; 2) limitations on
market access; 3) limitations on national treatment; and 4) additional comments.
Schedules are difficult to read and even more difficult to write. Typically, a nation will
commit a service sector in column one, then indicate whether or not the various modes of
supplying that service will be bound to the market access rules of the GATS in column two
and/or in the national treatment rules in column three. Limitations may be placed in the
horizontal section of the schedule or in column one, two or three." GATS GLOSSARY,
supra note 20.
34. WTO, WTO Legal Texts, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal_e.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2007) [hereinafter WTO Legal Texts].
35. Id.
36. "The national treatment principle is the principle of giving others the same
treatment as one's own nationals." WTO, An Informal Guide to "WTO Speak,"
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min99-e/english/about-e/23glos-e.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2007) [hereinafter WTO Speak]. In other words, WTO Members must
treat domestic and foreign goods, services and/or investors in the same manner for
regulatory, tax and other purposes. The treatment must be either formally identical or
formally different, so long as it is no less favorable. The treatment is considered less
favorable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of the services or services
suppliers of the WTO Member. GATS art. XVII; see also GATS GLOSSARY, supra note
20
37. Each WTO Member is required to have a schedule of specific commitments in
services. Anna Lanoszka, Inst. for Trade & Commercial Diplomacy [ITCD], Practicum
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identify the services and service activities for which market access
is guaranteed, and set out the conditions governing this access.
Once consolidated, these commitments can only be modified or
withdrawn following
negotiation of compensation with the country
3
concerned."

1

Services commitments are binding on national policymakers 9
The schedules amount to "binding commitments on how much
access foreign service providers are allowed for specific sectors. '
Schedules include "lists [of] types of services where individual
countries claim they are not applying the most-favored-nation
principle of non-discrimination (MFN).""' These binding
commitments are valuable because they create a more predictable
and certain legal system than existing liberalized regimes on trade
in services provide on their own. Mainly, binding commitments
ensure that there will be no withdrawal or rollback of measures
that could force businesses to undo an already-existing commercial
presence. Recent changes in Thailand and other Latin American
nations highlight the value of such certainty and predictability."2
Supporters of trade liberalization - the reduction of tariffs
and removal or relaxation of non-tariff barriers - argue that it is
sensible to liberalize trade globally because (1) freer trade allows
countries to specialize in what they do best (under a theory of
comparative advantage), thereby creating greater economic
efficiency and allowing more goods and services to be produced
and consumed;"3 (2) if a market is open to imports, domestic
About Multilateral Negotiations on Liberalizing International Trade in Services (2002),
available at http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/simulations/multilateral-negotiations.
tm [hereinafter ITCD Practicum].
38. EC, Summaries of Legislation:
Aspects Relating to Trade in Services,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rll012.htm (last visited January 31, 2007) [hereinafter

EU Summaries].
39. See GATS GLOSSARY, supra note 20, at 1.
40. WTO Legal Texts, supra note 34.
41. Id. See also GATT 1994; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. Most-favorednation treatment is a core principle of the WTO agreements. UNDERSTANDING THE
WTO, supra note 11, at 10.
42. Johannes Bernabe & Shuaihua Cheng, Int'l Centre for Trade & Sustainable
Development [ICTSD], The Doha Round Negotiations on Services: An Overview 2 (Feb.
16, 2007) (unpublished seminar paper, on file with author).
43. For examples of liberalization founded in the theory of comparative advantage,
see Malathy Knight-John & Chethana Ellepola, The Impact of GA TS on
Telecommunications Competition in Sri Lanka, in WTO CASE STUDIES, supra note 27,
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producers are exposed to competition from overseas (and being
successfully competitive at home vis-A-vis imports implies greater
chances to be competitive overseas); and (3) competitive imports
are beneficial for the consumer from choice, price, and quality
viewpoints. A sensu contrario, a policy of maintaining trade
obstacles to imports tends to raise the cost of living and reduce
consumer choice.
Not everyone, however, is convinced that trade liberalization
is beneficial for every WTO Member, especially the poor." It has
been argued that: (1) "government transfers can shrink as
liberalization cuts the government's receipts of trade-related
taxes," (2) "terms of trade can deteriorate as liberalization affects
world prices," and (3) "liberalization can impose adjustment costs
and raise short-run risk owing to competition from imports and
reallocation of productive factors.""5
B. Why a New Round Was Needed
Before the creation of Doha Round in 2001, developing and
least-developed countries had been marginalized in the world
trading system, raising serious economic implications. In response,
the new round is called the development agenda; the argument is
that a more open and equitable trading system brings more peace
to the world."6 In this sense, the DDA should not be approached as
a zero-sum game (as many developing countries seem to perceive
it). Instead, the new round must be framed as a win-win situation.
Although wealth redistribution does seem vital to truly
helping the poor nations of the world, and even while firmly
defending the DDA argument that developed countries should
Case Study 39, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudies_e/
case39_e.htm; Amir Muhammed & Wajid Pirzada, Pakistan: The Consequences of a
Change in the EC Rice Regime, in WTO CASE STUDIES, supra note 27, Case Study 35,
availableat http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudiese/case35 e.htm; Turab
Hussain, Victory in Principle: Pakistan's Dispute Settlement Case on Combed Cotton Yarn
Exports to the United States, in WTO CASE STUDIES, supra note 27, Case Study 34,
availableat http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp e/casestudiese/case34 e.htm.
44. Timothy A. Wise & Kevin P. Gallagher, Doha Round and Developing Countries:
Will the Doha deal do more harm than good? (Research and Info. Sys. for Developing
Countries, Policy Brief No. 22, Apr. 2006).
45. Antoine Bouet, How Much Will Trade LiberalizationHelp the Poor? Comparing
Global Trade Models 1 (Int'l Food Policy Research Inst., Research Brief No. 5, 2006).
46. See Brinkmanship Marks First Day's Proceedings, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE,
Dec. 14, 2005,
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/wto-daily/14_December/
en051214.pdf.
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help the poor, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy is correct that
the WTO's role is not about redistribution of wealth. Therefore, a
new round is necessary to include poor countries in the world
trading 4system, promote economic development, and alleviate

poverty.

A successful DDA result will mean more growth and
development in the world trading system. The failure of the DDA

provides no growth or development, especially for the poorest
countries on the planet. Additionally, the failure of the DDA will
be historically regarded as a missed opportunity to eliminate
export subsidies and end trade distortion. Although all countries in
the world trading system lose, developing countries would
especially feel a failure of the DDA.4 8 Liberalizing trade among
developing countries is an essential part of the Doha exercise
because the biggest development gains would certainly be in the

core areas of goods, services and agriculture. 9
In the case of services trade, a new services negotiation round
was necessary and justified because the Uruguay Round was just a
first step in the process of trade liberalization." Observers tend to
agree that while the Uruguay negotiations succeeded in setting up
the main structure of the GATS, the liberalizing effects for which
the GATS was conceived have been relatively modest.5 Apart

47. This is certainly the position of European trade commissioner Peter Mandelson,
who said that far from being responsible for poor labor conditions, free trade could be a
ladder out of poverty and "an engine of the very prosperity that helps societies put poor
labor conditions behind them for good." Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Comm'r, Free Trade
is not the Enemy of Decent Work, Speaking Points at a Party of European Socialists
Conference (May 10, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/
mandelson/speeches-articles/sppm098_en.htm). He concludes that "[f]ree trade is not the
enemy of decent work. The enemy of decent work is our willingness to turn a blind eye to
it. Free trade does not mean trade indifferent to fair conditions of production." Id.
48. See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Remarks at the Ceremony in Memory of
Arthur Dunkel: A Life Dedicated to a More Open and Fair World Trading System (Nov.
2, 2005), availableat http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl-e/sppll3_e.htm.
49. As we saw in the pre-Hong Kong ministerial conference period of negotiations,
the agriculture negotiations are considered key to the success of the overall Doha Round
of WTO talks. See, e.g., Kate Millar, EU, U.S. Strike Joint WTO Bid to Revive Stalled Farm
Talks, TRADE OBSERVATORY, Aug. 13, 2003, http://www.tradeobservatory.org/
headlines.cfm?reflD=18501.
50. For a view on why the international community should have a new round, see
W.T. Eijsbouts et al., Why Are We Having a Round?, 28 LEGAL ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION 243, 243-47 (2001).
51. See generally Rolf J. Langhammer, The EU Offer of Services Trade Liberalization
in the Doha Round: Evidence of a Not-Yet-Perfect Customs Union, 43 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 311 (2005) (providing a numerical assessment of the degree of trade restrictions in
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from exceptions in financial and telecommunication services, most
schedules have remained confined to confirming status quo market
conditions in a relatively limited number of sectors. This may be
explained in part by the novelty of the GATS and the perceived
need for WTO Members to gather experience before considering
wider and deeper commitments. It could also be a lack of political
will, negotiating expertise, or capacity.52 Moreover, many
administrations need time to develop the necessary regulations including
quality
standards,
licensing
and
qualification
requirements, etc. - that ensure the compatibility of external
liberalization with the core policy objectives (quality, equity, etc.)
of socially important services.
III. WHAT IS THE GATS?
The GATS is one of the seventeen major international trade
agreements achieved during the Uruguay Round and enforced by
the WTO, entering into force as part of the WTO substantive law
on January 1, 1995."3 Because the very notion of including the
services sector in a trade agreement was controversial, most GATS
requirements only apply to the service sectors of countries that
specifically agree to be open to competition by foreign
corporations. 4
the EU).
52. See J.H.H. WEILER
[hereinafter
WEILER
&

& SUNGJOON CHO, TRADE IN SERVICES 6 (2006)
CHO,
TRADE
IN
SERVICES],
available
at

http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wto/Units/index.html.
53. For an analysis of the GATS, see W. Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice
Relating to the GA TS, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, at 381-420

(F. Ortino & E.-U. Petersmann eds., 2004); M. MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION:

LAW, PRACTICE, AND

POLICY ch. 11 (2003); WTO, 2 WTO

ANALYTICAL INDEX:
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 1083-1147 (2003); A.F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ch. 6 (2003); CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE
NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENTS: GLOBALIZING LAW THROUGH
SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000); M.J. TREBILCOCK & R. HOWSE, THE

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ch. 11 (2nd ed. 1999); M. Bronckers & P.
Larouche, TelecommunicationsServices and the WTO, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1997, at 4;
Matthew Kennedy, Services Join GA TT: An Analysis of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, 1 INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 11, 11-20 (1995).
54. See Frederick M. Abbott, Are the Competition Rules in the WTO TRIPS
Agreement Adequate?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 687 (2004); Philip Marsden, WTO Decides First
Competition Case - With Disappointing Results, COMPETITION L. INSIGHT, May 2004, at
3-9; Joel Davidow & Hal Shapiro, The Feasibility and Worth of a World Trade
Organization Competition Agreement, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 2003, at 49; Robert D.
Anderson & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilateral Trading
System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 531 (2002); Marco Bronckers, The WTO Reference Paper on
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The GATS consists of three components: (1) a general
framework agreement for all WTO Members which lays out the
general rules and obligations for trade and investment in services;55
(2) several important annexes (sometimes called protocols) on
specific service sectors; 6 and (3) national schedules of specific
commitments 7 concerning market access for each WTO signatory
government, listing the specific
58 service sectors that each nation has
agreement.
the
to
committed
A. Objectives and Principles
Unlike trade in goods, multilateral services trade did not have
a multilateral liberalization movement. Multilateral trade in
services only came into being after the GATS went into force. This
is because services were initially, although incorrectly, perceived as
non-tradable. In some services industries, for example, it was
considered essential to have the simultaneous presence of
Telecommunications: A Model for WTO Competition Law, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 371, 379-89 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds.,
2000); Edwin A. Vermulst, Should Competition Law Violations Distorting International
Trade Be Subject to GA TT Panels?,J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1993, at 55.
55. "Obligations contained in the GATS may be categorized into two groups: 1)
general obligations which apply directly and automatically to all Members, regardless of
the existence of sectoral commitments; and 2) specific commitments whose scope is
limited to the sectors and activities where a Member has decided to assume market access
and national treatment obligations." ITCD Practicum, supra note 37. Obligations can also
be divided into unconditional and conditional obligations. Unconditional obligations apply
to all services except those not subject to coverage by the GATS. Examples of
unconditional obligations are the most-favored-nation treatment (except for those listed in
the Annex on Article II Exemptions) and certain transparency obligations, whereas
conditional obligations are Member-specific and contained in individual Members'
schedules of specific commitments. "Conditional obligations are assumed in a "bottomup" or positive list approach." Stoler, supranote 24.
56. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement of the World Trade
Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1947, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157,1163-64 (1994).

57. See WTO, Schedules of Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions,
http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/serv-e/servcommitmentse.htm (last visited Mar.
13, 2007) [hereinafter Schedules of Commitments]; see also WTO Legal Texts, supra note
34. Each WTO Member maintains a schedule of specific commitments listing sectors in
which it grants market access and national treatment. Stoler, supra note 24. These are
conditional obligations. Unconditional obligations also apply to these sectors. In the case
of services, they are the equivalent of tariff schedules in the GAT, laying down the
commitments accepted - voluntarily or through negotiation - by WTO Members. India
and the WTO, A to Z of WTO: A Glossary of WTO and Related Terms,
http://commerce.nic.in/dec05/main.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2007); Schedules of
Commitments, supra note 57.
58. See Petersmann, supra note 56, at 1161.
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producers and consumers within a particular market. The current
perception of services, however, is diametrically different than
how services were perceived before GATS."9 The GATS commits
WTO Members to undertake negotiations on specific issues and to
enter into successive rounds of negotiations to progressively
liberalize trade in services.' According to Article XIX of the
GATS, the first round of negotiations was to start no later than
five years after 1995:
In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members
shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not
later than five years from the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to
achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization. Such
negotiations shall be directed to the reduction or elimination of
the adverse effects on trade in services of measures as a means
of providing effective market access. 61
The GATS is therefore the first set of rules and disciplines
governing international trade in services that were agreed to at a
multilateral level.' The OATS sets rules for who controls or owns
services, limits government regulation in the services sector, and
covers all services including health care, education and utilities
such as water, data management, energy, banking, transportation,
and insurance. The GATS is fairly flexible; VTO Members have
the freedom to choose the services, as well as the degree to which
foreign services suppliers can operate, in their domestic markets.
For example, if a WTO Member chooses financial services and
commits to open its domestic banking sector for foreign suppliers,
it may also restrict market access by limiting the number of
licenses it grants.3

The GATS was inspired by essentially the same objectives as
its counterpart in the trade in goods, the GATI' As outlined by
59. For an analysis of the post-Uruguay Round trade liberalization implications, see
DILIP K. DAS, GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE CROSSROADS. A POST-SEATTLE

PERSPECTIVE 128-50 (2001).
60. See Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law [CIEL], WTO Negotiations to Liberalize Trade in
Services:
New Challenges for Sustainable Development (2002), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/services.pdf.
61. GATS art. XIX (1).
62. See CIEL, supra note 60.
63. See generally Mavroidis, supra note 25, at 1-23.
64. WTO, The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives,
Coverage and Disciplines, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/gatsqa-e.htm
[hereinafter GATS Objectives].
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the WTO, the GATS main objectives are (1) the creation of a
credible and reliable system of international trade rules, (2) the
stimulation of economic activity through guaranteed policy
bindings, (3) the assurance of fair and equitable treatment of all
participants (the so-called principle of non-discrimination), and (4)
promotion of trade and development through progressive
liberalization.65
By comparison, the basic principles of the GATT include:
non-discrimination (most-favored-nation treatment and national
treatment), liberalization of trade, no "unfair trade" (antidumping, subsidies, and state trading - under certain conditions),
transparency and neutrality of the administration of trade laws,
and horizontal exceptions, including special and differential
treatment. For the purposes of this Article, we will only deal with
the principle of non-discrimination.
Some commentators argue that only a small part of the GATS
is about trade. The GATS is often called a "backdoor Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI)," because it creates rights for
foreign investors to set up service businesses within other WTO
countries. The GATS does allow some flexibility for a country to
determine which service sectors it wants to subject to GATS full
participation and deregulation pressures. Some GATS rules,
however, apply to sectors that individual countries may not have
committed to the agreement. In addition, the text of the GATS
commits all WTO countries to "progressive liberalization."'
The GATS is based on the principle of MFN. According to
this principle, each WTO member must unconditionally accord
services and service suppliers from any other member-state no less
favorable treatment than that it accords to services and service
suppliers of any other country.67 However, certain exceptions 68 to
the MFN requirement are envisaged in the context of specific
service activities within the framework of a list of exemptions.' In

65. Id.
66. GATS art. XIX.1.
67. See WEILER & CHO, TRADE IN SERVICES, supra note 52, at 2.
68. "Exceptions are binding provisions on all signatories built into the core text of an
agreement that lists the circumstances when a country may violate a term of an agreement
without penalty. Exceptions only come into play as a defense when a country's law or
policy has been challenged in a dispute resolution as a violation of an agreement."
WALLACH, supra note 3, at 17.
69. "Work on this subject started in 2000. As mandated by the GATS, all these
exemptions are currently being reviewed to examine whether the conditions which created
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fact, in its schedule, each government has included the services for
which it guarantees access to its market by setting out the limits it
wishes to maintain for such access."
The drafters of the GATS seem to have reached two
conclusions in their attempt to define the scope of services
activities subject to the GATS. First, given the enormity of
tradable services and the constant change in the description of
what is understood by a "service" due to continued technological
advances," the drafters concluded that for purposes of the GATS it
suffices to define only what is meant by trade in services. Secondly,
the definition of trade in services should be precise enough to
capture all modes for the services trade. 2 As Markus Krajewski
argues,73 the sectoral scope of the GATS is broad and includes
most public services." To narrow the scope of the GATS, WTO
Members may collectively take legislative steps, such as a change
in the agreement itself, or an additional treaty instrument. 5
B. HistoricalBackground to the GA TS
The GATS is a manifestation of an attempt to expand the
principles of the GATT' into the field of services. 6 The motivation

the need for these exemptions in the first place still exist. And in any case, they are part of
the current services negotiations." UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 11, at 40.
70. EU Summaries, supra note 38.
71.

See Fariborz Moshirian,

Trade in Financial Services, in 17 THE WORLD

ECONOMY 347, 348-51 (1994) (viewing changes in the definition and content of financial
services as a result of development of new telecommunications technology).
72. The "modes" constitute the means of delivering services. Modes of supply are
defined on the basis of the origins of the service supplier and the consumer, and the type
of territorial presence that both have when the service is delivered. As we will see later,
there are four modes of supply. EC External Trade Glossary, supra note 19.
73. See Markus Krajewski, Public Services and Trade Liberalization: Mapping the
Legal Framework, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 341, 346 (2003) [hereinafter Krajewski, Public
Services and Trade Liberalization].

74. "The GATS leaves it entirely to its Members to decide whether they provide
public services themselves, directly or indirectly (through public undertakings), whether
they entrust their provision to a third party, or finally whether they rely entirely on private
markets." TRANSATLANTIC CONSUMER DIALOGUE [TACD], TACD 2002 REPORT
CARD: TACD RESOLUTION ON CHILDREN AND E-COMMERCE AND EUROPEAN
COMMISSION SERVICES' RESPONSES 7 (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consissue/
tacd-report02-en.pdf; see also EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMM. ON INDUS., EXTERNAL
TRADE, RESEARCH & ENERGY, PUBLIC HEARING ON "GATS : THE FUTURE OF
SERVICES" 5 (2002), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20021126/

itre/contributions.pdf.
75.

See Krajewski, Public Services and Trade Liberalization, supra note 73, at 367.

76. See Petersmann, supra note 56, at 1161.
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for the agreement came mainly from developed countries, given
that the exports of developed nations are gradually switching to
services that require a high level of value-added knowledge, as
opposed to traditional industrial products." The globalization of
the world economy was underway, trade in services was of major
interest to more and more countries, and the expansion of services
trade was closely tied to further increases in the worldwide trade in
goods."
The GATS is the first multilateral trade agreement to cover
trade in services. 9 Its creation was one of the major achievements
of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that began in 1986
and ended in 1993.80 This achievement came almost a half century
after the GATT entered into force in 1947." Among the several
new legal disciplines in the field of international trade stemming
from the Uruguay Round, the GATS still remains the most
complex and unexplored agreement. While the level of actual
liberalization achieved by the WTO in the field of services is
relatively low, the new legal disciplines provided in the GATS
have the potential to have far reaching implications for all WTO
members involved.n
Unlike goods negotiations, services negotiations entail a
lengthier, more complicated process of ascertaining precisely
which limitations and conditions should apply to the entry and
treatment of foreign services suppliers. The GATS negotiations
are essentially a bilateral request/offer exercise. No particular
format is needed for the requests, though it should be clear as to
what is being requested.83 The request could be a letter or a
77.

See Anthony Arnull, The Scope of the Common Commercial Policy: A Coda on

Opinion 1/94, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER THE GATF

URUGUAY ROUND 343,344 (N. Emiliou & D. O'Keefe eds., 1996).

78. "Globalisation is the result of the worldwide spread of flows of goods, services,
capital, technologies and people against a background of deregulation. It is driven by the
development and diffusion of information technologies and the internet. Globalisation can
create more wealth for everybody, but it is also disruptive and needs to be harnessed by
international rules. When business goes global, the rules for fair play must also be set
globally." EC External Trade Glossary, supra note 19.
79. See WEILER & CHO, THE SYNTAX AND GRAMMAR OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW, supra note 17, at 1.
Background,
Training
Module:
Historical
80. WTO,
GATS
(last visited Feb.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/cbtcourse-e/clslpl-e.htm
19, 2007) [hereinafter GATS Historical Background].

81. Id.
82.
83.

See id.
GATS Negotiations, supra note 24.
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template.' In framing a request, negotiators should refer to the
Services Sector Classification List." Typical requests include
removal of existing limitations, requests for additional
commitments,"' removal of most-favored-nation exemptions, and
modifications to "horizontal commitments."87 As for the offer, it is
normally presented as a draft schedule of commitments.' Potential
contents of an offer include an agreement to additional coverage
of a sector, agreements to liberalize for all modes of delivery" in
both market access and national treatment (or possibly just certain
modes and retain some limitations), agreements to total
liberalization of limitations (or possibly just ease the impact
90
partially), and agreements to modify horizontal commitments.
C. Scope of the GA TS
There have been several proposals for reforming the
objectives of the WTO. One example is the proposal by Aaditya
Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian to broaden the scope of
negotiations in the framework of the WTO to include all fields of
production, including capital and the labor force.91 For the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See GATS art. XVIII (stating additional commitments are commitments under
the GATS made on regulations relating to qualifications, standards, licensing or
competition matters, which do not discriminate against foreigners).
87. Stoler, supra note 24. The GATS consists of a horizontal and vertical commitment
framework. The horizontal commitment contains basic signatory obligations across the
board to the entire WTO membership, whereas the vertical commitment applies to a
service or sub-sectors thereof which governments have chosen to open up (partially, fully,
or not at all) for competition. Each government must provide a schedule of commitment.
The most relevant Article in the horizontal commitment is the GATS Article II on MostFavored-Nation Treatment, while GATS Article XVII on National Treatment and GATS
Article XVI on Market Access stand out in vertical commitments. See, e.g., WEILER &
CHO, THE SYNTAX AND GRAMMAR OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 17, at
5-6 (discussing a countries' commitment to market opening, market access, and national
treatment).
88. Isabelle Van Damme, The Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments, 41 J.
WORLD TRADE 1 (2007).

89. Modes of delivery are a classification related to trade in services. Services can be
sold in four different ways: (1) The service itself can cross a border (i.e., a sale over the
internet); (2) it can be consumed abroad (i.e., a training course, a medical operation, or a
tourist visit abroad); (3) it can be purchased from a foreign company that is established
locally; or (4) the personnel of a foreign firm can travel temporarily to a host country to
perform services (i.e., key management for a construction project). See WEILER & CHO,
THE SYNTAX AND GRAMMAR OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 17, at 9.
90. Stoler, supra note 24.
91. Id.
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purposes of this Article, however, the focus will be on the scope of
services negotiations.
1. Measures Within the Scope of the GATS
GATS ' Article I states that the GATS covers "any service in

any sector, ,92 meaning that no service is excluded from the

agreement's scope.93 All levels of government, "central, regional,
or local governments or authorities,"' 4 must comply with the
GATS terms, such that the GATS covers local sewer systems,
public hospitals, elementary education, and water systems. GATS
constraints also cover actions of "non-governmental bodies in the
exercise of powers delegated by" any level of government. 9
Examples include boards of universities, hospitals, and
professional organizations such as legal bar associations.
The GATS not only sets constraints on governmental policies
which directly relate to services, but also extends to "measures by
[WTO] Members affecting trade in services." 6 This broad
definition of services means that all governmental policies that
affect services are constrained by the GATS, including those not
specific to services, such as general labor market policies or other
broad regulations. Also, the GATS clearly states that no sector is
excluded a priori,7 meaning no sector can be carved out
altogether, and that countries are bound to follow some of the
GATS rules even if they do not explicitly agree to subject a service
sector to the GATS coverage. Some GATS defenders incorrectly
claim that the GATS rules apply only to sectors that governments
volunteer for coverage. In reality, there are some GATS rules
which apply unconditionally to all service sectors,99 whether or not
they are offered by a country covered by other GATS terms. 99
92. GATS art. I

3.b.

93. See generally Markus Krajewski, CIEL, Public Services and the Scope of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (2001), available at http://www.gatswatch.org/

docs/markus.html.
94. GATS art. I 3.a.i.
95. GATS art. I 3.a.ii.
96. See Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation,Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT[DS27/RIUSA (May 22, 1997) ("[GATS] Article I (1) refers

to any measure in terms of their effect, which means that they could be of any type or
relate to any domain of regulation.").
97. GATS art. V 1.a ("[T]his condition is understood in terms of number of sectors,
volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements
should not provide for the a priori exclusion of supply.").
98. See ScoTr SINCLAIR & JIM GRIESHABER-OTTO, FACING THE FACTS: A GUIDE
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Defenders of the GATS also argue that WTO Members were
able to list exceptions to the MFN principle when initial
commitments were made under the GATS. ° However, the GATS
defenders who make this argument forget to mention that, under
the GATS provisions, WTO Members. are to phase out such
exemptions within ten years, and that "[i]n any event, they shall be
subject to negotiation in subsequent trade liberalizing rounds.'.'.
Another incorrect interpretation rendered by GATS supporters is
that the GATS explicitly excludes all public services."2 They point
to a provision in the GATS that allows for certain governmentprovided services to be excluded from GATS coverage, but this
provision is limited to government services that are neither
provided on a "commercial basis" nor "incompetition with one or
more service suppliers."' 3
In many countries, public services are provided by both
governmental and private operators."° Examples include primary
education, medical and hospital services, retirement pensions, and
transportation. Even in the case of services provided exclusively by
the government, only services delivered directly from governmentto-people are exempt from the GATS. Despite this situation, many
governments provide many public services through a mixed
delivery system that includes both public and private components.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) noted that "[t]his exception is, however, limited: where a
Government acts on a commercial basis and/or as competitor with
other suppliers, its activities are treated like those of any private
supplier."'" 5
TO THE GATS DEBATE 27 (2002), available at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/
documents/NationalOfficePubs/facingfacts.pdf.
99. See GATS art. II (stating that in relation to the most-favored-nation principle that
"with respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each member shall accord
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other member
treatment which is no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country").
100.

See SINCLAIR & GRIESHABER-OTTO, supra note 98, at 30.

101. GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions art. 6.
102. SINCLAIR & GRIESHABER-OTTO, supra note 98, at 19-20.
103. Id.; see also GATS art. I at J 3.b ("'[A] service supplied in the exercise of
governmental authority' means any service which is supplied neither on a commercial
basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.").
104. See SINCLAIR & GRIESHABER-OrTo, supra note 98, at 20.
105. URSULA KNAPP, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES: AN ANALYSIS 7 (1994), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,2340,en_2649_33783766-20854521_1_1,00.html.
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2. Measures Not Within the Scope of the GATS
Although the scope of the GATS is very wide, and deals with
all measures "affecting trade in services,' ' 6 certain policy measures
in some areas are not covered by the GATS disciplines, provided
that the measures are not used to circumvent GATS obligations,
including:
* Immigration rules, provided they do not
contravene Commitments on temporary entry
under mode 4;
* Services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority,' 7 defined as "any service which is
supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in
competition with one or more service suppliers;"'08
* Fiscal policy and taxation measures, provided the
taxes do not discriminate against foreign services
or service suppliers;
* Air transportation services, i.e., measures affecting
traffic rights or services directly related to the
exercise of traffic rights;
" Import restrictions on equipment necessary for the
supply of a service;
" Restrictions on short-term capital movements, or
measures that affect property rights, provided they
are nondiscriminatory;
* Exchange rate management;
* Privatization of state-owned property, though
there are disciplines for state-owned trading
entities and monopolies.' 0
Though detailed rules are yet to be negotiated, other types of
government measures have been put into the GATS work
program. These include safeguard measures,"0 rules for
disciplines on subsidies, and
government procurement,"
disciplines for domestic regulations."2
106. GATS art. I 1 1.
107.

E.H. Leroux, What is a 'Service Supplied in the Exercise of Governmental

Authority' Under Article I:3(b) and (c) of the GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services?, 40
J. WORLD TRADE 345 (2006).

108. GATS art. I 913.c.
109. ITCD Practicum, supra note 37.
110. "Safeguards are actions taken to protect a specific industry from an unexpected
rise of imports. It is governed by Article XIX of the GATT 1994." EC External Trade
Glossary, supra note 19.
111. Government procurement is the "[p]urchase of goods and services by
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D. What is Trade in Services?

Although the GATS does not define "services," it does define
"trade in services..... As we will see, the definition of "trade in
services" applies not only the cross-border supply of services,"' but
also to transactions involving the cross-border movement of
capital and labor.
The term "service" refers to a diverse group of transactions
that may differ in nature, and thus there are many sectors of
services."' Because of this diversity, no agreement is found in
economic theory on the general definition of a "service."116 By
contrasting the term with goods, Tycho H.E. Stahl sees services
from an empirical point of view as "the dominant component of
the GNP of developed countries such as the United States and are
a major component of international trade.""7 From a theoretical
economic viewpoint, services are "intangible processes that are
traded via interaction between producers and consumers in crossborder movements of capital assets or personnel. They are also
subject to extensive government regulation and are extremely
difficult to measure."

governments and state-owned enterprises." ALAN V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE:
GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 120 (2006).

112. See Henk Kox & Hildegunn Kyvik Nordds, Services Trade and Domestic
Regulation (OECD Trade Policy, Working Paper No. 49, 2007), at 2, 12, 27, available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/4e6fece4616
ae431c125728200408b67/$FILE/JT03221792.PDF (finding it is not regulation that hampers
international trade in services, but rather regulatory heterogeneity that has relatively large
impact on both market entry and subsequent trade flows).
113. GATS art. I 2.
114. Cross-border supply of services refers to a situation "where the trade takes place
from the territory of one WTO Member into that of another. Only the service itself
crosses the border, without the movement of persons, such as information and advice
passing by means of fax or electronic mail, or cargo transportation. The service supplier
does not establish any presence in the territory of the Member where the service is
consumed." EC External Trade Glossary, supra note 19.
115. Among the many services sectors, we have inter alia audiovisual, accounting,
banking, business, computer, distribution, education, health, hotel and restaurant,
professional, insurance, telecommunications, financial, and transport services. Dep't of
Commerce (India), GATS: Frequently Asked Questions 24, annex I, available at
http://commerce.nic.in/wto sub/services/faqs-gats.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
116. See Herbert Grubel, All Trade Services are Embodied in Materialsor People, in 10
WORLD ECON. 319 (1987) (discussing the different views on the definition of a service).
117. Tycho H.E. Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade in Services: The Case for
Sidestepping the GA TT, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405,408 (1994).
118. Id.
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It is indeed difficult to measure services trade, for a variety of
different reasons. First, the act of introducing services in a foreign
market is not always done in discrete and quantifiable units at
convenient customs ports.1'9 Second, balance-of-payment statistics
have traditionally not provided disaggregated data on
international transactions in services. 2 ' An example would be
internationally traded services that are incorporated into trade for
goods but are not always reported separately.2
These difficulties in measuring services trade obstruct the
quantification or comparison of the value of concessions
exchanged in services trade negotiations. 2 Ultimately, this
obstruction impedes services trade liberalization.'" When the value
of reciprocal concessions cannot be quantified or compared,
negotiations may degenerate into irrational political exercises
which are not conducive to reciprocal reductions of comparable
trade barriers. 124
The following quotation illustrates these difficulties: "[W]ould
contracting parties which refuse to extend national treatment to
foreign banks risk retaliation in the form of the withdrawal of tariff
concessions on bananas or orange juice? Such an approach opens a

119. See, e.g., Rachel McCulloch, Services and the Uruguay Round, in 13 WORLD
ECON. 329, 334-35 (1990); Lisa Sue Klaiman, Comment, Applying GATT Dispute
Settlement Procedures to a Trade in Services Agreement: Proceed with Caution, 11 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 657, 672 (1990); Steven F. Benz, Trade Liberalization and the Global

Service Economy, 19 J. INT'L BUS. 95, 98 (1985).
120. See, e.g., Klaiman, supra note 119, at 671-72; Deepak Nayyar, Some Reflections on
the Uruguay Round and Trade in Services, 22 J. WORLD TRADE L. 35,37 (1988); Marianna

Maffucci, Comment, Liberalizationof International Trade in the Service Sector: Threshold
Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the GA TT, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371,378-

79 (1981).
121. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Significance of the Nice Treaty and Constitutional Treaty
in Relation to Services Trade and in the Doha Round Framework, 1 INT'L RELATIONS &

POLITICS ONLINE Q. 62, 64 (2005) (citing Nayyar, supra note 120, at 37; Robert N.H.
Christmas, Note, The GA TT and Services: Quill and Ink in an Age of Word Processors?,

10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 288, 295-96 (1986)).
122. Leal-Arcas, supra note 121, at 64 (citing Aaditya Mattoo, Services in a
Development Round, in OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TRADE, THE MARKET ACCESS
CHALLENGE IN THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 36, 49 (2003), available at

http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/b87c5404a6
eeefafc1256d590054d033/$FILE/JT00147081.pdf).

123. Id. Such concerns made France, Italy, and other EU Member States initially
oppose services trade liberalization. See Maffucci, supra note 120, at 388.
124. Stahl, supra note 117, at 412-13.
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virtual Pandora's Box of coercion and retaliation.
, According
to one scholar:
How is it possible to exchange landing rights in the aviation
sector with the right to open branches in the banking sector? Or
how it possible to exchange a relaxation of restrictions on transborder data flows with a relaxation of restrictions limiting the
right of doctors to medical practice in foreign countries?
Indeed, it is well nigh impossible to conceive a scale which
would bring about a progressive
reduction of barriers in the
6
context of many service sectors.1
Regarding the more specific question of trade in services, it is
important to note that the peculiar characteristics of trade in
services require that any international instrument for their
regulation depart from the concepts and rules incorporated in the
GATT. 7 In the late 1980s, academics undertook extensive
examination and analysis to determine the best method of dealing
with international trade in services prior to the final adoption of
the GATS. 28 In this sense, the Group of Negotiations on Services
(GNS),'29 at what used to be the GATT (now the WTO),
considered a series of proposals for a possible agreement on
principles for trade in services.' The literature focused almost
exclusively on three main points: (1) whether the GATT/WTO
could be legally augmented for the incorporation of services; (2)
the benefits from liberalization; (3) the costs for developing
countries, as well as whether• 131
they should participate in a
multilateral agreement on services.
125. Leal-Arcas, supra note 121, at 64 (quoting Murray Gibbs, Continuing the
InternationalDebate on Services, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 199, 215 (1985)).
126. Nayyar, supra note 120, at 40.
127. See Phedon Nicolaides, Economic Aspects of Services: Implicationsfor a GA TT
Agreement, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 125, 127-28 (1989).
128. Leal-Arcas, supra note 121, at 64.
129. As early as April 1987, after the Uruguay Round was launched, the Group of
Negotiations on Services met to organize the Uruguay Round's work and to undertake
negotiations. Problems arose including lack of data on services, difficulties in negotiating
trade in services, and countries making commitments without knowing how they would be
affected. These problems consequently gave birth to the Group of Negotiations Services.
See Chakravarthi Raghavan, Third World Still Terra Incognito on Services Data, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK, Feb. 19, 2000, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/terra.htm.

130. See Nicolaides, supra note 127, at 128.
131. See, e.g., BRIAN HINDLEY, INTRODUCING SERVICES INTO GATT (1986); Jagdish
Bhagwati, Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 207,207-17 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987);
Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1 WORLD
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There are four general differences between trade in goods
32
and trade in services: (1) services are intangible and non-storable;'
(2) there are different modes for trade in services (contrary to the
exclusively cross-border mode for trade in goods, services can be
provided at the location of the service supplier, at the location of
the service consumer, or at neither of these two locations);131 (3)
international trade in services usually requires movement of one or
more factors of production, such as the establishment by the
service supplier of a commercial presence' at the location of the
service consumer (movement of capital) or the transfer by the
service supplier of personnel to the location of the service
consumer (movement of labor); 5 and (4) the level of national
regulation of services trade is more extensive than that of trade in
goods.'36 Contrary to the exclusively cross-border mode for trade in
goods, services can be provided at the location of the service
supplier, at the location of the service consumer, or at neither of
these two locations. '" Most barriers to international trade in
services are not designed to restrict trade in services but merely to
regulate the service sectors in the national economy.138
Nevertheless, these barriers are perceived as having the effect of
discouraging entry into the local market by foreign services
suppliers.
The definition of services trade under the GATS is fourpronged and dependent upon the territorial presence of the
BANK ECON. REV. 4 (1987).
132. See generally Nicolaides, supra note 127, at 126 (discussing the differences

between goods and services).
133. See generally Gary Sampson & Richard Snape, Identifying the Issues in Trade in
Services, 8 WORLD ECON. 172, 172-75 (1985) (discussing the classification of international

transactions in services based on the proximity of supplier and consumer).
134. Commercial presence refers to "the possibility of a service provider to be
physically present (a branch or subsidiary, for instance) within the territory of a member
of the GATS for the purpose of supplying a service." EC External Trade Glossary, supra
note 19.

135. Leal-Arcas, supra note 121, at 64-65. It has always been recognized that trade in
services would usually require movement of capital or labor. This accounted for the
GATT's reluctance to expand into the services area, since it would involve investment

issues, which is an area traditionally beyond the scope of the GATT.
136. Id. at 65.
137. See Sampson & Snape, supra note 133.
138. UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. [UNCTAD] & WORLD BANK,
LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES: A HANDBOOK 20-24

(1994).
139. See Josh Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA, and the
EC: A RegulatoryJurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 46 (1995).
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supplier and the consumer at the time of the transaction."'
Pursuant to GATS Article I (2),'" the GATS covers the following:
* Mode 1 - Cross-border trade: services supplied from
the territory of one member into the territory of any
other member. 142 For example, a user in country A
receives
services
from
abroad
through
its
telecommunications or postal infrastructure. Such
supplies may include consultancy or market research
reports, tele-medical advice, distance training, or

architectural drawings.'
* Mode 2 - Consumption abroad: services supplied
within the territory of one member to the service
consumer of any other member.'" For example,
nationals of A have moved abroad as tourists,
students, or patients to consume the respective
services.
* Mode 3 - Commercial presence: services supplied by
a service supplier of one member, through actual
commercial presence in the territory of any other
member.' For example, the service is provided within
A by a locally-established affiliate, subsidiary, or
140. See Karen Lapid, Outsourcing and Offshoring Under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 341, 356 (2006)
141. Id. at 328. GATS Article 1 (2) reads:
For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of
a service:
(a)from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member;
(b)in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member;
(c)by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in
the territory of any other Member;
(d)by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.
142. See Andrea Appella, Comment, ConstitutionalAspects of Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ
Concerning the WTO Agreement, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 440, 447 (1996) (giving the
following example: "A firm of architects established in country A supplies an electrical
installation project to a firm of engineers established in country B.")
143. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, CROSS BORDER HEALTH
SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, EIGHTH REPORT, 2006-7, H.L. 48, 2, availableat
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldeucom.htm.

144. See Appella, supra note 142, at 147 (giving the following example: "Services
supplied in country A to tourists from country B.").
145. See id. (giving the following example: "A supply and establishment of services in
country A by undertakings or professionals from country B. Banking service is an example
of this.")
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representative office of a foreign-owned and controlled company (bank, hotel group, construction
company, etc.).
0 Mode 4 - Presence of natural persons: services
supplied by a service supplier of one member, through
the presence of natural persons of a member in the
territory of any other member. " For example, a
foreign national provides a service within A as an
independent supplier (e.g., consultant, health worker)
or employee of a service supplier (e.g. consultancy
firm, hospital, construction company).'4 7
This last mode can be misinterpreted as an open door for
migration.14 1 It is in Mode 4 where there is the greatest discrepancy
among EU member states in services trade; while some EU
countries 4 are
in favor of liberalizing Mode 4, others are more
9
reluctant.'
A large group of developing nations remains disappointed
with developed countries' offers, particularly in Mode 4. Many of
these nations are reluctant to open their service markets to them
because of the poor quality of offers made in Mode 4. Some
developing countries consider the lack of progress on negotiating
over agriculture, industrial goods, and rules as the reason for their
inability and lack of drive to make more liberal offers in services.
On the other hand, wealthy nations maintain that developing
countries bear the responsibility for the low quality of offers. In
the view of developed countries, "the issue of linkage with other
146. See id. at 447 (giving the following example: "An undertaking from country A
supplies services in country B by means of workers coming from country A, such as in
construction work."); see also WTO, GATS Training Module: Definition of Services
Trade
and
Modes
of
Supply,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/
cbtcoursee/cls3ple.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Definition of Services
Trade and Modes of Supply].
147. Definition of Services Trade and Modes of Supply, supra note 146.
148. See Press Release, EC, Summary of the EU's Revised Services Offer in the Doha
Negotiations (June 2, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/05/190&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
149. For relevant literature on Mode 4, see, for example, Rupa Chanda, Movement of
Natural Persons and the GATS, 24 WORLD ECON. 631, 631-54 (2001); Rupa Chanda,
Movement of Natural Persons and Trade in Services: Liberalising the Temporary
Movement of Labour Under the GATS (Indian Council for Research on Int'l Econ.
Relations, Working Paper No. 51, 1999); WTO Secretariat, Presence of Natural Persons
(Mode 4), S/C/W/75 (Dec. 8, 1998); Neela Mukherjee, Exporting Labour Services and
Market Access Commitments Under GA TS in the World Trade Organization,30 J. WORLD
TRADE 21, 21-42 (1996).
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negotiating areas is a two-way street-i.e., substantial offers in
services could facilitate negotiations in other areas" of the trade
agenda.' °
Although the movement of natural persons under the GATS
represents a very small subset of overall migration, some WTO
members argue that the issues being discussed in the context of
overall migration might inform the Mode 4 work of the Council for
Trade in Services at the WTO.' Moreover, the Swiss delegation to
the WTO has proposed a method which seeks to help improve
transparency and comparability of assessing the quality of offers in
numeric terms.'52
The WTO's definition of services trade under the GATS is
significantly broader than the balance of payments (BOP) concept
of services trade:
While the BOP focuses on residency rather than nationality i.e., a service is being exported if it is traded between residents
and non-residents - certain transactions falling under the
GATS, in particular in the case of [Mode 3], typically involve
only residents of the country concerned. Commercial linkages
may exist among all four modes of supply. For example, a
foreign company established under mode 3 in country A may
employ nationals from country B (mode 4) to export services
cross-border into countries B, C, etc.
Similarly, business visits into A (mode 4) may prove necessary
to complement cross-border supplies into that country (mode 1)
or to upgrade the capacity of a locally established office (mode
3)153

With such a definition, the GATS has failed to provide a legal
definition of what "services"" ' should mean for purposes of the
Agreement. Although GATS does not define services, but it does
define trade in services, GATS "applies to measures by members
affecting trade in services." ' Instead, the Appellate Body has so

150. Bernabe & Cheng, supra note 42, at 3.
151. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Report by the Chairman to
the Trade Negotiations Committee, 12, TN/S/22 (Oct. 13, 2005).
152. See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Methodology to Assess
Schedules of Commitments Under the GA TS, 1, TN/S/W/51 (Sept. 23, 2005).
153. Definition of Services Trade and Modes of Supply, supra note 146.
154. GATS art. I j 3.b.
155. GATS art. I 1 1.
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far taken a pragmatic approach in adjudicating
under the GATS
1 6
by merely indicating which sector was affected. 1
The Appellate Body's failure to address these definitional
matters certainly raises issues concerning scope of applicability of
the GATS. Although the scope of the GATS is not limited to any
list of covered sectors, to date there has been no agreement on an
exhaustive list of services. The genesis of this problem can be
found in the negotiations on electronic commerce at the WTO."'
However, the lack of a comprehensive agreement has
surmountable legal implications; namely, although WTO members
may impose restrictions when scheduling their specific
commitments, the general GATS obligations apply to all
services."'
During the Uruguay Round, a "Services Sectoral
Classification List" was developed. 161 It is based on the UN Central
Product Classification System (CPC) and classifies services by
sector.1 6' The use of the Services Sectoral Classification List is not

156. See Appellate Body Report, Canada- Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry,
157, WT/DS142/AB/R (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter Canada - Automotive
Industry]; Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distributionof Bananas,J $ 223-28, VT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter
EC - Bananas].
157.

LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? A

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 116-17 (The New Press 2004) (1991).
158. See MARC BACCHETIA ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO: SPECIAL STUDIES 2 (1998).

159. See GATS.
160. See GATT Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120
(July 10, 1991) (giving such examples as reinsurance and retrocession (CPC 81299) and
voice mail (CPC 7523)).
161. The UN Central Product Classification System is intended to facilitate future
statistical comparisons of services domestically produced with those internationally
negotiated and traded. The UN Provisional CPC code ("CPCprov") is a concordance of
goods and service-sector definitions that are used by many countries to identify service
sectors in the GATS negotiations. Most WTO governments place the CPCprov code next
to the service sector they are offering in these negotiations. It is only by going to the
CPCprov data base on the UN web site and looking at the categories, subcategories and
sub-subcategories that a person can begin to get a more complete picture of what services
are being offered, and what is at stake. For instance, under the benign category of
"wholesale distribution," which the United States committed in 1995, a close examination
of the CPCprov shows that the commitment includes wholesale distribution of nuclear
fuel. Thus, U.S. restrictions on the trade and sale of this product could constitute a GATS
violation. The CPCprov can be found at UN Statistics Div., Classifications Registry:
Detailed Structure and Explanatory Notes, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/
regcst.asp?CI=9&Lg=l (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
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mandatory. Yet many WTO members have adopted it as a basis
for scheduling their commitments under the GATS.62
As Dilip K. Das argues, trade in services tends to be more
heavily protected than trade in manufactured products.
Developing economies have more restrictive barriers vis-A-vis
trade in services than industrial economies." Developing
economies protect their services in various ways, since they are a
rather heterogeneous group. On the other hand, industrial
economies seem to have more liberal markets in services trade,
and governments have higher levels of market-access
commitments.'66
E. ProgressiveLiberalizationof Services Trade'7
The Uruguay Round was only the beginning of liberalization
of services trade. GATS Articles XIX through XXI deal with
progressive liberalization: Article XIX on the negotiation of
specific commitments; Article XX on the schedules of specific
commitments; and Article XXI on the modification of schedules.
However, the GATS requires more negotiations. These
negotiations began in early 2000 with the aim to achieve a higher
level of liberalization of trade in services." Liberalization will be
aimed at enhancing the level of commitments in the schedules and
reducing the adverse effect of measures taken by member
governments. 9 In this sense, services negotiations started officially
162. See GATS arts. XVI, XVII, and XVIII.
163. DILIP K. DAS, THE DOHA ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
ARDUOUS ISSUES AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES 119 (2005).

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Philippa Dee & Kevin Hanslow, Multilateral Liberalization of

Services Trade, in SERVICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 117, 117-39 (Robert M.

Stern ed., 2001).
168. After the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, the WTO launched new
negotiations to expand global rules on cross border trade in services in a manner that
would create vast new rights and access for multinational service providers, and would
newly constrain government action taken in the public interest world wide. Negotiations
are currently underway at the WTO in Geneva, aimed at expanding the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The original text of the GATS was agreed in
1994, and the current GATS 2000 negotiations are part of the 'built-in agenda' which the
WTO inherited on its formation in 1995. GATSwatch.org, GATS 2000: Where Are We
Now?, http://www.gatswatch.org/GATSandDemocracy/wherenow.html (last visited Feb.
23,2007).
169.

See EC, TRADE IN SERVICES: CONDITIONAL OFFER FROM THE EC AND ITS
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in early 2000 under the WTO Council for Trade in Services. 7 '
In March 2001, the WTO Services Council fulfilled a key
element in the negotiating mandate by establishing the negotiating
guidelines and procedures.171 Thus, the negotiations on services
were already almost two years old when they were incorporated
into the DDA in 2001. These negotiations guidelines aimed to
increase the participation of developing countries in trade in
services. GATS Article XIX:2 provided for the appropriate
flexibility for individual developing country members to
participate. Special priority was granted to least-developed
country members as stipulated in GATS ArticleIV:3. The
guidelines made clear that due consideration should be given to
the needs of small and medium-sized service suppliers, particularly
those of developing countries. Moreover, the negotiations were to
take place within the existing structure and principles of the
GATS, retaining the right to specify sectors in which commitments
to the four modes of supply were to be undertaken.
As for the scope of the negotiations on trade in services, it is
important to note that MFN exemptions are subject to negotiation
according to paragraph 6 of the Annex on GATS Article II. In
such negotiations, appropriate flexibility is accorded to individual
developing country members of the WTO. In relation to the
modalities and procedures achieved by the WTO Services Council
guidelines, it was agreed that future negotiations would be
conducted in special sessions of the WTO Council for Trade in
Services and regular meetings of its relevant subsidiary committees
or working parties."2 These groups would report on a regular basis
to the General Council, in accordance with decisions taken by the
General Council. Needless to say, the negotiations would have to

STATES
(Apr. 29, 2003),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/
march/tradoc_116491.pdf;
EC,
Aspects
Relating
to
Trade
in
Services,
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl1012.htm (last visited July 21, 2004). Not
surprisingly, tourism is the sector with the highest number of bindings; health and
education, however, have the lowest number of commitments. Rudolf Adlung, The GA TS
Turns Ten: A PreliminaryStocktaking 8 (Econ. Research & Statistics Div. [ERSD], WTO,
Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-05, 2004), available at www.wto.org/English/
res e/reser e/ ersd2004O5-e.doc.
170. WTO, The Doha Declaration Explained, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dda-e/dohaexplainede.htm#services (last visited July 26, 2004) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration Explained].
171. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and Procedures
for the Negotiationson Trade in Services, S/L/93 (Mar. 29, 2001).
172. Doha Declaration Explained, supra note 170.
MEMBER

2007]

Resumption of Doha

369

be transparent and open to all members, acceding State territories,
and separate customs territories according to decisions taken in
this regard by the WTO General Council.
The modus operandi of services trade liberalization is through
bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral negotiations, and the main
method of negotiation is the request/offer approach. The Council
for Trade in Services in Special Sessions must continue to carry out
an assessment of trade in services in overall terms and on a
sectoral basis with reference to the objectives of the GATS and of
its Article IV in particular. This should be an ongoing activity of
the Council and negotiations should be adjusted in the light of the
results of the Council's assessment. In accordance with GATS
Article XXV, technical assistance is provided to developing
country members, on request, in order to carry out
national/regional assessments."' The negotiations take place in
"special sessions" of the WTO Services Council and regular
meetings of its relevant subsidiary committees or working
parties."' The EC should aim at and press for the greatest possible
liberalization of services trade. It should also insist on further
market opening to the exports of WTO members. 75'
In 1999, the attempt by the EC (and others) to launch a new
round of WTO trade negotiations at Seattle was spectacularly
unsuccessful.'76 The accompanying street protests raised the
173. See Raymond Saner & Laura Piez, Technical Assistance to Least-Developed
Countries in the Context of the Doha Development Round: High Risk of Failure, 40 J.
WORLD TRADE 467, 467-68 (2006). See also ELISABETH TUERK & MARKUS KRAJEWSKI,
ASSESSMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT GATS
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WTO (2001), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/

AssesmentGATSWTO.pdf (arguing for the importance of assessment of trade in
services for developing countries).
174. Doha Declaration Explained, supra note 170.
175. For an evolution of the services negotiations in the WTO, see WTO, The New
Negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/s-negs~e.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2006).
176. The criticisms of the WTO were quite diverse in nature, spanning from opposition
to its existence to suggesting a serious internal reform. Among the many charges against
the WTO are the following: (1) the WTO system of internal governance tends to
concentrate power among a small group of developed countries, to the detriment of lessdeveloped country interests; (2) the WTO is undemocratic in its control over national
trade policies; (3) the WTO system tramples upon its members' sovereignty; (4) the WTO
system favors open markets (capitalism, profits, the interests of multinational
corporations) over environmental protection, labor standards, and human rights; and (5)
the WTO system prevents governments from protecting the interests of working people
displaced by import competition. Publications critical of the WTO include GLOBALIZE
THIS! THE BATTLE AGAINST THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND CORPORATE
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question of whether new negotiations to liberalize trade were
appropriate at all. While the opposition to negotiations seemed to
be inspired by many unconnected issues, certain themes were
perceptible: whether trade liberalization itself was an appropriate
goal or whether it should be accompanied by or subordinated to
other concerns, such as those related to the environment,'77
workings conditions, human rights,'78 and the right of communities
to choose and apply their own policies and standards. 9
Before the launch of the GATS 2000 talks,'80 a coalition of
developing countries called for an assessment'"' of the outcomes of
service-sector liberalization and the GATS rules prior to
undertaking further expansion of those rules during the GATS
2000." A global campaign of civil society groups called for a
RULE (K. Danaher & R. Burback eds., 2000); S.SHRYBMAN, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE (2d ed. 2001); PUB. CITIZEN, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE
TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1999), available at https://www.citizen.org/

documents/wto-book.pdf.
177. Trade liberalization and environmental policies can and should be mutually
supportive of sustainable development. See Div. for Sustainable Development, UN Dep't
of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, International Cooperation to Accelerate Sustainable
Development
in Developing
Countries
and
Related
Domestic Policies,
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2l/english/agenda2lchapter2.htm
(last
visited January 21, 2007).
178. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International
Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J.INT'L ECON. L. 133 (2002).
179. For an overview of the GATS in prospective, see Aaditya Mattoo, Shaping Future
GA TS Rules for Trade in Services (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2596,
2001).
180. The concept "GATS 2000 talks" refers to the part of the WTO post-Uruguay
Round that concentrates on services trade, specifically the "built-in" services left from the
agenda of the Uruguay Round. LORI WALLACH, BACKGROUNDER ON WTO SERVICE
SECTOR LIBERALIZATION AND DEREGULATION (2005), http://www.citizen.org

/documents/PC' GatsBackgrounder 05-05.pdf
[hereinafter
WALLACH,
BACKGROUNDER]. The starting date for the talks was set for January 1, 2000, in Geneva.
Id. These GATS 2000 negotiations have been confronting two central challenges: (1) the
completion of the incipient framework of the GATS rules and disciplines so as to ensure
the GATS's and WTO's continued relevance in a globalizing environment; and (2) the
achievement of greater overall trade and investment liberalization than was possible
during the Uruguay Round and in subsequent sectoral negotiations, such as basic
telecommunications, financial services, maritime transport, and labor mobility issues (the
so-called temporary movement of service suppliers). Pierre Sauvd & Robert M. Stern,
New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization: An Overview, in GATS 2000: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 2 (Pierre Sauv6 & Robert M. Stern
eds., 2000).
181.

See TUERK & KRAJEWSKI, supra note 173.

182. Special Session on the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from
Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia,Mexico, Nicaragua,Pakistan, Panama,Paraguay,The Philippines,Sri
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moratorium on the GATS 2000 talks until this assessment was to
be conducted.' 3 However, these requests were quashed. ' The
WTO Secretariat, the United States, and the EC pushed for the
immediate launch of the built-in GATS expansion talks.' 5 Indeed,
the December 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration not only
dismissed the demands for a services assessment, but also set a
specific time line for the GATS 2000 talks to conclude by 2005,".
which did not happen.''
Service-sector liberalization was possible after the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round, in part because the political context was
favorable toward the Reagan-Thatcher dream of radical
deregulation, which was fast becoming a reality in many nations."
In the United States, for example, the promotion of market-driven
industry self-regulation instead of government oversight brought
economic disasters such as the collapse of the savings and loan
industry in the 1980s, which cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of
dollars,189 as well as the energy deregulation of the 1990s, which
sent energy costs for California consumers soaring.'90 Despite these
experiences, the United States continues to push its model on

other countries.' 9' Europeans, however, are even more vociferous
in their service-sector demands, as was the case of the EC in the
GATS 2000 talks.'92 Other examples include Russia's privatization,

Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay and the Members of the Andean Community (Bolivia,
Elements for Negotiating Guidelines and
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela):
Procedures,$$ 11-12, S/CSSIW/13 (Nov. 24,2000).
183. For the demand letter and a list of available signatories, see Pub. Citizen, Stop the
GATS Attack!, www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/Sign-on/articles.cfm?ID=1584 (last visited
March 1, 2006) [hereinafter Pub. Citizen, Stop the GATS Attack!].
184. Prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, GATS negotiations
proceeded on a bilateral "request/offer" basis. WALLACH, BACKGROUNDER, supra note
180. This means that one nation issued a request document for service sector liberalization
to another and indicated what it was willing to offer in a second document; then the two
nations bargained on a bilateral basis. Id.
185. Id.
of 14
November 2001,
% 15,
Ministerial Declaration
186. See WTO,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
187. Julius Melnitzer, U.S. Pushes for Open Legal Markets at GATS Talks, INSIDE
COUNSEL, May 2005, availableat http://www.insidecounsel.com/section/regulatory/145.
188. WALLACH, BACKGROUNDER, supra note 180.
189. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE [GAO], COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1991).
190. See Nancy Vogel, Electric Utilities Seek up to 30% Rate Hike, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2000, at Al.
191. WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 157, at 132.
192. WALLACH, BACKGROUNDER, supra note 180.
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referred to as the "Looting of Russia,, 91 3 and the fight in South

Africa against electricity privatization.9 '
These unfortunate experiences have not prevented member
nations to push even further for services trade liberalization. In
April 2002, the EC's GATS requests numbered hundreds of pages
and included country-by-country demands for new access to
education,
health,
water,
energy, transportation,
and
entertainment services.'95 The EC's requests to the United States
alone contained a state-by-state list of zoning, land ownership,
liquor distribution, and other regulatory laws that the EC sought
to eliminate. "6 Such demands for market access are concrete
examples of the issues at stake in the current GATS negotiations.
In the framework of the GATS 2000 talks, Modes 3 and 4 remain
the most controversial.'97 The shift from a focus on trade across
borders (mode 1) to establishment of a business within another
country (mode 3) brings every domestic policy issue and priority
under scrutiny of the GATS.'98
In the specific case of Mode 4, the controversy arises because
Mode 4 can be associated with immigration policy, even if the
relationship between the two concepts does not appear anywhere
in the GATS. 9 In this respect, an agreement among WTO
members on the scope of Mode 4 would be a major success. One
benefit that Mode 4 brings to the world trading system is the
alleviation of the lack of qualified workers in WTO countries.
However, whether exporting countries of Mode 4 will have enough
human capital to actually benefit from this input is an issue of
concern.21' As it stands, some WTO members might not even be

able to benefit from Mode 4 because of a lack of highly-qualified

193. Theft of the Century: Privatization and the Looting of Russia, 23 MULTINAT'L
MONITOR (2002), available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/02jan-feb/anfeb02interviewklebniko.html.
194. Patrick Bond, Power to the People in South Africa: Operation Khanyisa! and the
Fight Against Electricity Privatization, 23 MULTINAT'L MONITOR (2002), available at

http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/02jan-feb/an-febO2corp4.html.
195. WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 157.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Basav Sen, Legalizing Human Trafficking, DOLLARS & SENSE, May/June 2006,
availableat http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/0506sen.html.
200. Interview with Jose Plaza, Spanish Trade Diplomat, in Madrid, Spain (Mar. 15,
2006).
201. Id.
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professionals. Since there is no specific categorization in Mode 4,
the only informal requirements are (1) the service is temporary
and (2) the service provider does not seek permanent entry in the
labor market of the WTO Member where the service takes place. 2
However, the question remains: which type of service providers
will not seek entry in the labor market? Once again, Mode 4
creates a division between developed and developing countries of
the WTO; developed countries do not want Mode 4 to become a
substitute for immigration, arguing that there is already
immigration in developed countries, whereas developing countries
want full implementation of Mode 4.203
While the EU has important offensive interests in the area
covered by Mode 4, developing countries have placed a particular
emphasis on Mode 4. Many developing countries are not pleased
with developed countries' offers to them in this mode, particularly
the lack of quality offers has made delegations reluctant to commit
to opening their services markets in other areas. Furthermore,
some developing countries complain over a lack of progress on
important issues to them in areas such as agriculture, industrial
goods, and rules. The failure to address these areas has made
developing countries more inclined to table more liberal offers in
services. 4 In rebuttal, developed countries argue that the
responsibility for poor quality of offers is on developing countries.
In the view of developed countries, the issue of linkage with other
negotiating areas is a "two-way street," in other words, major
offers in services could encourage negotiations in other areas of
interest to developing countries."
The term "liberalization" is often used incorrectly in
academic and political debates. 6 From a broader viewpoint,
liberalization is often associated with a critical view of
governmental intervention as well as greater reliance in market

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Johannes Bernabe & Shuaihua Cheng, The Doha Round Negotiationson Services:

An Overview 3 (Unpublished
template/page.cfm?pageid=106.
205.

seminar

paper),

http://www.gmfus.org/economics/

Id.

206. See

MARKUS
KRAJEWSKI,
NATIONAL
REGULATION
AND
TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN SERVICES: THE LEGAL IMPACT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON

TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS) ON NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTONOMY

1 (2003)

[hereinafter KRAJEWSKI, NATIONAL REGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN
SERVICES].
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processes. 2" From a narrower viewpoint, liberalization is
understood as the removal of legal and other barriers to
competition." Liberalization can also be referred to in the context
of privatizing former public monopolies.' Since liberalization can
be understood as the process of having more market access
(whether domestic or international), this requires the removal of
obstacles to market entry and competition.2 1" For liberalization to
take place, it may require the reduction of regulations or the
abolition/replacement of the regulatory regime."' Seeking further
trade liberalization can also play a valuable part in helping to
achieve other global objectives.
International
liberalization
often matches
domestic
liberalization."' The GATS is to services trade liberalization what
the WTO is to trade liberalization. In the definition of trade in
services in the GATS, the distinction between domestic and
international supply of services often depends only on the
nationality of the service supplier or consumer.21 For example,
measures that affect the domestic supply of a service (e.g., the
opening hours of a store) may also affect the international supply
of this service, if the storeowner is a foreign service provider. 14 In
such cases, when the liberalization of trade in services demands the
abolition of certain regulatory measures, it also contributes to
domestic liberalization.
The liberalization of barriers to international trade in services
can contribute to growth in two distinct ways. First, multilateral
negotiations on trade in services can stimulate the removal of
barriers to domestic competition within individual countries,
eliminating internal constraints to the achievement of greater
economic efficiency in providing services. Second, multilateral
M

207.

Id.

208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. at 7-9.
210. Id. at 5.
211. Id.
212. See Linda Schmid, Barbados: Telecommunications Liberalization,in WTO CASE
STUDIES, supra note 27, Case Study 4, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/

booksp-e/casestudies e/case4_e.htm.
213.

See KRAJEWSKI, NATIONAL REGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN

SERVICES, supra note 206, at 6.
214. Id.
215. Geza Feketekuty, Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberalization in Services, in
GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION, supra note 180, at
225,239.
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negotiations on the services trade can eradicate barriers to
external competition for services, which could result in gains in
domestic productivity (as domestic producers respond to the
international competition), expanded markets for competitively
produced services, and lower prices for consumers.2 "' In the specific
case of developing countries, the significance of liberalizing the
services trade arises from several factors: what an efficient service
sector can provide to economic development, the consequences of
curbing international service transactions, the growing role of"
services in the economic output and international trade of most
wealthy nations, the growing dynamism of services markets, and
the small amount of opening in the services market during the
Uruguay Round.21
Nevertheless, arguments against services trade liberalization
remain. Some sectors still need regulation in order to protect the
environment, 18 to improve public health, and to maintain a level of
economic welfare. 19 Moreover, many nations worry that
liberalizing services trade may weaken the sovereignty of local and
national governments by jeopardizing, inter alia, control over land
use, licensing, and environmental health. ° In addition, some
216. Id.
217. Bernabe & Cheng. supra note 42, at 1.
218. For more on the specific issue of the clean development mechanism within the
environment, see Glenn Wiser, Frontiers in Trade: The Clean Development Mechanism
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2 INT'L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 288309 (2002).
219. Indeed, civil society forces against the WTO are quite clear in their thesis.
Although they accept that, at the time when the WTO was established in 1995, its stated
purpose was to bring about greater prosperity, increase employment, reduce poverty,
diminish inequality, and promote sustainable development around the world through
greater free trade, more than ten years later the civil society forces feel that the WTO has
had exactly the opposite results: (1) livelihoods are being destroyed, human rights
ignored, public health endangered, the environment plundered, and democratic systems
eroded; (2) local economies are being undermined, with workers, peasants, small farmers,
fishers, consumers, women, and indigenous peoples being especially disadvantaged and
exploited; and (3) people's aspirations to guarantee access to the essentials of life,
promote health, safety and food sovereignty, as well as to protect cultural and biological
diversity are being undermined, and sometimes eliminated. Our World is Not for Sale,
is
Possible!,
Another
World
Globalization:
Corporate
Stop
http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/about.asp?about=signon&lang=english (last visited
Mar. 7, 2007). In this context, some members of civil society argue that not only must the
efforts of the WTO to further liberalize global trade be resisted, but its jurisdiction must
be rolled back from many areas where it has been forcibly imposed, such as services,
agriculture, and intellectual property rights. Id.
Summary,
220. See Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Services
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/services.html (last visited July 21, 2004).
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countries may argue that those international services which are not
provided with the same standard or quality as domestic services
should be excluded. Furthermore, liberalization and privatization
of essential public services 211 would dramatically affect everyone's
day-to-day life. This attempt to convert public resources into new
profit opportunities for multinational corporations will make many
more people aware of the threat that these agreements pose to
democratically equitable governance.222
Developing economies have been skeptical about the
multilateral liberalization of the services trade since as early as the
early 1980s. Led by Brazil and India, a coalition of developing
economies opposed the inclusion of services trade as an agenda
item in the GATT Ministerial Meeting of 1982 held in Geneva.
The main source of its skepticism was the perception that the
services sector in developing economies is rather inefficient and
cannot compete against the highly resourceful services suppliers
from the industrial economies. Its hesitation was based on
concerns that future negotiations in services would be likely to
favor one side and would produce no benefit for developing
economies. Worried that the strong bargaining position of
industrial economies would result in firms from industrial
countries gaining easy access to markets in developing economies,
these economies were concerned that the reverse would not
happen. 3 Indeed, empirical evidence reveals that many developing
economies not only believed that they overcommitted after the
completion of the Uruguay Round, but they also felt that they had
joined an uneven and detrimental agreement. Developing
economies feared that trade in services negotiations would
translate into more disproportionate adjustments to their domestic
economies.
221. Essential public services tend to be those considered so indispensable to modern
life that for moral reasons their universal provision should be guaranteed, and they may be
associated with fundamental human rights (such as the right to water). See WALLACH,
BACKGROUNDER, supra note 180. An example of a service which is not generally
considered an essential public service is hairdressing. In modern, developed countries the
term public services often includes: education, public transportation, broadcasting and

communications, electricity and gas, fire service, healthcare, police service, waste
management, and water services. Id.
222. See Pub. Citizen, Stop the GATS Attack!, supra note 183.
223. See generally Carsten Fink, Aaditya Mattoo, & Randeep Rathindran, Liberalizing
Basic Telecommunications:
The Asian Experience (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2718, 2001).
224. An example of hostility to services liberalization can be found in the
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Accordingly, developing nations implement protective
policies either because they may have a stake in the operations of
their domestic firms or because they fear vulnerability from
pressures by domestic interest groups that benefit from national
121
When governments do not have the ability to
protection.
threaten to liberalize, domestic firms may have an incentive to precommit to high costs or poor quality. Such behavior forces
governments to prolong socially-costly protection. 26 Developing
countries argue that further trade liberalization is undesirable
because (1) domestic political obstacles, often from producer
interests, can make liberalization very difficult;227 and (2) instead of
allowing new industries to be exposed to full global competition,
developing countries should aim at protecting their new industries
(the so-called "infant industries" argument). 28 However, too much
infant industry protection can be a long-term problem in the face
of world competition. 9
Therefore, this Article suggests that governments should
continue to push toward further global (services) trade
liberalization, as is the case in the Doha Round, where
governments also looked at non-tariff barriers 3. to goods and
services, in addition to tariffs on goods. This removal of trade
barriers will encourage greater worldwide economic growth. 3'

entertainment industry. Most countries resent foreign ownership in their audiovisual
industry because most societies tend to see it as part of their national cultural identity.
Foreign ownership in the movie industry is often perceived as an unacceptable intrusion.
225. Robert W. Staiger & Guido Tabellini, DiscretionaryTrade Policy and Excessive
Protection, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 823, 823 (1987).
226. Id. at 824.
227. Id. at 823. These political obstacles need to be taken seriously in the tradeopening debate at the national level.
228. Steven F. Benz, Trade Liberalization and the Global Service Economy, 19 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 95, 99 (1985).
229. Howard Pack & Kamal Saggi, The Casefor IndustrialPolicy: A CriticalSurvey 21
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3839, 2006).
230. The WTO characterizes non-tariff barriers as any law or policy that is not
necessarily a tariff, but still has the effect of limiting trade. WTO, Understanding the
WTO - Non-Tariff Barriers: Red Tape, etc., http://www.wto.org/English/thewtoe/
whatis e/tif__e/agrm9_e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); see also EP Committee Votes to
Smoothen Transatlantic Trade, EURACTIV, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/
en/trade/ep-committee-votes-smoothen-transatlantic-trade/article-154497.
231. See generally Petros C. Mavroidis, If I Don't Do It, Somebody Else Will (or
Won't): Testing the Compliance of Preferential Trade Agreements with the Multilateral
Rules, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 187, 187-214 (2006). For more on preferential trade
agreements and services liberalization, see Martin Roy et al., Services Liberalization in the
New Generation of PreferentialTrade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the
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Launched at the fourth WTO ministerial conference in
November 2001, the Doha Round has three pillars: (1) the opening
of trade in agriculture,233 (2) manufactured goods, and (3)
services.23' Although not as broad as the Uruguay Round's agenda,
the Doha Round includes negotiations on a range of subjects,
including issues related to the implementation of agreements
arising from previous negotiations, namely the 1986-1994 Uruguay
Round that created the WTO" Although the main focus of the
Doha Round trade negotiations concerned agriculture - the main
engine of the multilateral trade negotiations - discussion focused
on other areas of trade liberalization as well, including industrial
market access, services, trade facilitation,236 WTO rules (i.e., trade
remedies, regional trade agreements and fish subsidies), and
development. 37 The goal of the Doha Round was to reduce trade
barriers so as to expand global economic growth, development and
opportunity. 38
The Doha Round was intended to address issues such as
unfair agricultural subsidies that have kept some developing
countries out of international markets, to reduce tariff peaks 9 and
escalation2 4 particularly for products of interest to developing
countries, and to fine-tune WTO rules in areas like anti-dumping.41
GA TS? (ERSD, WTO, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-07, 2006).
232. See EC, WTO Acknowledges Crucial EU Role in the Multilateral Trading
System, Feb. 26, 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/pr260207_en.htm
(evaluating the EC's contribution to the multilateral system and ongoing Doha Round
negotiations).
233. It is interesting to see the differences of opinion between the G-20's strong stance
on eliminating agricultural subsidies and the EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson's
statement that while there was a need for an ambitious Doha Round outcome, focusing on
agriculture alone would be counter-productive. Brinkmanship Marks First Day's
Proceedings,supra note 46.
234. Doha Declaration, supra note 186,
13-16.
235. Id. [ 28-30.
236. Trade facilitation refers to the act of removing obstacles to the movement of
goods across borders (e.g., simplification of customs procedures).
237. WTO: July Framework Agreed at Eleventh Hour, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE,
Aug. 3, 2004, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-08-03/storyl.htm.
238. Doha Declaration, supra note 186,
1-2.
239. A tariff peak is a single, particularly high tariff on a good.
240. Tariff escalation is an increase in tariffs as a good becomes more processed, with
lower tariffs on raw materials and less processed goods than on more processed versions of
the same or derivative goods. For example, low duties on fresh tomatoes, higher duties on
canned tomatoes, and higher yet on tomato ketchup.
241. Dumping is exporting at below cost to gain market share. Article VI of the GATT
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This section examines the role played by the EC in the Doha
Round by analyzing the principles of the DDA. With its twentyseven member states in the WTO, the EC is the largest and most
comprehensive entity in the WTO. The WTO is a member-driven
organization that typically makes decisions on a consensus basis.242
While the twenty-seven EC member states generally coordinate
their positions in Brussels and Geneva, the European Commission
alone speaks for the EC and its member states at almost all WTO

meetings."
A. Principlesof the Doha Development Agenda

A conference of WTO trade ministers takes place every two
years.2 " As the highest decision-making body in the WTO, the
ministerial conference offers trade ministers from WTO members
the opportunity to meet and discuss important developments in
the multilateral trading system and the global economy.245 The
three WTO ministerial conferences held prior to Doha were
Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998), and Seattle (1999); the last one
perhaps best remembered for the anti-globalization movement
that it provoked.2" Doha was the forum for the fourth WTO
1994 permits the imposition of anti-dumping duties against dumped goods equal to the
difference between their export price and their normal value, if dumping causes injury to
producers of competing products in the importing country. GAT art. VI.
242. In the WTO, voting consensus is achieved if no Member "present at the meeting
when the decision is taken, formally objects." Each WTO Member has one vote,
regardless of its economic clout, and among them, developing countries are increasingly
making their presence felt. WTO Agreement art. IX; EC, Statement on World Economic
and Social Forums at the European Parliament Plenary Session (Feb. 10, 2003), available
at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradocjl18263.pdf. The WTO cannot
therefore be hijacked by a group of countries or multinational companies.
243. EC, The EU and the WTO, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/
index en.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
244. Canadian Dep't of Foreign Affairs & Int'l Trade [CDFAIT], Fourth Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar (November 9-13, 2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/WTO-About-en.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
245. Id.
246. Much academic literature has been produced in relation to the analysis of the
global phenomenon of "globalization." See generally PUTrING DEVELOPMENT FIRST:
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW
CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT
(2005); UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: OVERVIEW (2005), available at

www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index overview.htm;
GLOBALIZATION
GLOBALIZATION
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ministerial conference, held in November 2001. Because the
various WTO members were divided on the subject of the WTO's
future agenda, the Doha ministerial conference put off all major
decisions until the following WTO ministerial conference, held in
Cancun in 2003. The principal aim in Cancun was to present an
overview of the progress of the negotiations in the framework of
the DDA.247 In Cancun, talks that were intended to forge
agreement on the Doha Round's objectives collapsed due to
strong North-South divide on agricultural issues. Developing
nations gained in strength, succeeded in rejecting a deal which they
viewed as unfavorable, and formed two new negotiating groups the G-20 group of middle-income developing countries,"' and the
G-90 groupof poorer developing countries."'

The Cancun conference failed to accomplish its objectives.
The idea there was to take stock of progress made in the
multilateral trade negotiations and to agree on the scope of further
negotiations. However, the conference collapsed and the WTO's
ever-growing crisis of legitimacy burst into the pubic view when
the United States and the EC stubbornly rejected the demands of
the majority of the WTO members to make global trade rules
fairer.25
GLOBALIZATION (2d ed., 2004). Conversely, literature on anti-globalization is just as
abundant. See generally WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE: A NEW CRITICAL REALISM

FOR A POST-SEATrLE WORLD (Amy Schrager Lang & Cecelia Tichi eds., 2006); JEANPIERRE BORIS, COMMERCE INEQUITABLE:
LE ROMAN NOIR DES MATIERES
PREMIERES (2005); CRITICAL THEORIES, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND "THE ANTI-

GLOBALISATION MOVEMENT"
COALITIONS ACROSS BORDERS:

(Catherine Eschle & Bice Maiguashca eds., 2005);
TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST AND THE NEOLIBERAL

ORDER (Joe Bandy & Jackie Smith eds., 2004); Barbara Epstein, Anarchism and the AntiGlobalization Movement, MONTHLY REVIEW, Sept. 2001, at 1; DAVID RANSOM, THE NONONSENSE GUIDE To FAIR TRADE (2001); AMORY STARR, NAMING THE ENEMY:

ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENTS CONFRONT GLOBALIZATION (2000).
247. Doha Declaration, supra note 186,
45-46.
248. The Group of 20, or G-20, is a group of developing countries focused on tearing
down industrialized countries' barriers to agricultural trade. In March 2006, the group
included 21 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand, Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. See G-20, Official Website,
http://www.g20.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
249. The G-90 is a tripartite alliance of the Africa Union (AU), the African, Caribbean
and Pacific Group (ACP) and least-developed countries (LDCs), forming a majority of

developing countries in the WTO.
250. Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG., July 26, 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-07-26/storyl.htm. When

arguing the importance of making global trade rules fairer, it is also implicit in the
argument the need to change the current attitude of corporations in global trade. The
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Arguably, the main substantial and organizational reasons for
the failure of Cancun were fourfold: (1) the joint U.S.-EC position
on agriculture, which antagonized developing countries by
appearing to retract elements of the Doha Declaration, such as the
non-fulfillment of the commitment to reduce export subsidies with

a view to phasing them out entirely; (2) U.S. reluctance to move on
cotton, which was perceived by many as a sign of lack of interest of
the Americans in making a success of the Doha Round; (3) the
Singapore issues;' and (4) the actual procedure of the WTO
ministerial conference later that year.
The only decision made in Cancun was to meet again at WTO
headquarters to assess the situation.25 Following Cancun's failure,
major corporate interests and their respective governments
scrambled to lay blame anywhere other than the WTO and its
failed globalization model. 3 The last and most recent ministerial
conference took place in December 2005 in Hong Kong, which was
vital for moving the then four-year-old DDA negotiations forward

sufficiently enough to conclude the round in 2006.'

destructive, social, political, and environmental consequences of the pro-corporate, neoliberal model of globalization has elicited rising resistance from a broad range of civil
society organizations and social movements around the world, including at WTO
Ministerial Conferences in Seattle, Doha, Cancun, and Hong Kong. Pub. Citizen, Stop the
GATS Attack!, supra note 183. Various NGOs against the process of a corporate-led
globalization pose the vision of a global economy built on principles of economic justice,
ecological sustainability, and democratic accountability, asserting thereby the interests of
people over corporations; in other words, that over corporate interests other interests
should prevail, such as those of workers, peasants, farmers, fishers, small producers, and
those marginalized in the current system - such as women and indigenous people. See Our
World is Not for Sale, supra note 219; see also Transnat'l Inst., WTO Introduction,
www.tni.org/intros/wto-intro.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (arguing that the WTO favors
transnational corporations over indigenous peoples).
251. The so-called Singapore issues refers to four working groups set up during the
WTO Ministerial Conference of 1996 in Singapore, namely investment protection,
competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation.
252. Cancun Collapse: Where There's No Will There's No Way, BRIDGES DAILY
UPDATE, Sept. 15, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/
wtodaily/ben030915.pdf.
253. A few major corporations blamed three sets of actors of being responsible for the
failure of Cancun: "[1] the majority of WTO members that defended their publics'
interests in Cancun, [2] the Mexican diplomat who chaired the summit, and [3] even civil
society groups and social movements." WALLACH, supra note 3, at 12.
254. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, WTO Meets in Hong Kong to Continue Doha
Round, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.calchamber.com/CC/Headlines/Archive/International/
2005/12152005TS.htm.

382

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 29:339

On July 31, 2004, WTO members agreed on a framework
package to keep the Doha Round trade negotiations alive."'
"After almost a year of stalled negotiations following the
breakdown of talks at the last Ministerial meeting in Cancun ...
Members had set the end of July [2004] as a deadline for agreeing
on a negotiating framework package. The 31 July 2004 Agreement
allowed countries to send an important political message that the
Doha Round is still alive." 6 The EC, the United States, Japan, and
Brazil agreed to eliminate all agricultural export subsidies, reduce
trade-distorting subsidies, and lower tariff barriers. Developing
nations consented to reduce tariffs on manufactured goods, with
the right to protect key industries. The Doha Round was intended
to eliminate or reduce industrial tariffs: Taking this into account,
the main points of discussion of the Doha ministerial conference
were to "review and advance the ongoing work of the WTO,
including addressing developing countries' concerns regarding
implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, considering
ways to facilitate the accession process for least-developed
countries [LDCs], 7 clarifying WTO rules and disciplines where
necessary, determining ways to provide more and better
coordinated assistance to help improve the capacity of poorer
countries to trade; making the WTO more open and transparent,
and strengthening the dispute settlement system.""
. Among the various far-reaching goals of the Doha Round, the
WTO members hoped to achieve the following:
"Launch a new WTO round - the [DDA] - comprising both

further trade liberalization 259 and new rule-making with
commitments to strengthen substantially assistance to
developing countries; [h]elp developing countries implement
255. WTO, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex D,
(Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
WT/L/579,
ddae/drafttext-gc-dg_31julyO4_e.htm.
256. WTO: July Framework Agreed at Eleventh Hour,supra note 237.
Towards Shared
257. See Chakriya Bowman The Pacific Island Nations:
Representation, in WTO CASE STUDIES, supra note 27, Case Study 33, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudiese/case33_e.htm#fntext 10
(presenting an empirical study that explains the difficulties of these nations in the world
trading system).
258. CDFAIT, supra note 244.
259. For an overview of EU services trade liberalization, see M. Lopez Escudero, La
liberalizaciondel comercio de servicios en la Union Europea: un modelo de referenciapara
el GATS?, in LA ORGANIZACION MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO Y EL REGIONALISMO
EUROPEO 275-313 (A. Remiro Brotons & C. Esposito eds., 2001).
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the existing WTO Agreements; [i]nterpret the TRIPS (Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement in
a manner that ensures Members'26 rights under TRIPS to take
actions to protect public health. 0
B. The EC and the Doha Development Agenda
Conducting a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
was partly a European responsibility. Former EU trade
commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, launched the idea of starting a
new round of multilateral trade negotiations, which was called the
Millennium Round.26 His reasons for creating a new round were
well-founded - under the built-in agenda of the WTO, new
negotiations on the further liberalization of trade in agriculture
and trade in services had to be opened by 2000.262

The DDA is the EC's most important trade policy priority to
boost global economic growth and development opportunities.263
The EC advocates a declaration where all parts of the negotiation
need to continue to move forward together.M
The European Commission reaffirmed that in the context of
the negotiations on the liberalization of services trade, success may
only be achieved in the context of a broad and time-bound
framework of negotiations. 26' However, the agenda proposed by
the EC may be too complex to address in a short period of time.
Four major issues are proposed by the Commission in the Doha
Round: "(1) to secure further trade liberalization and create
improved conditions for competitiveness; (2) to strengthen the
WTO and make it 'a truly universal instrument for the
management of international trade relations; (3) to enhance the
developmental role of the WTO, and (4) to ensure that the WTO

260. EC, The Doha Development Agenda, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/
newround/dohada/index en.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Doha
Development Agenda].
261. Guy de Jonquieres, World Trade 2: Tentative Embrace of the Open Market: The
European Union, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 29, 1999, at 2.

262. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. __ [hereinafter
Agriculture Agreement] and GATS 1994 art. XIX; see also Stefan Tangermann, Europe's
Agricultural Policiesand the Millennium Round, 22 WORLD ECON. 1155, 1155 (1999).

263. See Doha Development Agenda, supra note 260.
264. See id.
265. See id.
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addresses issues of
266 broad concern such as health, environment, and
social concerns.,
At a special session in Doha on November 14,2001, the EU
Council decided to approve the conference texts and authorized
the Commission to convey the agreement of the Community and
its member states to the draft ministerial declaration at the
2 According to the negotiation
conclusion of the conference. 67
mandate of the EU Council," the EC's general priorities in the
DDA include the following:69
" Better access to markets;27
* Further liberalization of agriculture;
* Giving developing countries a better deal; 1
266. Pitou Van Dijck & Gerrit Faber, Preparingfor the Future, in THE EXTERNAL
ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 364 (Pitou Van Dijck & Gerrit Faber
eds., 2000); see, e.g., Mandelson Wants Free Trade in "Green" Goods, EURACrIV, Feb. 13,
2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/mandelson-wants-free-trade-greengoods/article-161632.
267. Bulletin EU 11-2001
1.6.29, available at http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/
200111/p106029.htm; see also General Report on the Activities of the European Union
2001 876, availableat http://europa.eu/generalreport/en/2001/pt0876.htm#fn2.
268. There is no such thing as "a" Doha mandate, but rather a series of EU Council
conclusions adopted in various phases of the negotiations which, together, constitute the
Doha mandate. Although a negotiating mandate is not easy to find, since mandates do not
tend to be published for obvious negotiating strategies reasons, these are as follows:
Council of the European Union, Preparation of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference Draft Council conclusions, Oct. 22 1999, 12092/99 (on file with author); General Affairs
Council on the WTO, SN 73/01, Oct. 29, 2001 (on file with author); Council of the
European Union, Special Session of the Council, held in Doha (Qatar) from 10 to 14
November 2001, PV/CONS 66, Nov. 21, 2001 (on file with author); Council of the
European Union, WTO negotiations on agriculture: outline of the EC comprehensive
negotiating proposal - Conclusions of the Agriculture Council, 13656/00, Nov. 22, 2000 (on
file with author); Press Release, Council of the European Union, Special Council meeting,
General Affairs and External Relations, Geneva (July 30, 2004) (on file with author);
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the WTO Doha Development
Agenda, Oct. 18, 2005 (on file with author); Council of the European Union, General
Affairs and External Relations Council, Council Conclusions on WTO - DDA, Nov. 21,
2005 (on file with author).
269. See Doha Development Agenda, supra note 260.
270. In as much as further market-access negotiations on services should bring
considerable market opportunities for businesses as well as benefits to consumers worldwide, the EC has no intention to aim at general deregulation or privatization of sectors
where principles of public interest are at stake, i.e., education or healthcare. These, as well
as further agricultural reform, are areas where the EC would not make concessions. See
Swedish Inst. for European Policy Studies [SIEPS], Report From the Seminar on "Which
Priorities for the New Commission in the WTO?," in Stockholm, on Thursday, 16
December 2004, at 1 (2004) (arguing that member countries of the WTO need to make
better efforts to open their services markets), available at http://www.sieps.se/sem/2004/
sem_1216/041216 referat.pdf.
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* Protection of the environment; 27 and
* Better international governance and the promotion
of sustainable development (achieved by an update
to the world trade rulebook in order to obtain a
rules-based
fair, predictable and transparent 273
system to govern trade and investment).
All EU member states have much to gain from a successful
outcome of the Doha Round. An open trading regime has
traditionally benefited European economies. The removal of
additional
technical barriers to trade will certainly help provide
2741
h
opportunities for further open trading success. In the specific
case of the UK, services play a major part of its economy.
On the other hand, more protection ism 2 will be generated
worldwide if the Doha Round fails."6 These protectionist
tendencies of some WTO countries have been the subject of recent
political debate in various countries on the grounds that jobs in
services were being exported from developed to developing
271. For an empirical study on negotiating over trade with developing countries, see
JOHN S. ODELL & ANTONIO ORTIZ MENA, HOW TO NEGOTIATE OVER TRADE: A
SUMMARY OF NEW RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004), available at
http://www.ruig-gian.org/ressources/dupont-Summary-Odell-OrtizMena.pdf.
272. See Mandelson Wants Free Trade in "Green" Goods, EuRACriv, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/mandelson-wants-free-trade-greengoods/article-161632.
273. "The concept of sustainable development refers to a form of economic growth,
which satisfies society's needs in terms of well-being in the short, medium and - above all
- long terms. It is founded on the assumption that development must meet today's needs
without jeopardising the ability of future generations." EC, Glossary Inforegio English,
http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/glossary/glos6_en.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
Practically, the term means planting the seeds for long-term economic development while
respecting the environment and involves both industrialized and developing nations
encompassing economic, environmental and social aspects. Id.
274. The technical barriers to trade (TBT) are related to product standards and
conformance. The aim of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement) is to ensure that mandatory technical regulations, voluntary standards, as well
as procedures for assessing conformity with technical regulations and standards do not
generate avoidable obstacles. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trad&, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120,
[hereinafter TBT
available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbte.htm
Agreement].
275. Protectionism is the economic policy of restraining trade between jurisdictions,
through methods such as high tariffs on imported goods and restricting imports in an
attempt to protect industries in a particular locale from competition. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 567 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
276. Susan Krause, China Has Major Stake in Global Trade Talks, U.S. Official Says,
USINFO, Aug. 29, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.htmlp=washfile2
english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060829182457ASesuarK0.181057 .
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economies." Employers in developed economies have been
exporting their services to economies where the service provider is
much less expensive.' Some politicians, such as Patricia Hewitt,
the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, argue in this
respect that "an extra job in India is not one less job in Britain." 279
It is not only one fewer person in poverty in India: "it is also one
more potential customer for our goods and services.""
C. The Case of Services Trade
The services sector is currently by far the most dynamic of
any other sector. It already contributes to worldwide economic
growth more than any other sector, and accounts for almost twothirds of the gross domestic product and employment in the EU.2'
As a rule of thumb, the services sector contributes 44 percent to
the GDP in developing economies, and up to 69 percent in the
industrial economies.' However, the true value of trade in services
is understated because a good deal of it is conducted by expresslycreated corporate establishments in their export markets. This
means that this trade in services is not recorded in the balance of
payments statistics." Furthermore, given the invisibility and
intangibility of many services when they are delivered to a trade
partner, their passage is often not recorded by the customs
department. Statistics on trade in services are therefore not
entirely reliable.'
Developed countries are quite keen on seeing an agreement
reached for liberalization of the services trade because substantial
gains are to be made for both developed and developing countries
277. See Tad DeHaven, There They Go Again: The Truth about "ExportingJobs" 1-2
(Nat'l Taxpayers Union [NTU], Policy Paper No. 115, 2004), available at
http://www.ntu.org/pdf/pp-ntu-115.pdf.

278. See Thomas F. Siems & Adam S.Ratner, Do What You Do Best, Outsource the
Rest?, SOUTHWEST ECON., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 13-14.
279. SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN
UNION, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE ROLE OF THE EU POST-CANCON, 2003-4, H.L. 104, 1 19
[hereinafter THE WTO: THE ROLE OF THE EU POST-CANCIDN].

280. Id.
281. Stormy Mildner & Welf Werner, Progress or Stagnation?Services Negotiations in
the WTO Doha Development Round, 40 INTERECONOMICS 158, 158 (2005).
282. See id.
283. Id. at 166.

284. See id. at 163.
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by increasing trade in this sector. Thus, countries should open their
service markets to external competition for the benefit of all.
Countries such as India, whose service sector is rapidly growing,
are positioned to profit from the liberalization of global markets.
Written into the GATS is a commitment by WTO members
to progressively liberalize trade in services by entering into
successive rounds of negotiations." At the fourth WTO ministerial
conference in Doha, Qatar, negotiations on services were
incorporated into the DDA:
The negotiations on trade in services shall be conducted with a
view to promoting the economic growth of all trading partners
and the development of developing and least-developed
countries. We recognize the work already undertaken in the
negotiations, initiated in January2000 under Article XIX of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the large number
of proposals submitted by members on a wide range of sectors
and several horizontal issues, as well as on movement of natural
persons. We reaffirm the Guidelines and Procedures for the
Negotiations adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on
28March2001 as the basis for continuing the negotiations, with a
view to achieving the objectives of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, as stipulated in the Preamble, Article IV and
Article XIX of that Agreement. Participants shall submit initial
requests for specific commitments by 30June2002 and initial
offers by 31March2003.286
The Doha Declaration called for participants of the Doha
round to submit initial requests for specific commitments from
other WTO members by June 30, 2002, and to present initial offers
to other WTO members by March 31, 2003.287 The EC, which has
played a major role in implementing and negotiating under the
GATS, submitted sectoral proposals to the WTO in December
2000, setting out its negotiating objectives in twelve services
sectors covered by the GATS. A communication on the EC's
general objectives for the negotiations was submitted in March
2001.
The European Commission believes that negotiations are
285. GATS Article XIX.
286. Doha Declaration, supra note 186, T 15.
287. For an explanation of the commitments under the GATS in the Doha Round, see
Rudolf Adlung & Martin Roy, Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments
Under the GA TS and Prospects for Change (ERSD, WTO, Staff Working Paper ERSD2005-01, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/English/res-e/resere/ersd2005Ole.htm.
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conducted by the Commission in a transparent way. Its objectives
are stipulated in a mandate given to the Commission by the EU
Council and the European Parliament in October/November 1999.
To intensify and expedite services negotiations, Annex C of the
Draft Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration introduced an
interesting mode of negotiations - plurilateral negotiations. Unlike
conventional bilateral negotiations, plurilateral negotiations
permit a group of members to present collective requests to other
members in any sector or mode of supply.' Furthermore, "the
plurilateral approach has solidified a platform for interested
[WTO] Members to build upon initial, sector-specific discussions,
either through an extended round of negotiations similar to what
transpired after the Uruguay Round, or in the context of the next
round of services negotiations mandated under GATS." ' 9
However, Annex C failed to deliver any timelines for service
negotiations, even in a preliminary sense.
The Doha Declaration endorsed the work of the Council for
Trade in Services, reaffirmed negotiating guidelines and
procedures, and established some key elements of the negotiation
timetable including, most importantly, the deadline for concluding
the negotiations as a part of a single undertaking. Following the
Doha Declaration, the roadmap for the Doha Round could be
summarized as follows:
" Continue negotiations started in 2000 under the
Council for Trade in Services;
* Accept initial requests for market access by June 30,
2002;
* Present initial offers of market access by March 31,
2003;
" Stock taking in 2003 at the fifth WTO ministerial
conference in Cancun.9 ,
Use of the term "initial" was indicative of the reality of the
288. See, e.g., TNC: Lamy Outlines Doha Round Roadmap for Hong Kong and
Beyond, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 19, 2005, at 3, available at

http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-10-19/BRIDGESWeekly9-35.pdf.
289. Bernabe & Chang, supra note 42, at 2.
290. See, e.g., TNC:

Lamy Outlines Doha Round Roadmap for Hong Kong and

Beyond, supra note 288.
291. Press Release, EC, EU Tables Market Access Requests to Inject Momentum into
WTO Services Negotiations (July 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IPlO2/lOOl&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN
&guiLanguage=en.
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negotiating process, which in itself was a succession of requestsand-offers operations. Each WTO member submits an initial
request which does not have to be exhaustive. WTO members do
not necessarily have to think of every possible item that they wish
to request of the other WTO members.
The principal aim of services negotiations for the EC is to
improve market access for European services exporters.292 During
the Uruguay Round, the EC made liberal commitments in more
than 120 sub-sectors. Thus, the main objectives of the EC are the
elimination of entry barriers (such as limitations on the number of
services suppliers), limits on foreign ownership or shareholding,
restrictions on the type of legal entity, and compulsory jointventure or numerical quotas. Specifically, the EC is seeking
improved commitments and clarification of existing commitments.
At the same time, the EC is seeking a reduction in scheduled
limitations, both of a horizontal and sector-specific nature.
On July 1, 2002, the EC fulfilled a major step in its DDA by
presenting its initial requests for improved market access on
services to 109 WTO members in Geneva.293 These requests, which
sought a reduction in restrictions and an expansion of market
access opportunities, cover the following sectors: professional
services, telecommunications, business services, postal services,
distribution, construction and related engineering services,
financial services, environmental services, tourism, news agency
services, and energy services. No requests were made to any
country on health services or audiovisual services, however, and
only the United States received a request limited to privatelyfunded higher education services. Requests on environmental
services did not touch on the issue of access to water resources
which, in the EC's view, in no way undermined or reduced host
governments' ability to regulate pricing, availability and
affordability of water supplies as they chose. The EC requests
were not intended to dismantle public services... or to privatize
292.

Peter Hardstaff, Benchmarking in GATS: Exposing the EU's aggressive services

agenda (World Dev. Movement, London, U.K.), Nov. 2005, http://www.wdm.org.uk
/resources/reports/trade/benchmarkinginGATS0112005.pdf.
293. See EC, Summary of the EC's Initial Requests to Third Countries in the GATS
Negotiations, July 1, 2002, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/
aprilltradoc_116821.pdf.
294. "Public services" does not have a precise legal meaning. See Carol Harlow, Public
Services, Market Ideology, and Citizenship, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN
EUROPEAN LAW 49, 49-51 (Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1998); Colin Scott,
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state-owned companies.
Requests in services trade negotiations that seek to eliminate
or reduce exemptions from the obligation to accord MFN
treatment in financial services might be folded into the plurilateral
discussions on financial services. Other areas regarded by the
Commission as being more sensitive, such as education, health,
and audiovisual sectors, would remain off limits.Addressing
journalists in Brussels on June 2, 2005, EU trade commissioner
Peter Mandelson said, "[t]ime is running out for others to match
our level of ambition and bring real market-access opportunities to
the table."295Referring to the sixth WTO ministerial conference in
Hong Kong, at which it was hoped that a long-awaited
breakthrough in the stalled Doha negotiations would be achieved,
Mandelson stated that it was "essential for a successful and
balanced agreement" to be reached at the Hong Kong
conference.296
Services trade is a major area of interest to the EC. The EC
has a solid background in the field thanks to the EU internal
market experience, making EU member states like-minded in most
areas of services. Although press reports of the Doha Round
focused on agriculture, the EC actively pushed for opening up
services markets in developing countries.97 Such a policy would
open up essential public services in the developing world, such as
health, water, and transportation to competition from western
corporations.298
The European Commission feels that public services are not
threatened by the GATS negotiations and has stated that public
services are an essential feature of the social model and of each
country's cohesion. Public services are at the heart of the
Services of General Interest in EC Law: Matching Values to Regulatory Technique in the
Public and PrivatisedSectors, 6 EUR. L.J. 310, 312 (2000); Elisenda Malaret Garcia, Public
Service, Public Services, Public Functions and Guarantees of the Rights of Citizens:
Unchanging Needs in a Changed Context, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN
EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 290, at 57, 57-59.
295. In WTO Round, EU Offers Moderate Opening of Services Market, EURACTIV,
June
3,
2005,
http://euractiv.com/en/trade/wto-round-eu-offers-moderate-opening-

services-market/article-140421.
296. Id.
297. See Press Release, War on Want, Report Exposes Role of Corporate Lobbyists in

Setting EU Trade Agenda (2005) http://www.waronwant.orgfReport%20exposes%20role
%20of%20corporate %201obbyists%20in%20setting%20EU%20trade%20agenda%20111
33.twl.
298. See id.
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European social model and, in this respect, the European
Commission expresses a commitment to ensuring that this remains
so. According to the WTO Secretariat, the GATS negotiations
are about opening up service trade, not about deregulating
services.3 ° All WTO members would arguably remain free to
pursue the following legitimate policy options regarding public
services: (1) to maintain the service as a monopoly, public or
private; (2) to open the service to competing suppliers, but to
restrict access to national companies; (3) to open the service to
national and foreign suppliers, but to make no GATS commitment
on it; (4) to make GATS commitments covering the right of
foreign companies to supply the service, in addition to national
suppliers.'
This view on the impact of the GATS negotiations on public
services is not universally shared. In all these cases, governments
remain free to set levels of quality, safety, price or any other policy
objective they see fit."2 It is inconceivable that any WTO member
would agree to surrender such a fundamental right.
On January 24, 2005, the EC submitted revised requests for
improved market access on services to the WTO members in
Geneva. The revised requests seek a reduction in market access
restrictions and an expansion in trading opportunities for the
European services industry. To guide the negotiations to a
successful conclusion in services trade, a work plan was created in
the pre-Hong Kong ministerial conference phase. This plan
included setting an ambitious level for market access to services
and developing a negotiating strategy to achieve an ambitious level
of global services liberalization, particularly in key sectors such as
financial services, telecommunications, computer and related
services, express delivery, distribution, and energy services.
The EC provides market access in services trade. 3 Within the
WTO, countries agree to open trade in services on the basis of
requests and offers to other WTO members. Each country decides

299. A European Legal Frameworkfor Public Services (CCEP, Brussels, Belg.), Nov.
26,
2007,
http://www.ceep.eu/media/right/publications/a-european-legal-framework
for publicservices (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
300. See WTO, GATS - FACT AND FICTION 9 (2001), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/serv-e//gatsfactsl0O4_e.pdf [hereinafter GATS - FACT AND FICTION].
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See SIEPS, supra note 270, at 1.
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which sectors it wants to open to international trade."° There
remain some sectors within the EU in which market access for
services imports from third countries could be improved. It is a
win-win situation, where it is in the mutual interest of the EC and
its trading partners to reduce barriers to trade. Thus, the EC's
agenda is to seek better access for European services exporters in
foreign markets and to secure a more transparent and predictable
regulatory environment for services. 5 This scheme would also be
beneficial for developing countries because they depend on access
to modern services, including finance, telecommunications,
transport and IT services, to obtain economic development and
export growth.
The EC can achieve this goal by requesting that WTO
member countries reduce restrictions and expand market-access
opportunities for the European services industry. This is important
to the EC because the services sector is the single most important
economic activity in the European Union. EU Member States
should press for a wide-ranging EC approach to the Doha Round,
aimed at tackling the main barriers to trade in services. It is not
surprising that tourism is the sector in which there is the highest
number of binding commitments. Health and education,
meanwhile, have the lowest number of binding commitments."
This proves that the GATS is respectful of the diversified
economic and social realities among its member countries."
Despite this potentially fruitful approach, the EC and its
member states tabled their initial offer for ongoing DDA services
negotiations under the GATS framework in April 2003, after
giving careful consideration to the requests submitted by WTO

304. See Press Release, EC, WTO-DDA: EU Ready to Go the Extra Mile in Three
Key Areas of the Talks (May 10, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/622&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&g
uiLanguage=en.
305. For a historical perspective of trade in services for the EU, see Christiaan
Timmermans, Common Commercial Policy (Article 113 EEC) and International Trade in
Services, in

DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

AU

DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION 675-89

(Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987).
306. See Rudolf Adlung & Aaditya Mattoo, GATS and the Current Services Round:
An Overview 18 (Servs. Trade and Int'l Negotiation Course, World Bank Inst.,
Washington,
D.C.,
Apr.
19-23,
2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETRADE/Resources/WBI-Training/288464-1121285527226/AdlungGATS_
pres.pdf.
307. See EC, Trade in Services, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/
services/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
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members, particularly those submitted by developing countries . "
The decision reached by the WTO General Council on August 1,
2004, on the DDA work program (the so-called "July package")
provided renewed impetus for services negotiations and set forth a
process for improving the quality of the offers submitted.
Following the conditional offer from the EC and its Member
States on April 29, 2003, developing countries have accused the
EC of being protectionist in this sector.3°The EC offer was
conditioned on the submission of substantive offers from WTO
members in sectors where the EC had made requests. The EC,
therefore, retained its right to withdraw any elements of the offer
at any time during the negotiations. As stated above, in July 2002
the EC already submitted its initial requests for improved market
access in services to WTO Members.
On June 2, 2005, the EC submitted a revised services offer in
the Doha negotiations."' The new proposal outlined the extent to
which the EC is prepared to further open access to its services
market in exchange for improved access to other WTO Members'
markets. As with the initial offer, this revised offer was conditional
on other WTO members making substantive offers in sectors
where the EC has made requests. While ambitious in scope and
responsive to requests for access from developing countries, the
EC's offer safeguards public services such as education, health,
and audiovisual services. It would allow lawyers, accountants,
bookkeepers, architects, and engineers to open offices in the EU
or to offer their services from abroad. Specialists such as computer
programmers could obtain short-term residence permits through
Mode 4. Working conditions, minimum wage requirements, and
collective wage agreements of the EU and member nations would
apply. EU Member States would continue to be able to refuse
entry to persons who pose a-security threat or are considered to be
at risk of abusing the terms of their entry.
This revised offer covers horizontal commitments, MFN
308. Rolf Langhammer, The EU Offer of Service Trade Liberalization in the Doha
Round. Evidence of a Not-Yet-Perfect Customs Union, 43(2) J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES

311, 311-25 (June 2005).
309.

See EC, CONDITIONAL OFFER FROM THE EC AND ITS MEMBER STATES (2003),

availableat http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc -113003.pdf.
310.

EC, COMMUNICATION
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STATES:
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EUROPEAN
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COMMUNITIES

OFFER

(2005),
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available

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/june/tradoc-123488.reduced%20cells%20v2.pdf
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exemptions, and specific commitments in individual service
sectors. By no means should the revised offer of the EC be
construed as offering the privatization of public undertakings or as
preventing the EC from regulating public services in order to meet
national policy objectives. The EC focused on many of the same
sectors as the United States, which showed an interest in
continuing the lowering or elimination of equity caps on foreign
investment "along with the binding of existing levels of crossborder services' supply into other markets and expanded
commitments in financial, telecommunications, energy, computer311
related, distribution, express delivery, and audio-visual services.
In addition, the EC also identified environmental services as a
sector where they will continue to press trading partners to
undertake commitments.
EU Member States use two main instruments to enforce their
national policy guidelines: the economic needs test and residence
criteria. First, Article XVI:2 GATS permits resort to an economic
needs test. Through such a test, when it comes to wholesale and
retail services trade, the governments of Belgium, Denmark,
France, Italy, and Portugal set a limit on the number of
department stores in order to prevent ruinous competition, to
facilitate transport infrastructure planning, and to regulate the
special distribution of stores. This needs test creates uncertainty
about the stability of market accessibility.3 As for residence
criteria, companies are restricted in supplying specific insurance
services through Mode 1 only if the head office is based in the EU.
Residence criteria are also applicable to natural persons if they act
in a position of responsibility on behalf of the company (i.e., the
CEO, founder, board of directors, supervisory council etc.). Such
restrictions are often found in offers for trade in financial and
insurance services.
It is interesting to note that, although the EU is a customs
union in trade in goods, when it comes to services trade it has not yet
311. Members Looking at Potential Compromises on Services, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG., Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-03-14/story3.htm

(noting that there is some exception in the area of audio-visual services, where France's
insistence on protecting cultural diversity requires Brussels to exclude the sector from any

liberalizing commitment).
312. Id.
313. See Patrick Low & Aaditya Mattoo, Is there a Better Way? Alternative Approaches
to Liberalizationunder the GA TS, in GATS 2000: NEw DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE
LIBERALIZATION 449,456 (Pierre Sauvd & Robert M. Stern, eds., 2000).
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reached the same level of integration. It is difficult to assess how far
the EU has to go from becoming a customs union in services trade
because the nature of trade restrictions is non-quantitative. Mainly,
serious differences in national policies are the reason for lack of a
customs union in services trade in the EU. An example is the
discrepancy among EU Member States concerning the perception of
Anglo-Saxon dominance in audiovisual services. External influences
such as the Doha Round may help in the creation of a customs union
for services trade, as was the case of industrial goods during the
Dillon and Kennedy Rounds.
D. Hong Kong: The Sixth WTO MinisterialConference
1. Objectives of the Conference
The goals of the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong
Kong" 4 were to secure (1) an agreement on the modalities (i.e.,
detailed negotiating parameters) for negotiations in agriculture
and non-agricultural market access (NAMA); (2) an effective
negotiating framework for a significant result in services; (3)
directions to ensure that WTO rules remain effective and in some
cases are strengthened;3 "' and (4) the outline of an agreement on
trade facilitation. 6
The overarching goal before the WTO Members was to settle
issues that were expected to shape a final agreement of the DDA,
Conference,
Ministerial
WTO
Sixth
The
WTO,
generally
314. See
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min05_e/min05-e.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2007).
315. See, e.g., Will Members Reveal Their Cards in Time? BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE,
2005,
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/wto daily/15_December/
15,
Dec.
en051215.htm ("Several high-level trade officials - including the U.S. Trade
Representative, the EU agriculture commissioner, trade ministers from New Zealand and
Senegal, the agriculture secretary of the Philippines, the Brazilian fisheries secretary and a
representative of Chile's foreign affairs minister- joined forces with the UN Environment
Program (UNEP) and the environmental group World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to call for

urgent action on disciplining fisheries subsidies in the WTO at a press conference in the
Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference.").
316. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC
(Dec. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 18 Ministerial Declaration]. "Despite the suspension of
the DDA, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has called for WTO Members to
pursue negotiations on a trade facilitation agreement and on an Aid for Trade package to
address developing countries' capacity constraints and help them deal with the costs of
customs modernization." The WTO Doha Development Round, EURACTIv, June 4, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.comlen/trade/wto-doha-development-round/article-157082.
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which WTO Members hoped to complete by the end of 2006, a
year later."7 As in the Uruguay Round, the system that would be
used in future global trade negotiations is the so-called "single
undertaking," to which all WTO Members were required to
subscribe, although with differing implementation periods. In
accordance with the single undertaking principle, nothing is agreed
until all subject areas are agreed upon. '8 In that regard,
Commissioner Mandelson made a statement to the General
Affairs Council regarding the framework of the Doha Round
negotiations and the Commission mandate:
At the heart of the EU mandate is of course the imperative
need for balance within the agricultural negotiations and across
the different areas of negotiation, linked to the principle of the
single undertaking. I have made clear that no agreement will be
reached on agriculture until agreement is reached on other
issues. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed... Let me be
clear. It is absolutely and unequivocally not the intention of the
Commission to use the DDA negotiations to precipitate a new
phase of CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) reform... Surely

it would be the wrong reaction and a terrible mistake for the
EU at the first sign of serious movement in the talks movement that we have been calling for - to lose confidence
and pull in our horns. I hope that is not the message of our
meeting today.1 9
An alternative to the single undertaking procedure is the socalled "variable geometry." 2 ' This term refers to situations where
obligations for the various WTO Members differ and some WTO
Members may choose to take on more or fewer obligations."' One
317. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 254.
318. Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Comm'r, Statement to the General Affairs Council:
Doha Round Negotiations and the Commission Mandate (Oct. 18, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/618&format=PDF
&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
319. Id.
320. In the EU context, the variable geometry concept refers to a situation in which
some countries integrate agreed-upon provisions faster than others. RODNEY LEACH, A
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (3d

ed.),

http://www.euro-

know.org/dictionary/v.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007). "The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
represented the first attempt to formalise this principle. Before that, however, the UK's
and Denmark's opt-outs on the EMU, the UK's and Ireland's exemptions from the
Schengen Agreement and Denmark's opt-out on anything to do with a common EU
defence policy had already created de facto variable geometry." Id.
321. Id. These obligations, however, may or may not be enforceable through the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.
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example of variable geometry is differential treatment in giving
special recognition for the needs of developing countries; another
example is regional or other GATT Article XXIV agreements.
Out of the nine plurilateral agreements that the Tokyo Round
generated, only two remain operational: those agreements
covering government procurement (subscribed by only around
one-fifth of the membership) and agreements regarding trade in
civil aircraft (subscribed by even less of the membership).323
In the plurilateral agreements, members might negotiate on
single topics or across a broad agenda. The risk of this plurilateral
approach, however, is to marginalize WTO Members - typically
the weakest and poorest members of the WTO family. 2' To avoid
this risk, the world trading system should allow members to
participate in the plurilateral negotiations, but provide them with
the freedom to opt out if a counter-productive would result.
a. Background
The initial objective at Hong Kong was to conclude a final
agreement, but the progress made up until that point was too
feeble to accomplish this goal.3 Instead, members reached a deal
in which rich nations agreed to allow quota and tariff-free imports
from all least-developed countries (LDCs),326 with a 2013 deadline
for eliminating agricultural export subsidies. 327 Thus, as a result of
the Cancun failure, expectations of what could be achieved had
been diminished in Hong Kong. In this respect, the Singapore
issues were removed from the negotiations agenda, allowing WTO
Members to concentrate on the main topics, i.e., agriculture, nonagricultural market access, and trade in services.
322. See generally Andre Sapir, Trade Regionalism in Europe: Towards an Integrated
Approach, 38 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 151 (2000); Frederick M. Abbott, Regional
Integration Mechanisms in the Law of the United States: Starting Over, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 155 (1993); Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The
NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP.
L. 917 (1992).
323. Peter Norgaard Pederson, From the Trenches, WORLD TRADE REV., Mar. 2006,
at 103, 128 n.67.
324. Faizel Ismail, How Can Least-Developed Countries and Other Small, Weak and
Vulnerable Economies Also Gain from the Doha Development Agenda on the Road to
Hong Kong?, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 37, 41 (2006).
325. Information from EC:
The Doha Development Round, NEWSLETTER,

(Netherlands-African Business Council [NABC], The Hague, Neth.) Jul.-Aug. 2006, at 7.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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According to various reports, the Doha Round of trade talks
in Hong Kong was in danger of failing before it even began.328
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy stressed that time was
running out and that the WTO was "faced with mountains of work
and very little time.,1 29 In a speech given on October 22, 2005, he
stated: "[Plositions are still too far apart on agricultural market
33 On November 7,
access to allow the negotiations to progress.""
2005, EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson commented that
the Doha Round had been "pushed into an agricultural siding" by
the aggressive stance of the United States, Brazil, and Australia.'
He called the EC offer to cut farm subsidies "unprecedented" and
blamed the lack of progress on other WTO members who seem
focused on securing an agreement on farm subsidies before
opening negotiations on industrial goods and services.32 In an
attempt to avert this delay, ministers from various countries,
including India, the EU, the United States, Japan, and Brazil, held
an informal meeting in London on November 7, 2005, to work out
their differences.3 On November 8, 2005, these ministers joined
others in Geneva for further talks hosted by Lamy."
b. Issues
Efforts to reach a preliminary agreement on the crucial Doha
trade round had been stalled on the issue of agricultural subsidies
and tariffs. The big trading blocs in the WTO (the United States,
Brazil, and Australia on one side, and the EC on the other) had
been engaged in a tit-for-tat struggle, refusing each other's offers
of subsidy cuts as inadequate. To further complicate matters, the
328. What Happenedin Hong Kong? InitialAnalysis of the WTO Ministerial5, (Oxfam

Int'l, Briefing Paper No. 85, 2005), available at http://www.oxfam.de/download/
What-happened in HongKong.pdf.
329. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Speech at the Annual Conference of the
Parliamentary Network of the World Bank (Oct. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl-e/sppll le.htm.
330. Id.
331. See Mandelson Turns Hopes for WTO Deal from Hong Kong to 2006, EU

BUSINESS, Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.eubusiness.com/Trade/051111102313.7alkxnxc.
332.

Id.

333. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Report to Heads of Delegations (Nov. 10, 2005),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news05_e/stat_lamynov05_e.htm.
334. WTO Talks May Stall on Agriculture, EURACTIV, Nov. 8,

2005,

http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/wto-talks-may-stall-agriculture/article-147045.
335. "Tit-for-tat" is the modus operandi in international trade. For example, country A
raises barriers on product X because country B did it to product Y. See ROBERT
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:

COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
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G-20 demanded heavier cuts from both sides. '6 In response to a
U.S. offer to cut farming subsidies by 60 percent, the EC offered to
reduce its tariffs on agricultural goods by 38 percent (on average) an insufficient figure in the eyes of developing countries and the
United States.337 The EC, however, was driven by internal conflict,
with France accusing Commissioner Mandelson of exceeding his
mandate.38
The EC also continued to work towards improving bilateral
trade relationships. Commissioners Mandelson and Benita
Ferrero-Waldner met with Chinese trade minister Bo Xilai on
November 4, 2005, to discuss not only the Doha trade round, but
also a wide range of issues including the environment, energy, and
intellectual property.
At the Hong Kong conference, the WTO trade ministers
hoped to agree on the main points of the agricultural section tariff cuts, the reduction or elimination of quotas, and the
elimination of export subsidies for farm products by 2013340 - and

make progress on manufacturing and services. To this end, Lamy
suggested that ideally the Hong Kong conference would finalize
two-thirds of the still-outstanding DDA negotiations."'
2. Intent and Examples from the Hong Kong Ministerial
ECONOMY 76 (2005).
336. WTO Talks May Stall on Agriculture,supra note 334.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Press Release, EC, EU-China Talks Focus on Doha, Market Access, Intellectual
Property Rights (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction
.do?reference=IP/05/1374&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
340. The initial proposal called for a substantial portion of the support to be
eliminated by 2010, but was later changed to 2013 to gain the support of the EU. Prabhash
Ranjan, Agriculture and NAMA Negotiations: Searchingfor the Landing Zone at iii (Ctr.
for Trade & Dev., Working Paper No. 4, 2006) available at http://www.centad.org/
download/Agriculture%20&%20NAMA%20NegotiationsWP4_final.pdf. On a related
note, EU trade commissioner Mr. Mandelson argued in Hong Kong that "a great deal of
U.S. in-kind food aid was tantamount to an export subsidy to its farmers... [and that] the
EC would be far more open to the U.S. proposal to eliminate export subsidies by 2010 if
the latter agreed to move away from 'fake food aid' towards less market-distorting
alternatives such as cash payments to countries that require food aid but are not in
emergency situations." Brinkmanship Marks First Day's Proceedings,supra note 46.
"[Former] U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman described the EC as 'obsessed' by
food aid, and suggested that the approach it favored ran the risk of making people go
hungry." Id.
341. See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Address to the Trade and Development
Board, UNCTAD: Trade is "Fundamental Tool" in the Fight Against Poverty (Oct. 6,
2005), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl05-e.htm.
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Declaration
The Declaration coming out of Hong Kong intended to
capture the progress that countries had made in negotiations since
July 2004, as well as build on progress in key areas so that Hong
Kong could be a launch pad for full negotiating modalities later
on. 2 In the eyes of EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, the
modalities must set a level of ambition high enough to match the
levels of ambition set in the areas of agriculture and NAMA. 3 A
high level of ambition to reform trade in services is therefore
necessary to have a balanced DDA package that will be acceptable
to the EU.14 In Mandelson's view, four elements should be taken
into consideration while drafting the modalities for the Doha
Round: (1) a multilateral formula for commitments by WTO
members, (2) agreement on the principle of sectoral model
schedules,34 ' (3) firm dates for proposing new revised offers and
final offers, and (4) agreement on targets for negotiations on rules
emergency safeguards, 3' and
(i.e., government procurement,
M7
subsidies) in the services areas.3
A multilateral formula for commitments by WTO Members
should be based on a mandatory numerical target for the number
of services sectors in which each WTO Member would be required
to make offers.' The current services negotiations are based on
the traditional bilateral request-offer system in which each WTO
Member tables a request from another member and a parallel
offer of what it is willing to provide. Since the current level of
342. See Dec. 18 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 321. The term "modality" is used
here to refer to a plan or method to accomplish the goals of tariff and subsidy reduction:
the target dates for these reductions, the actual quantity of reduction, and so on.
343. Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Comm'r, Statement at the WTO Doha Round
Informal Ministerial: EU Conditional Negotiating Proposals (Oct. 10, 2005), available at
[hereinafter
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/october/tradoc-125077.pdf
Mandelson Statement].
344. Id.
345. The sectoral model schedule approach "sets out agreed objectives for the
liberalization of a specific service sector and can be achieved in various ways." See Sherry
M. Stephenson, Multilateral and Regional Services Liberalizationby Latin America and the
Caribbean23 (OAS Trade Unit Studies Series No. 9, 2001).
346. An emergency safeguard mechanism is a form of safety valve to allow a
government to support a domestic industry that is facing difficulties in coping with
intensified international competition in the domestic market due to trade liberalization
obligations. See WTO, Technical Information on Safeguard Measures, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/safege/safeg-infoe.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
347. Mandelson Statement, supra note 343.
348. See id.
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progress is rather disappointing, the proposed system aims to
establish certain minimum numbers of sectors to be covered, and
to produce model schedules within certain sectors that will provide
ambitious benchmarks at which WTO Members can take aim.4 9
As for agreeing to the principle of sectoral model schedules,
the EC proposes to produce benchmarks to guide the level of
commitment in sectors of interest to WTO Members. 5° Efforts
should be focused on those sectors where a large number of WTO
Members show an interest."'
The EC's proposal for setting dates for new revised offers and
final offers also contemplated using the sixth WTO Ministerial
Conference as a forum to fix clear and firm dates for the
3 2
presentation of revised offers on reform in services tradeY.
The

EC hoped that these deadlines would fall within the first four
months of 2006 and reflect both multilateral targets and sectoral
model schedules.53 Thus far, not much progress has been made.
3. Actual Modus Operandi of Services Negotiations: How to Deal
With 152 Members and the Outcome of Hong Kong
It is said that negotiations under the GATS are relatively easy
to conduct due to its remarkable flexibility.3 This enables WTO
Members "to determine the level of market liberalization
obligations that they would like to assume. '' .
3 6
Four main features are responsible for the GATS flexibility.Y
First, WTO Members identify the sectors and sub-sectors for
making commitments to foreign services suppliers. 7 Since there is
no minimum requirement of commitments, even if there is a
schedule of commitments, WTO Members have the liberty to
identify any part of one sector (no matter how small) for
guaranteeing the rights of foreign suppliers to provide services. 351
Second, a WTO Member has the right to set limitations on market
access and the degree of national treatment that they are willing to
349. See id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
GATS - FACT AND FICTION, supra note 300, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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guarantee.359 Third, WTO Members frequently limit their
commitments to one or two of the recognized "modes of supply"
through which services can be traded." Fourth, WTO Members
are free to make deviations from the MFN principle to provide
favorable treatment to certain trading partners. 1
The GATS is composed of several general obligations that
apply to all services sectors."' The MFN principle is the most
significant of all the general rules applicable to the GATS. 6 ' Apart

from the general obligations, each WTO member defines its own
rules in its own obligations through the commitments in its
national schedule."6 The GATS accepts that developing countries
would liberalize fewer services sectors than the industrial
economies.36 This means that the commitments of developing
economies are less extensive." That said, many delegations at the
WTO, especially those with strong interests in securing improved
market access across a wide range of services activities, are
resigned to accept that the offers of market access commitments
already on the table may be as good as it gets:
The loud complaints during the Cancun WTO Ministerial
Conference with respect to inclusiveness and transparency have
far from disappeared. More than 4,000 protesters - mostly from
Korea, India and Indonesia - marched on the Hong Kong
Convention Centre on the first day of the Sixth WTO Ministerial
Conference chanting the "WTO is killing farmers.''

From a

practical standpoint, most WTO Members seem to have accepted
that the Ministerial Chair's consultative group meetings (so-called
"Green Room"3 69 meetings) are the only realistic way to
359. Id.
360. Id.; see also Juan A. Marchetti, Developing Countries in the WTO Services
Negotiations 8-16 (ERSD, WTO, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-06, 2004), availableat
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/reser e/ersd2004O6_e.doc.
361. GATS -FACT AND FICTION, supra note 300, at 7.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Services: Domestic Regulation Leaps Forward, Market Access Stands Still,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG-., July 19, 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-0719/story2.htm (last visited January 15, 2008).
368. See Thousands of Protesters March on Hong Kong WTO Meeting Venue,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 12, 2005, available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/
wto/3651.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
369. The "Green Room" is a phrase taken from the informal name of the VTO
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accomplish reform in a 152 member organization.37 These
meetings, normally consisting of between twenty and forty
delegations, are the major workhorse for accomplishing
compromises in negotiations."' No one has been able to find an
alternative way of achieving consensus on difficult issues because it
is virtually impossible for members to change their positions
voluntarily in meetings of the full membership. 72
Green Room meetings can be called by either a committee
chairperson or the WTO director-general and can take place
anywhere, such as at ministerial conferences."' In the past,
delegations have sometimes felt that Green Room meetings could
lead to compromises being struck behind their backs. 7' To combat
this mistrust, extra efforts are made to ensure that the process is
handled fairly, with regular reports sent back to the full
membership. 5 In the end, decisions reached in the Green Room
have to be approved by the consensus of all members. 6
In addition to member country negotiations, NGOs also can
positively contribute to the negotiations to liberalize trade in
services. Some NGOs, such as Oxfam International," ' know the
world trade agenda well and can help facilitate meaningful and
positive agreement on certain divisive areas.7 8 Accordingly, the
main problem confronting NGOs is not one of expertise and
influence, but one of conflicting paradigms. Free trade is seen as
good for development by certain factions yet harmful by others. In
this respect, it is difficult for governments to cooperate with NGOs
that do not believe in the benefit of free trade. But even some
director-general's conference room. WTO, Whose WTO is it Anyway?,
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/orgle.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Whose WTO is it Anyway?].
370.

Brinkmanship Marks First Day's Proceedings,supra note 46.

371. Whose WTO is it Anyway?, supra note 369.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
377. Oxfam International is "a confederation of 13 organizations working together
with over 3,000 partners in more than 100 countries" to find lasting solutions to poverty,
suffering and injustice around the world. Oxfam Int'l, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about-us/faq/index.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
378. See Natalie Domeisen & Peter Hulm, Collaboratingwith an Advocacy NGO,
INT'L TRADE

FORUM,

2006, available at http://www.tradeforum.org/news/fullstory

.php/aid/1041/Collaboratingwith anAdvocacyNGO.html (discussing Oxfam's expertise
in the area of international trade).
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NGOs that believe in the added value of free trade in relation to
development argue instead that the manner in which it is carried
out is incorrect, undemocratic, and unfair.379
For developed WTO Members (principally the EC, the
United States and Canada) who were keen on the further
liberalization of trade in services, the legal document on which
they agreed, GATS Article XIX, was insufficiently particular in
achieving this goal. 8 For developing countries, however, the text
did not sufficiently emphasize Mode 4 and was too detailed on
what should be liberalized in each of the modes." Developing
countries also wanted to have the right to reject the praxis of
plurilateral negotiations if they thought it would damage their
national interest.382
At Hong Kong, the G-90 used a slightly different strategy
from the ordinary praxis in that they presented a new document
and tried to use this legal text as the basis for the WTO trade
negotiations. 83 One trade diplomat perceived this as a way to
break with or violate the normal procedure of international trade
negotiations."
Negotiations in the Green Room brought
amendments of minor importance.8 What changed was the
language used in the government procurement agreement,
emergency safeguards, and subsidies."
Regarding the content and outcome of the conference, the
trade ministers' main decision in Hong Kong was simply to keep
talking." By continuing the dialogue and putting off discussions on
the most contentious issues in the Doha Round negotiations, the
ministers could avert another Cancun-style collapse." The
ministers gave themselves until the end of April 2006 to reach
agreement on these issues.8 Some delegates had suggested that an
379. Shirdath Ramphal, Globalisationand Trade Liberalisation- ConcentratingPower,
(Caribbean Ass'n for Feminist Research and Action, St. Augustine, Trin. & Tobago) Nov.
9, 2002, http://www.cafra.org/article416.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
380. Interview with Jose Plaza, supra note 200.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Doha Negotiations to Start Again Next Week in Geneva, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Jan. 18 2006, http://w*w.ictsd.org/weekly/06-01-18/storyl.htm
388. Id.
389. WTO, Day 6: Ministers Agree on Declaration That "Puts Round Back on
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April deadline for finalizing "full modalities" was improbable, and
that June or July 2006 would have been a more realistic timeline.39°
If an agreement was not going to be reached by July 2006 (as it
stood then, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration called for
WTO members to translate these modalities into draft
commitment schedules by the end of that month), it was going to
be difficult for them to meet their stated goal of concluding the
Doha Round by the end of the year."'
Services negotiations moved into a new phase with the launch
of the plurilateral (or collective) sectoral request process agreed to
by the ministers at Hong Kong." This has been the most relevant
consequence of the conference regarding the services trade.
Starting February 28, 2006, groups of WTO Members are expected
to present their requests on various services sectors to other WTO
Members.393
It is important to note that negotiations on trade in services
remained a focal point of discussion during the last days of the
conference as members reacted to the G-90's revised Services
Annex proposal.394 Contrary to the wishes of the EC and the
United States, the proposal weakened the mandatory language of
the original draft.395 However, for some countries, even the revised
draft of the service annex was unacceptable. Venezuela, for
example, was unwilling to even look at a proposal as long as it was
based on the proposed annex's original language.3 9"
The EC was noticeably less proactive during the negotiations
in areas of shared competence than it would normally be when
negotiations concerned a field of exclusive EC competence. 7 In
shared competence issues, the Commission listens more to the
Track," http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/ministe/min05_e/minO5_l8dece.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007).
390. Doha Negotiations to Start Again Next Week in Geneva, supra note 387.
391. Id.
392. WTO, Plurilateral Negotiations in Services Start (Feb. 28, 2006)
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/serv_28feb06_e.htm.
393. Id.
394. Revised MinisterialDraft to be Issued Today, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE, Dec. 17,
2005, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/wto-daily/17-December/enO51217.htm.
For additional reading of Annex C (annex on services), see Dec. 18 Ministerial
Declaration, supra note 316, Annex C.
395.

Revised MinisterialDraft to be Issued Today, supra note 394.

396. Id.
397. Interview with Raimund Raith, Legal Advisor, Permanent Delegation of the
European Commission to International Organizations, Geneva (Nov. 7, 2005).
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needs of EU member states individually prior and during
negotiations.398 At Hong Kong, there was absolute consensus on
the European negotiating position among the EU members in
services trade. The broader question among them was to what
extent had Annex C - with which all of the then twenty-five EU
member states were unhappy - had been kept. 3 This was a
dubious point for EU member states, but it was nevertheless clear
that it had to be the basis for the Hong Kong negotiations.4 "
Korean trade minister Kim Hyun-Chong, while summing up
the proceedings of his "open-ended" meeting, reportedly
remarked that "15 delegations had intervened to ask for revisions
to the text, while 26 wanted to preserve it.""4 1 Kim Hyun-Chong
emphasized the need for direct talks between members in addition
to his consultation sessions.4 " Of particular importance to the
United States was the strengthening of qualitative targets on crossborder trade (Mode 1) and commercial presence (Mode 3) .3 He

also noted that the EC was "pursuing at the Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference a reference to ambitious sectoral coverage,
possibly in the body of the declaration, as well as seeking stronger
commitments on Mode 3, plurilateral market access negotiations,
and sectoral liberalization initiatives. '
The original text's controversial annex on services was also
modified in an attempt to make it acceptable to more WTO
members, despite the risk of making it less acceptable to the EC.'
Some delegations were reportedly disappointed with changes
presented in the December 18, 2005, draft declaration's services
annex that reaffirmed the non-prescriptive nature of its
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. On a related note, Mitchell Smith had already argued that "sectoral
liberalization has advanced significantly [in the European Community] during that period
[1990s], even if under critical constraints. It remains unlikely that a new conception of
industrial policy will supplant the hegemonic position of competition, or fundamentally
alter Europe's state of liberalization." MITCHELL SMITH, STATES OF LIBERALIZATION:
REDEFINING THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN INTEGRATED EUROPE 191 (2005).
405. See
WTO,
Draft
Ministerial
Declaration
Revision,
Annex
C,
WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.2 (Dec. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Revision of Doha Work Programme
Draft],
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min05_e/draft_
text5_e.doc (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
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recommendations, as well as the fact that the reference to it in the
body of the text (paragraph 25) remained bracketed.4" Instead of
obliging members to enter into plurilateral market-access
negotiations, the new text stipulates that they "shall consider such
requests" in line with different rules and guidelines for conducting
services negotiations." The EC was also reportedly disappointed
by the removal of the December 7 version's4 1" implicit reference to
a 2002 EC proposal (SIWPGR/W/39) that laid out a framework for
liberalizing government procurement in services." Emma
Harrison, a campaign director for Consumers International, a
global consumer protection organization, expressed concern that
countries with insufficient regulatory systems would be pressured
into liberalizing "essential services" sectors such as water4.. and
electricity."' She noted that the text made no mention of universal
public access.41 2

In a speech to European Parliament members on January 16,
2006, EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson blamed the G-20
in particular for failing to offer new concessions on NAMA and
services."' He said that the EC would be willing to let the
negotiations fail rather than "pay for a round that offers nothing
new on industrial market access, services, [geographical
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See WTO, Draft Ministerial Text, WT/MIN(05)/W/3 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/ministe/min05_e/draft-text3-e.htm (last visited Feb.
27, 2006). "This document is a revision of JOB(05)/298/Rev.1, incorporating three
amendments agreed by the General Council, namely the addition of brackets in paragraph
21 (Services), the removal of brackets in paragraph 53 (accession of Tonga), and the
addition of some wording at the end of paragraph 34 (TRIPS & Public Health)." Id. at n.1.
409. See Working Party on GATS Rules, WTO, Communication from the European
Communities and Their Member States, S/WPGRIW/39 (July 12, 2002), available at
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradocll3108.pdf
(reference
was
removed from Annex C, I 4(b)).
410. See generally Aaron Ostrovksy, et al., GATS, Water and the Environment:
Implications of the General Agreement on Trade in Services for Water Resources (CIEL &

World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF], Discussion Paper, Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/GATSWaterEnvNovO3.pdf
(discussing the GATS
implications on water management policies).
411.

Talks Continue Around the Clock in Search of Consensus, BRIDGES DAILY

UPDATE, Dec.
18,
2005,
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/wto-daily/
18_December/en051218.htm.
412. Id.
413. See Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Comm'r, Speech to the European Parliament in
Strasbourg: Conclusions of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (Jan.
16, 2006) [hereinafter Conclusions of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference], availableat
http://ec.europa.eu/commission-barroso/mandelson/speeches-articles/sppm077-en.htm.
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indications]," 4 or other rules that lend strength to the multilateral
way of managing our international affairs.'4..
E. Post-Hong Kong WTO MinisterialConference
As time progresses toward the conclusion of the Doha
Round, developing countries seem to have increasing doubts as to
whether it is worth it to continue negotiating.416 According to
Mandelson, there is no reason why the Doha talks should not
succeed."7 In his opinion, NGOs that suggest developing countries
should walk away from the Doha talks are wrong.4"' For developing
countries, a successful Doha Round means the opportunity to lock
in farm reform in the developed world, open new markets for their
exports, and develop new trade among them. 19' It can produce new
multilateral agreements on trade rules that benefit developing
countries and aid that will boost their capacity to trade. 2° In
Mandelson's view, it would be a considerable mistake for the
developing world to walk away from the table.42 This is a
considered a "free" round for the fifty least-developed countries in
that any advances that are made will be free of cost to these
countries. 2 '
Carlo Trojan, EU Ambassador to the WTO, said that he was
"personally convinced" that a comprehensive deal could be made
before the summer holidays.2 ' However, for such an agreement to
be concluded, a breakthrough on modalities and sufficient
progress on issues other than agriculture and NAMA would have

414. Geographical indications are place names (or words associated with a place) used
to identify products (for example, "Champagne," "Tequila," or "Roquefort") which have
a particular quality, reputation or other characteristic because they come from that place.
See WTO, Negotiation, Implementation and TRIPS Council Work, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/ministe/min99_e/english/about-e/lOtrips-e.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2007).
415. See Conclusions of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 413.
416. See generally Simon J. Evenett, The World Trade Organization Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong: What Next? 40 J. WORLD TRADE 221, 221-38 (2006).
417. See Conclusions of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 413.
418. Id.
419. Id.

420. Id.
421. Id.
422. The Message of Peter Mandelson, EUROPAWORLD, Dec. 12, 2006,
http://www.europaworld.org/week266/mandelsonmessgel2506.html.
423. Lamy To TNC: Members Must Step up Intensity of Negotiations, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., May 3, 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-05-03/story2.htm.
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to be made by mid-June 2006.42" The EU has been seeking deeper
industrial tariff cuts from the G-20 developing countries. 2 ' It has
also come under heavy pressure from the G-20 and the United
States to offer deeper cuts to its own farm tariffs.426 Trojan stressed
that success in the negotiations would depend on "a preparedness
to accommodate each others' genuine political red lines." 27 He
noted that "much remains to be done" to strike an appropriate
28
exchange rate between market access in agriculture and NAMA.
The initial target was to finalize the Doha Round negotiations
by the end of 2005, so that the agreement could be approved by
the United States under the fast-track procedure and avoid a
lengthy Congressional debate. 29 Although some progress was
achieved along the way - notably in December 2005 in Hong Kong
where rich nations agreed to eliminate all of their farm export
subsidies by 2013 and to allow quota- and tariff-free imports from
all LDCs - a final deal remained elusive."3 ' Successive deadlines
were missed. "3' Finally, at the July 2006 G8 meeting in Saint
Petersburg, Russia, leaders of the world's biggest economies
pledged to give their trade negotiators the flexibility they needed
to reach a compromise deal and to hold last ditch talks during the
weekends of July 23-24 and 28-29, 2006.32
1. Suspension of the Multilateral Talks
On July 24, 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy
formally announced the suspension of the talks, bringing five years
of negotiations to an end.4 "3 The WTO suspension of the Doha

424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.

427. Id.
428. Id.
429. The

WTO

Doha

Development

Round,

EuRACrIv,

Aug.

1,

2006,

http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/wto-doha-development-round/article-157082.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. WTO Talks Called Off, EURACTiV, July 24, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/
en/trade/wto-talks-called/article-156912. See also Pascal Lamy, What now, trade ministers?
INT'L HERALD TRIB. 6, July 27, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/27/

opinion/edlamy.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
433. Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, supra note 250; see
also Pradeep S.Mehta et al., Suspension of Doha Round Talks: Reasons and the Possible
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Round followed the refusal of the United States to make bigger
cuts to its farm subsidies if the EC and emerging developing
countries such as India, China, and Brazil did not reduce their
tariffs on agricultural and industrial products." Major trading
powers, including the EC, blamed the United States for the
collapse.43 Trade officials have continued to meet informally since
then, particularly since there was a soft re-launch of discussions in
November 2006.36
This is not the first time that one of the WTO negotiation
rounds has broken down.37' Negotiations are inevitably complex as
each WTO member has veto power over the final agreement.38'
The Uruguay Round, which began in 1986 and led to the
replacement of the GATT by the WTO in 1995, was frozen for
over a year due to antagonism between the EC and the United
States, although it was never formally suspended. "39
Since the failure of the Doha Round, the Commission appears
ready to refocus its commercial strategy on bilateral free trade
agreements so as to catch up with the United States and Japan."'
Bilateralism/regionalism is the normal consequence of failed
multilateralism, which has certainly dangerous repercussions on
weak economies." Officially, concluding the Doha Round remains
the EC's number one priority; however, since negotiations were
suspended, the EC has been looking for other ways to open up
foreign markets and keep up with its main trade rival, the United
States."2 The Americans are currently leading the race to conclude

After Effects (CUTS Ctr. for Int'l Trade, Econ. & Env't [CUTS-CITEE], Briefing Paper,
2006), http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/SuspensionDohaRoundTalks.pdf.
434. Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse,supra note 250.
435. Mehta et al., supra note 433, at 2-3.
436. Doha Round: Lamy Gives Green Light to "De Facto" Resumption of Geneva
Talks,
BRIDGES
WKLY.
TRADE
NEWS
DIG.,
Nov.
22,
2006,

http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-11-22/storyl.htm.
437. The WTO Doha Development Round, supra note 429.
438.

Id.

439. Id.
440.

EU to Boost Competitiveness Through Bilateral Trade Agreements, EURACrIv,

Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-boost-competitiveness-bilateral-tradeagreements/article-157120.
441. But see Leon Trakman, The Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements: Bane or
Beauty? (Univ. of New S. Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 54,
2007 (claiming bilateralism can actually help developing countries in the world trading
system).
442. See id. Nevertheless, according to Peter Sutherland, this proliferation of bilateral
trade agreements outside the WTO process is perceived as ,betraying the multilateral
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high-market-potential

countries." The Commission's decision"' to launch new bilateral
trade negotiations"' with countries such as India, South Korea, and
the ten ASEAN"6 states"' "could further complicate its trade
regime, and divert interest from the multilateral trading system,""
according to a bi-annual report carried out by the WTO on the
EC's trade policies and practices."9 The Commission also hopes to
negotiate more far-reaching agreements than would be possible
under the WTO talks by tackling issues such as investment,
competition policy, and public procurement - the Singapore

issues- dropped from the Doha agenda in 2003.4"'This return to a
system of bilateral agreements and FTAs will mean that the large
WTO members would be able to strong-arm the small members.
Further, it will generate higher transaction costs. In a speech to the
European Parliament's International Trade Committee on
October 17, 2006, Lamy warned that bilateral deals could
contribute

to

weakening

the

multilateral

trading

system."

ideals that underlay the WTO and its forerunner, the GATT. Alan Beattie, WTO
Hampered by "Spaghetti Bowl" Deals, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a20a0f30-6899-11d9-9183-00000e251lc8.html?nclickcheck=1.
443. Commission Pushes for Free-trade Agreements, EuRAcriv, Dec. 4, 1006,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/commission-pushes-free-trade-agreements/article160201.
444. See Press Release, EC, European Commission Welcomes Adoption of
Negotiating Mandates for New Free Trade Agreements with India, Korea and ASEAN
(Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/07/540&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
445. See Press Release, Council of the EU, Conclusions on the Recommendations to
Open Negotiations with Countries of ASEAN, India and South Korea (Apr. 23, 2007),
available at http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/2007_04_23_Councilconclusions.pdf.
446. See Press Release, ASEAN, Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN Economic
Ministers and the European Union Trade Commissioner on the Launch of Negotiations
for the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (May 4, 2007), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-EU-FTA.pdf; see also EU Launches Free-trade Talks
with ASEAN, EURACTIv, May 4, 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-launchesfree-trade-talks-asean/article-163559.
447. EU to Start Free Trade Talks with India, South Korea and Asean, EURACTIV,
Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-start-free-trade-talks-india-southkorea-asean/article-163321.
448. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/S/177 (Jan. 22, 2007), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/s77-00_e.doc.
449. See id.
450. EU to Boost Competitiveness Through Bilateral Trade Agreements, supra note
440.
451. See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Speech to the International Trade Committee
of the European Parliament (Oct. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Lamy Warns Doha Failure Will
Seriously Weaken Trade System], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
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Moreover, he argued that the growing number of bilateral and
regional trade talks..2 risked distracting from attempts to clinch a
long-elusive global deal. " ' When it came to bilateral talks, some
countries appeared to be promising concessions beyond what
would be needed to unblock the multilateral negotiations.4" Before
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Lamy said:
While bilateral agreements can be a useful complement, I do
not believe they can substitute a strong multilateral trading
system. Bilateral agreements are by their very nature
discriminatory. They have obvious limitations in terms of issues
covered since they do not tackle the toughest areas where trade
restrictive and distorting measures, such as subsidies, still
prevail. They may lead to trade diversion as opposed to trade
creation. And they complicate the trading environment of
economic operators who have to abide by a spaghetti bowl of
different rules. In short, bilateral agreements are not the easy
way out.455
Patrick Messerlin argues along the same lines by saying that
multilateral liberalization of trade "should be the center of
European trade strategy. 4.' He claims that the recent shift in EC
trade policy to negotiate bilateral agreements is taking the EC into
"dangerous waters" because the "bilateral trade agreements
considered by the EC are generally characterized by high tariff
and non-tariff barriers in
goods, and by restrictive regulations in
45 7
services and investment.

sppl-e/sppl44_e.htm.
452. See Roberto V. Fiorentino et al., The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade
Agreements: 2006 Update (WTO, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2007), available at
www.wto.org/englishlres-e/bookspe/discussion-papersl2a-e.pdf
(analyzing the main
trends and characteristics of regional trade agreements in force or under negotiation).
453. The same argument is made by a WTO report, which claims that the EC's
decision to seek bilateral free-trade agreements, as agricultural tariffs rise, could be
detrimental to the Doha negotiations on a global-trade pact. See EC, Trade Policy Review,
WT/TPR/G/177 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpre/s17700_e.doc.
454. Id.
455. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, The Doha Development Agenda: Is Time
Running Out on U.S. Leadership?, Speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Apr. 23,
2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl6le.htm [hereinafter
The Doha Development Agenda: Is Time Running Out on U.S. Leadership?].
456. Assessing EU Trade Policy in Goods, EURACriv, June 5, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/assessing-eu-trade-policy-goods/article-164278.

457. Id.
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Stephen Woolcock, however, argues that the EC's increased
use of FTAs is compatible with its commitment to multilateralism,
but only if the bloc redefines its concept of "all trade" as being 95
percent of trade and avoids excluding large bands of sensitive
products in specific sectors such as agriculture. ' While the EC will
find that it might be able to address some of its specific concerns
through bilateral agreements, it will not be able to answer all of
them. In addition, the countries that the EC will negotiate with in
these bilateral negotiations will want to see concerns like subsidies
in agriculture addressed, and that will be possible only be through
the multilateral WTO process.
In the face of globalization, the EC must remain open. ' It
must also ensure that markets abroad are open to its exports.'
European businesses often find it difficult to access foreign
markets due to high tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as
discriminatory measures applied against foreign companies."
Removing such barriers is particularly important in the services
sector, which represents around 70 percent of Europe's jobs and
the EU's gross domestic product (GDP).' 62
This proposed strategy of negotiating bilateral trade
agreements is diametrically opposed to the EC's previous trade
strategy, which focused strongly on multilateral negotiations
within the WTO. In the past, free trade deals were driven
primarily by the logic of development or geopolitical goals, rather
than economic interests. 63 That said, U.S. businesses in Europe
urged EU and U.S. leaders to stop neglecting the transatlantic
relationship in favor of boosting relations with China and
India.'They argued that the two transatlantic economies have
become so interdependent that their future growth and job
458.

See Stephen Woolcock, European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements

11, (European Ctr. for Int'l Political Econ. [ECIPE], Working Paper No. 03/2007, 2007).
459.
440.

EU to Boost Competitiveness Through Bilateral Trade Agreements, supra note

460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Martin Bailey & Diana Farrell, How Europe's Regulations Hold It Back, FIN.
TIMES

(London),

Oct.

18,

2005,

at

13,

available

at

http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/mckinseynews/pressarchive/europe-regulations.asp.
463.
440.

EU to Boost Competitiveness Through Bilateral Trade Agreements, supra note

464. Press Release, Ctr. for Transatlantic Relations [CTR], U.S. Businesses Call for
"Translatlantic Single Market," (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://transatlantic.saisjhu.edu/ConferencesMeetings/2006/transatlantic-econ-pressrelease 2006.pdf.
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creation relies not on improving their relations with China and
India, nor in completing a successful Doha Round, but in
removing existing barriers to trade and investment in order to
create a veritable transatlantic single market. 6'Now, an ambitious
deal on service liberalization is of key interest to the EC because
of its economic benefits.' Increased trade in services would also
contribute to development goals because improved transport,
information technology and telecommunications, banking, and
insurance sectors form the backbone of a growing economy."
However, trade in services faces considerable restrictions,
mostly based on national regulations such as technical standards or
licensing requirements and procedures." According to a study by
Decreux and Fontagne, more could be gained by developing and
developed countries alike from a 25 percent cut of the barriers in
services than from a 70 percent tariff cut in agriculture in the
North and a 50 percent cut in the South.69' Eliminating barriers to
trade in services could result in enormous income gains for
developing countries. 70
Prior discussions in the WTO focused on establishing
disciplines to ensure that domestic regulatory measures do not
create unnecessary barriers to trade."' Although significant
progress was made in this area, negotiations on market access
stalled because of the lack of movement on agricultural and
industrial market access.472 In a speech to the EU-India Business
Summit on October 12, 2006, Lord Vallance said that developed
and developing countries will miss out on enormous potential
economic gains because services have once again been taken
hostage by agriculture, even though the latter represents only 8

465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Informationfrom EC: The Doha Development Round, supra note 325, at 8.
468. The WTO Doha Development Round, supra note 429.
469. Yvan Decreux & Lionel Fontagnd, A QuantitativeAssessment of the Outcome of
the Doha Development Agenda (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations
Internationales, Working Paper No. 2006-10, 2006).
470. Kym Anderson et al., Doha Merchandise Trade Reform: What's at Stake for
Developing Countries?,20 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 169, 174 (2006) (citing T.W. Hertel
& R. Keeney, What's at Stake: The Relative Importance of Import Barriers, Export
Subsidies and Domestic Support, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE REFORM AND THE DOHA

DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (Kym Anderson & Will Martin eds., 2006)).
471. See generally WTO Doha Development Round, supra note 429.
472. Id.
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percent of world trade and 2 percent of developed countries'
economies.73
a. The Failure of Multilateralism?
The Doha talks were suspended on July 24, 2006, after
ministers from the EC, the United States, Australia, Brazil, India,
and Japan (the so-called G-6 countries) failed once again to reach
a deal on agriculture and industrial goods "modalities" - formulae
and figures for tariff and subsidy cuts as well as exceptions to them
- primarily due to differences on farm trade.4 4 WTO DirectorGeneral Pascal Lamy lamented at the lost opportunity to
demonstrate that multilateralism works 17' and to integrate more
vulnerable members into international trade, which offers "the
' He warned of the
best hope for growth and poverty alleviation." 76
negative impact on the world economy with the possible
resurgence of protectionism. 77 "Today there are only losers," he
said.7 Similar words were used by the International Food &
Agricultural Trade Policy Council, an organization that pursues
pragmatic policies in food and agricultural trade and development
by seeking pragmatic trade and development policies, 479 to express
its concern over the failed talks. "
Lamy blames the deterioration of the Doha round on "far too
many negotiators focused on the small picture, forgetting the
bigger one. 4 81 He recommended that countries should shift their
focus away from domestic politics and broaden their vision. ' In his
473. See Lord Vallance of Tummel, Speech at the Seventh EU-India Business Summit
in Helsinki, Fin. (Oct. 12, 2006).
474.

See generally Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, supra

note 247 (explaining the reasons for the failure of the Doha Round talks).
475. WTO, Talks Suspended: "Today There are Only Losers," http://www.wto.org/
english/newse/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july-e.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter Summary 24 July 2006].
476. Id.
477. Id.

478. Id.
479. International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council > History,
http://www.agritrade.org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
480. Press Release, Int'l Food & Agric. Trade Policy Council, Today, we are all losers
(July 24, 2006) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law
Review).
481.

U.S. Chides EU on Trade as WTO Chief Calls for Big Picture Approach,

EUBUSINESS, Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.eubusiness.com/Trade/060920111214.gx969d35.
482. See The Doha Development Agenda: Is Time Running Out on U.S. Leadership?,
supra note 455.
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view, "the challenge is less technical, than political. It is about
leadership, about compromise, about countries recognizing their
common interest in success and the collective costs of
failure. ""According to Lamy, new concessions would have to be
made in order for the talks to resume.'
Similar thoughts were expressed by Paula Lehtomaki, the
Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, who
declared that "neither industrial countries nor developing
countries win" with the suspension of WTO Doha negotiations.'
Before the World Bank Board of Governors, World Bank
President Paul Wolfowitz argued at the 2006 annual meeting in
Singapore:
[E]very party in this deal needs to compromise. The United
States needs to accept further cuts in spending on tradedistorting agricultural subsidies. The European Union needs to
reduce barriers to market access. And developing countries
such as China, India, and Brazil need to cut their tariffs on
manufactures. Developing countries also need to remove trade
barriers that make it harder for low-income countries to trade
directly with each other. 486
All EU member states have much to gain from a successful
outcome of the Doha Round. Traditionally, an open trading
regime has been beneficial to European economies. The removal
of some technical barriers to trade4 7 will provide additional
opportunities for further success. On the other hand, more
protectionism will be generated worldwide if the Doha Round
fails. '

483. Id.
484. Summary 24 July 2006, supra note 475.
485. See Press Release, Finland's EU Presidency, Neither Industrial Countries nor
Developing Countries Win Upon Suspension of WTO Doha Negotiations,
http://www.eu2006.fi/news and-documents/press-releases/vko30/en GB/164286/.
486. See Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, Path to Prosperity, Address to Board
of Governors of World Bank Group (Sept. 19,2006).
487. The technical barriers to trade are related to product standards and conformance.
The aim of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) is to
ensure that mandatory technical regulations, voluntary standards, as well as procedures
for assessing conformity with technical regulations and standards do not generate
avoidable obstacles. See generally'TBT Agreement, supra note 274.
488. THE WTO: THE ROLE OF THE EU POST-CANCON, supra note 276, at 13; see also
Patrick A. Messerlin, The EC Trade Policy and the Doha Round, 57 BETRACHTUNGEN
ZUR AUSSENWIRTSCHAFrPOLITIK 271 (providing an insight on the costs of EC's
protectionism).
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b. Consequences of Protectionism: Competing Views of NGOs
NGOs offered their own opinions as to the growth of
protectionism and the possible failure of the Doha Round. Oxfam
International, a prominent NGO, stressed the enormous cost of
further delay. According to Oxfam, "the EU and the United States
remain free to subsidize their biggest agricultural producers and
continue dumping, while developing countries continue to struggle
to ensure survival of subsistence farmers and break into rich
Northern markets. '' .. The group said the United States and EC
must "make fundamental changes to their offers" in order to
contribute to the development goal. 90 According to Oxfam's view,
the EC should make more and greater concessions to keep the
development negotiations on track. 9 ' Moreover, Oxfam argued
that the suspension of the Doha talks would not solve the
underlying reasons why a development deal remained deadlocked
and in crisis. 92' Oxfam feared that multilateralism would
deteriorate further, and was therefore "concerned that the EU and
trade agreements to
the U.S. [would] turn to damaging regional
4 93
break open developing country markets.
Not every NGO shares the same opinion. Friends of the
Earth ,j which applauded the suspension of the Doha talks, 5
argued that the WTO should have greater powers to manage trade
opening to ensure that environmental and other considerations
were taken into account. 96' According to Friends of the Earth, the
failure of the talks allowed time to review and reconsider the

489. Press Release, Oxfam Int'l, Suspending WTO Talks Resolve Nothing (July 24,
2006), availableat http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/prO60724_wto.

490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.

494. Friends of the Earth is an international network of environmental organizations in
70 countries. Friends of the Earth U.S., Who We Are, http://www.foe.org/ (last visited Oct.
8, 2007); see also Friends of the Earth Int'l, Welcome to Friends of the Earth
International, http://www.foei.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
495. Press Release, Friends of the Earth Europe, WTO Deadlock: Good News for the
Poor and the Environment (July 24, 2006), availableat http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/
Friends%20of%20the%20Earth%20Europe-tcm29-156915.doc.
496. For more on the relationship between environmental agreements and WTO rules,
see The Relationship Between MEAs and WTO Rules and EU Trade Policy Making
(Ecologic, Inst. for Int'l & European Envtl. Policy, Background Paper, May 10, 2004),
available at http://www.ecologic-events.de/eu-trade-policy/en/documents/Background-en
040408.pdf.
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multilateral trading system in its entirety. 97' The group argued that
this news would be welcomed around the world because the
proposed WTO deal would have further impoverished the world's
poorest people and caused irreparable damage to the
environment.9 Friends of the Earth pointed to the fact that some
developing countries had refused to proceed with the talks because
they feared that a WTO deal would cause immense harm to
millions of small and subsistence farmers.'"
Other NGOs more critical of free trade viewed the collapse of
talks as good news for the world's poor and the environment, on
the grounds that it is better to have no deal than a bad deal. In
particular, Greenpeace called on world leaders to use the
opportunity to build a "new global trade system based on equity
and sustainability. ''s ° According to a report published by
Greenpeace, there is a need to "secure a safe political and legal
space for the environment...... The report goes on to outline "a
number of alternative approaches, which would enable
governments to move the current negotiations on the relationship
between trade rules and MEAs [multilateral environmental
agreements] from the WTO to a more suitable forum.""
According to the report, "the emergence of more environmentrelated trade dispute. . . has re-emphasized the need" for an
alternative to the WTO dispute settlement procedure for "solving
trade and environment conflicts."50 3
c. Trying to Get Negotiations Back on Track and the Way
Forward
Little was discussed in the way of specific new concessions
that could spur the resumption of multilateral trade negotiations. '
497. See Press Release, Friends of the Earth Europe, supra note 495.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. See Press Release, Greenpeace International, "Face it, Doha is Dead": Time to
Look at Alternatives to WTO (July 24, 2006), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/
international/press/releases/doha-is-dead.
501. Stephanie Pfahl, Is the WTO the Only Way? Safeguarding Multilateral
Environmental Agreements From International Trade Rules and Settling Trade and

Environment Disputes Outside the WTO 3 (Adelphi Consult et al., Briefing Paper, Dec. 2,
2005), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/isthe-wto-the-only-way.pdf.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Doha Round Starting To Thaw?, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Sept. 13,
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Nevertheless, ministers and senior officials from WTO members
including the G-20 developing countries, the United States, the
EC, Japan, and four West African cotton-producing nations
pledged to work towards re-launching the stalled talks at a
September 9-10, 2006 meeting in Rio de Janeiro." The meeting,
which coincided with a G-20 ministerial summit, marked the first
big gathering at that level since July 2006."o Brazil's Minister of
Foreign Affairs said that he had seen signs of flexibility from other
countries during the weekend's discussions. 7 Upon his return to
Tokyo, Japan's Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister
Shoichi Nakagawa told journalists that there should be some signs
indicating the end of the cessation in October 2006.? However,
governments needed to agree on modalities by the end of July
2006 in order to translate them into a Doha Round package of
legal agreements before the mid-2007 expiration of the Bush
administration's congressional mandate to negotiate trade
agreements. Without this "trade promotion authority," the Bush
administration is unable to submit trade deals to Congress for a
yes-or-no vote without the possibility of major amendments; thus,
the United States ceases to be a credible negotiator." Many trade
observers, as well as senior U.S. officials, suggested that if an
agreement appeared to be coming together by March 2007,
Congress might have been persuaded to extend the

2006, at 1, availableat http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-09-13/BRIDGESWeekly1O-29.pdf.
505. What Can We Expect Next?. BRIDGES MONTHLY REV., Aug. 2006, at 1, available
at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridgesBRIDGES10-5.pdf.

506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Doha Round Starting to Thaw, supra note 504.

509. Id. Fast-track trade authority [now known as trade promotion authority] allows
the President to submit to Congress for an up-or-down vote on a bill to implement into
U.S. law any international trade agreement entered into by the United States. WALLACH,
supra note 3, at 3. It is an unusual procedure through which the U.S. Congress delegates
the President constitutional authority to set the terms of trade for the purpose of
negotiating trade agreements. Id. The fast-track mechanism also provides special rules
which strictly limit Congress's role regarding such trade agreements to a "yes" or "no"
vote on a completed deal, with no amendments allowed and only twenty hours of debate.
Id. Fast-track causes an extraordinary shift in power, with the White House empowered to

sign and enter into trade agreements before Congress ever votes on them. Id.
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administration's trade promotion authority. ' ° Failing that, the
Doha negotiations are likely to remain stagnant until 2009." '
Since the Trade Promotion Act (TPA) of 2002 expired in July
2007, Congress subsequently resumed its power to make
amendments to any trade deal presented to it.1 2 This makes it less
attractive for other WTO members to participate in negotiations,
because there is uncertainty surrounding their ability to obtain real
commitments from the United States. 13' The U.S. administration
signaled that it would attempt to extend the TPA to make
concluding an agreement more feasible; otherwise, trading
partners are unlikely to agree to a trade deal that could later be
picked apart by U.S. lawmakers."4 However, "[p]ersistent
skepticism in sections of Congress about the benefits of economic
globalization means that support for some bilateral and
multilateral trade deals is far from clear. 5 . Also unclear is the
willingness to renew the TPA.516
Some Geneva-based negotiators believe that it may be
possible to secure a short-term extension of this TPA to cover the
end of the Doha Round negotiations, even with the recently5 17 Some Geneva-based
elected Democratic Congress.
negotiators
believed, however, that in order to get the Bush administration
and Congress interested, there had to have been hard evidence of
a viable deal by the end of March 2007.1 Another said that there
were no guarantees that attempts to win Congressional support
would ultimately succeed." 9 In fact, most press accounts suggest
that the U.S. legislature's already-shaky support for bilateral and
multilateral trade talks will be further weakened by the

510.

World Bank, IMF, Finance Ministers Call for Reviving Doha Round Talks,

BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Sept. 20, 2006, at 1, availableat http://www.ictsd.org/
weekly/06-09-20/BRIDGESWeeklylO-30.pdf.
511. Id.
512.

See US Trade Policy Stuck in Neutral as TPA MandateWinds Down, BRIDGES

WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 13, 2007, at 6, available at http://www.ictsd.org/
weekly/07-06-13/BRIDGESWeeklyl 1-21 .pdf.
513. Id.
514. Id.

515. Id. at 5.
516. Id.
517. See Doha Round:

The "Time Out" is Over, But Will Negotiations Resume?,

BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Nov. 15, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.ictsd.org/

weekly/06-11-15/BRIDGESWeeklylO-38.pdf.
518. Id. at 3.
519. Id.
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Democrats' ascent to power in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate. 2 ° In particular, the Bush administration is now
believed to be even less likely to get Congress to extend its fasttrack negotiating authority past the expiry date of July 2007.'2
"Without this, chances to conclude the struggling Doha Round
negotiations in the next few years would virtually disappear," even
if WTO Members had managed to revive the talks early in 2007.522
Midterm Congressional elections in the United States, which
took place on November 7, 2006, had been looming over the
negotiations. However, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab
argued that the outcome of the elections would not change
Washington's stance in the negotiations.123 Broadly restating the
standard U.S. position, she noted that "to break the current
deadlock, we need commitments that take us beyond current
positions in four key areas., 24 These key areas are (1) substantial
improvements by the EC, Japan, and other G-10 countries in
agricultural tariff cuts, especially for sensitive products that would
be exempted from the full tariff cuts; (2) deeper cuts in agricultural
tariffs by major developing countries, including for sheltered
special products; (3) deeper EC and U.S. reductions in tradedistorting support; and (4) cuts in industrial tariffs by developed
and major developing countries.5
Pascal Lamy called an informal meeting of the Trade
Negotiations Committee (TNC) on the morning of November 16,
2006. The stated purpose of the heads-of-delegation level
gathering was to discuss the situation in the DDA negotiations.26
This was the first session of the committee charged with
overseeing the Doha Round negotiations since they were
suspended in July 2006.57 The committee meeting might imply that
several WTO members would use the informal TNC meeting to
520. Democratic Win To Affect US Trade Policy, But How?, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Nov. 15, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-1115/BRIDGESWeekly10-38.pdf.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Susan C. Schwab, Op-Ed., Still Ready to Talk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2006, available
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=
November&x=20061109115012SAikceinawz0.314953.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. See Doha Round: The "Time Out" is Over, But Will Negotiations Resume?, supra
note 517.
527. Id.
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agitate for the resumption of the whole multilateral trade
negotiation business as usual, including the resumption of work in
all of the Doha Round negotiating committees.528 However, WTO
Members need to decide on how to revive the talks, particularly
since it was far from apparent that deadlock-breaking offers of
tariff or subsidy cuts would be forthcoming. 29
A November 10, 2006, Green Room meeting to which Lamy
invited about twenty influential members, including those from the
United States, Brazil, EC, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
and India, was pivotal in Lamy's decision to convene the informal
TNC.5 3' According to one WTO ambassador, participants at that

meeting broadly fell into two camps: those reluctant to restart
formal negotiations and those who felt the suspension of
negotiations in July failed to do what it had been intended to do.33
The former group argued that no new concessions had been
made. 32 Resuming the talks, they said, would quickly lead to the
old impasse - this time perhaps for good. 3 Those pushing to
restart negotiations ultimately carried the day. They argued that
the suspension of talks, instead of shocking countries into
softening their stances, had the opposite effect of taking off
pressure altogether." They argued that the resumed talks would at
least force key WTO Members to state publicly that they had
nothing new to bring to the negotiating table."'
In a speech at Chatham House on November 14, 2006, Peter
Sutherland argued that the cost of failure was potentially
prohibitive, because "if the Doha Development Agenda goes out
of the window so, eventually, may the effective functioning of the
multilateral trading system.,13 ' He further argued that once

negotiations resume, WTO members would do well to agree on an
achievable, if less ambitious Doha agreement, in the interest of
preserving the multilateral trading system."7 Sutherland
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Peter Sutherland, EU/US Trade Relations - Is A Free Trade Area an Alternative
to Doha?, The John C. Whitehead Lecture at Chatham House (Nov. 14, 2006) (transcript
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.).
537. Id.
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emphasized that such a deal would be "well worth having and
would deliver some creditable development goals.""3 8 More
significantly, "it would show that multilateralism can deliver,
before all credibility is lost."'
As for Commissioner Mandelson's strategy to re-launch
negotiations, it will have to be based on convincing others that
what was on the table in July 2006 is better than no deal at all, for
it seems unlikely that further concessions will be made by the
EU.Although in his November 2006 speech at the Hindustan
Times Leadership Summit, Mandelson pledged "to improve[the
EC's]farm-tariff offer by adding substantially to the 39% it offered
54 Although this offer was within close reach of the
a year ago.""
cuts demanded by developing countries, it was met by resistance
from the United States.4 ' Mandelson further stated:
[I]f Doha fails, the systemic and economic costs will be felt
everywhere. It is not just the hundreds of billions of euros
annually in new goods and services trade that will be lost - but
the multilateral agreements, too, that will extend duty free
quota, free access for the poorest nations and straighten out
customs rules and add billions of euros to developing country
revenues. 542
In a December 2006 report, Lamy seemed quite confident
that it was possible to get the Doha negotiations back on track and
conclude the Doha Round in 2007, thanks to an increasing level of
engagement among the various WTO Members.'43 However, this
could only happen if countries came forward with new concrete
concessions." Otherwise, the Doha talks risked total collapse. 4'
That said, Lamy acknowledged that no one was going to simply
come forward and specify how much more they were willing to

538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Peter Mandelson, Trade Comm'r, EC, Providing Leadership in the Doha Round,
Speech at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit (Nov. 18, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission-barroso/mandelson/speeches-articles/sppml3l-en.htm.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, We Can Stay on Track to Successfully Conclude
the Round Next Year (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/news06_e/tnc_chair-report-14decO6_e.htm.
544. Lamy: Concluding Round in 2007 Not Out of Reach Yet, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG., Dec. 20, 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-12-20/storyl.htm.
545. Id.

424

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 29:339

offer and how much less they were willing to accept in return.' 6 He
said that since there is a tradeoff between ambition and flexibility
- the deeper the overall tariff and subsidy cuts, the more flexibility
WTO Members will demand to shelter specific products from
reforms - trade officials could examine alternatives for potential
compromises. 7
WTO countries "would also have to test these different
scenarios with influential domestic constituencies to assess what
they could tolerate. '' 14' Lamy had already indicated that fullfledged negotiations, including those at the ministerial level, could
only restart once governments explicitly offered deeper subsidy or
tariff cuts and moderated what they wanted in exchange. 9 But
Lamy had no intentions to break the deadlock by proposing a
compromise text of his own, because such a maneuver would be
"very risky" and would sit uneasily with the "bottom-up"
principles of the WTO. °
In order to avoid a compromised text, Commission President
Jos6 Manuel Barroso and U.S. President George W. Bush agreed
that the EC and the United States must urgently resolve
differences that have been blocking the conclusion of a global
trade pact.'lAt the meeting, President Barroso stressed the need
for the United States to make further concessions if the Doha
Round is to succeed: "The U.S. holds the key to making a deal
possible in 2007." ' Commissioner Mandelson said after the
meeting that "[t]here's not an agreement to be announced on key
issues or key numbers, but there's certainly much greater
understanding and a measure of convergence now.. 53 U.S. Trade
Representative Susan Schwab said at the meeting that "nobody is
going to reach an agreement on the basis of an artificial deadline
[of March 2007] if the content isn't there that is substantively and
politically viable." ' 4 Hence, even if the major trade actors of the
WTO agree that there is a need to act quickly, precaution is also
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. EU, US Attempt Doha Revival, EURAcrIv, Jan. 9,2007, http://www.euractiv.con/
en/trade/eu-us-attempt-doha-revival/article-160722.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
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offered.
At the World Social Forum 2007, which brought together
activists in favor of an alternative globalization rather than that of
the business and political elite (as represented at the annual
meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos),"' civil-society
groups were more skeptical about reviving the Doha Round.5 "
These groups say that the Doha Round has lost sight of what
should have been its main priority - helping developing nations to
escape from poverty. 7

During a Green Room meeting on January 22, 2007, Lamy
agreed to a request by the United States, the EC, and Japan that
he stress that services trade is a critical component of the overall
market-access negotiations in Davos. Specifically, they requested
he emphasize that meaningful offers of services liberalization
could help unlock possible concessions by major developed
countries in the agriculture and industrial goods talks."' Domestic
regulation has long been guarded jealously by WTO Members as
their sovereign prerogative. "9 Domestic regulations typically cover
qualification requirements, qualification procedures, licensing
requirements, licensing procedures, and technical standards for
suppliers. All have the potential to be unduly trade-restrictive.
White House officials indicated that President Bush

555. In January 2007, around 30 trade ministers from the world's largest economies
revived global trade negotiations by agreeing to restart multilateral trade talks in Geneva,
Switzerland. See Davos brings global trade deal 'in sight,' EURACTIV, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/davos-brings-global-trade-deal-sight/article-l61252 (last
visited April 21, 2007).
556. See Press Release, Oxfam Int'l, Davos meeting must signal change of direction in
trade talks, (Jan. 3, 2007) (available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/2007/
pr070123-davos) (last visited Feb 12, 2007.). See also, Pros and cons of reviving Doha,
EURACriv, Apr. 11, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/pros-cons-revivingdoha/article-158665 (last visited April 21, 2007) (detailing the pros and cons of the revival
of the Doha Round).
557. See, e.g., Poor will Gain Nothing from latest attempts to kick-start Doha trade deal,
ACTIONAID UK, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.actionaid.org/index.asp?pageid=1545 (last
visited Feb. 12, 2007).
558. Some Members Call for Greater Focus on Services, as Talks Resume in Geneva,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Jan. 24, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-01-

24/story2.htm.
559. Id.
560. Id. Article VI of the GATS mandated WTO Members to negotiate possible
disciplines on domestic regulation. Id. The December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration specified that new disciplines should be developed before the end of the Doha
Round. See Dec. 18 Ministerial Draft, supra note 316.
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attempted to call on Congress to renew his TPA mandate.'
Extending this mandate is widely believed to be essential to
concluding the Doha Round in the foreseeable future."' However,
the Democratic leaders that control the U.S. Congress indicated
that any extension of fast track authority would be accompanied
by additional trade policy conditions.163 Regardless, U.S. trade
officials seemed hopeful that a breakthrough in the negotiations by
spring 2007 would help win support in Congress for TPA
renewal. '
In order to achieve a successful deal Lamy has said for the
past year that the basic ingredients of a Doha deal are clear: the
United States must agree to deeper cuts to its ceiling on tradedistorting farm subsidies, the EC must offer more agricultural
market-access,"6 - and developing countries such as Brazil and India
must further reduce their industrial tariffs. Further, several things
are required in order to move such a complex international trade
negotiations scenario forward.5 " Certainly, a necessary ingredient
is political leadership from major WTO Members since the
deadlock in agriculture and NAMA has "haunted both bilateral
and plurilateral consultations on services. '5 67 Then, once the
previous uncertainty in these areas is cleared, the chances increase
for a more ambitious services package." However, services
negotiations are not simply "pulled" by negotiations in other
fields, but also by playing a role in "pushing" forward the Doha
Round. 69
Second, expectations of WTO Members about services trade
561.

Larry Elliot, Bush Seeks to Renew Authority to Fast Track Trade Deal,

GUARDIAN,
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29,

2007,

http://business.guardian.co.uk/davos2OO7/story/

0,,2001022,00.html.
562. Doha Negotiations Set to Pick up Despite Lack of New Offers, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG., Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-01-31/storyl.htm.
563. See id.
564. Id.

565. See G-33 Ministers Call on Developed Countries to Take First Step to Break
Doha Deadlock,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS
DIG., Mar. 21,
2007,
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-03-21/storyl.htm.
566. But see Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and its Institutional Impediments (Univ. of
New S. Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 46, 2007), availableat

http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps/art46/

(arguing

that

systemic

institutional

impediments still exist, which not only hinder the successful conclusion of the Doha

Round,
567.
568.
569.

but also prevent effective long-term institutional governance and vision).
Bernabe & Cheng, supra note 42, at 5.
Id.
Id.
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may need to be modified in accordance with the overall
development of negotiations in the Doha Round.57 Regarding
access to the market, certain major developed nations may have
very little room to offer anything amounting to breakthrough in
Mode 4.57' For example, "[t]he United States remains caught up
with security concerns and border control measures against illegal
migration stemming from its common border with Mexico," and
the EU continues to have its own political difficulties managing
intra-EU migration.'
Third, through their development agencies, many developed
countries have tried to help developing nations by providing
technical and financial assistance. 7 These nations should continue
these practices with the goal of improving the ability of nations "to
implement the appropriate services trade restructuring and
regulatory reform, thus increasing their capacity to engage actively
in international trade and trade negotiations. '
Fourth, the WTO must create a safety net in the form of an
"emergency safeguard mechanism." ' This would allow WTO
Members to modify their commitments temporarily if
liberalization results in unpleasant negative consequences. 6
Lastly, aid for trade in services should be made available to
strengthen (1) "the ability of developing countries to negotiate
from a more informed position;" (2) "the capacity to better
manage the process of market opening and domestic regulation;"
and (3) "the ability to supply newly-opened foreign markets."5 7 To
implement these ideas, some suggest making adjustments to the
special and differential treatment proposals in a positive manner
by making binding commitments on aid for trade in services."'
Others have proposed redrafting one of the LDC modalities
articles to achieve the same result.5 9
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2. Resumption of the Multilateral Talks
On February 7, 2007, Lamy was able to report to the WTO
General Council that the talks had resumed across the board.5" In
his report to the council, Lamy said that, "political conditions are
now more favorable for the conclusion of the Round than they
have been for a long time. 58' He added that "political leaders
around the world clearly want us to get fully back to business,
although we in turn need their continuing commitment."' As for
the future, he added: "With regard to timing, in my view we should
not attempt to set [for] ourselves any false deadlines. We are all
very much aware of the urgency of the task ahead, but it is also
important to reach a substantive outcome which is acceptable to
everyone." 83
Since the negotiations stalled in July 2006, political and
business leaders haveacknowledged the considerable costs that
would be incurred by a failure to conclude a global-trade
pact.Business groups have voiced their concern about the potential
loss of considerable economic welfare gains, both for industrialized
as well as developing countries, and the risk of weakening the
safety net that the WTO provides against rising protectionist
tendencies." Furthermore, the Global Services Coalition (GSC)
held a series of meetings with WTO ambassadors and officials,
pressing the case for renewed efforts to produce a more
commercially attractive package of liberalization commitments in
the current Doha Round."' Lord Vallance of Tummel, Chairman
580. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, We Have Resumed Negotiations Fully Across the
Board
(Feb.
7,
2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news07_e/gc-dgstat7feb07_e.htm.
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available at http://static.tabd.com/

manilaGems/EuroBusforDoha250107.pdf. This joint EU industry statement supporting
the Doha Round was joined by the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU
(AmCham EU), European Services Forum (ESF), Eurochambres, EuroCommerce,

Foreign Trade Association (FTA), and the Confederation of European Business
(UNICE).
585. See generally Press Release, Global Services Coalition [GSC], Progress in Services
Negotiations Needed to Secure Business Support for Doha Round (Feb. 21, 2007),

http://www.uscsi.org/press/022107GSC-final-press-statement.doc.
GSC
membership
includes the leading service industry associations from Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
Caribbean region, Chile, EU, Hong Kong, Japan, India, New Zealand, Taiwan, and the
United States. Id.
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of the European Services Forum, expressed "cautious optimism"
His
about the prospects for completion of the Doha Round.
comments were tempered by his warning that much more progress
is needed on services if a Doha Round trade deal is to gain the
support of the global services industry."'
For its part, as has been the case in earlier stages of the WTO
negotiations, the official community has continued to stress that
further progress in the services area is linked inextricably to its
interests being satisfied in other areas of the Doha Round talks,
notably in agriculture and in goods trade."n In this sense, during
their first formal meeting in Delhi in April 2007 since global trade
talks broke down in July 2006, the EC, United States, India, Brazil,
Japan, and Australia expressed confidence that a deal could be
concluded by the end of the year.5 9A consensus among these six
WTO Members was considered crucial to an agreement among all
WTO Members. 9 ° Negotiators wanted to "imprint a sense of
urgency on the talks" by setting a new year-end target. 9 ' As
evidence of this urgency, the EU Trade Commissioner, U.S. Trade
Representative, Brazilian Foreign Minister, and Indian Commerce
and Industry Minister indicated that they would meet in mid-May
to "assess progress and instruct their officials on how to
proceed. '92 On April 18, the EU trade chief said that the four
representatives would meet three times over the next two
months. 93 However, Indian Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, who
hosted the gathering, said that meeting the year-end deadline
would depend on whether his nation's concerns were addressed. 9 '
He stressed that content was more important than the speed of
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. Arnaud Rodier, Les negociations de Doha butent toujours sur le dossier agricole,
LE FIGARO (Fr.), Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/20070413.FIG000000099lesnegociations de dohabutent-toujours sur-le dossier-agricole.html.
589. Trade Powers Agree to Finish Doha by End of 2007, EURACriv, Apr. 13, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/trade-powers-agree-finish-doha-2007/article-163122.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. G-6 Ministers Agree to Work to Conclude Doha Round by End of 2007, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-0418/storyl.htm.
593. Id.
594. Kartik Goyal & Ashok Bhattacharjee, US, EU, India Aim to Finish Doha Round
by 2007 End (Update 3), BLOOMBERG (Austl. & N.Z.), Apr. 12, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601081&sid=aJxCyI1B.F9w&refer=australia
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negotiations.595
Meanwhile, as the ICTSD pointed out, "some countries had
been growing increasingly uneasy about the G-4's discussions, and
all the more so with their apparent failure to make meaningful
progress." 9 ' The secrecy with which these discussions were
conducted only heightened anxieties. 97 G-4 officials declined to
provide details of the incremental progress that they claimed to be
making on issues such as cutting farm tariffs and subsidies.9 This
led some observers to wonder whether the four nations were in the
process of putting together a compromise, or simply trying to
manage the political fallout from an eventual collapse.5 9 On the
diagnosis of the G-4 meeting, Pascal Lamy argued that they were
locked in a "prisoners' dilemma."' They "are somewhat paralyzed
by fear that any move in the negotiation by any one of them will
be pocketed by the others and will not lead to reciprocal moves.""
After their April meeting in Lahore, Pakistan, ministers from
the Cairns Group of farm exporters warned that "action is needed
now to avoid putting the Doha Round at grave risk of drifting
indefinitely, or even failing."' They called on the EC, United
States, and Japan to "come forward with concrete contributions
without any further delay," saying that "as members responsible
for the greatest distortions in global agricultural trade," they "must
do much more to 6give
effect to the far-reaching mandate for
0 3
agricultural reform.
In the specific case of services trade, two weeks of intensive
market-access negotiations in services trade started at the WTO in
mid-April 2007."4 These marked the first services meetings to be
595. Id..
596. Divisions Unresolved, WTO Members Gear Up for Another Push Towards Doha
Deal, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/0704-25/storyl.htm.
597. Id.
598. Id. The G-4 refers to the United States, Brazil, India, and the EU. Id.
599. Id.
600. The Doha Development Agenda: Is Time Running Out on U.S. Leadership?,
supra note 455.
601. Id.
602. Sajid Chaudhry, Removal of Global Agriculture Trade Distortions: US, EU and
Japan Need to Do Much More: Communiqug, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Apr. 19, 2007,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007 %5C04%5C19%5Cstory_19-42007pg5_6.
603. Id.
604. Int'l Fin. Servs. London [IFSL], Ongoing Discussions in WTO Round: Raising
the Profile on Services, http://www.ifsl.org.uk/tradepolicy/news-index.cfm?Newsltem=274
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conducted in formal negotiating mode since the Doha Round talks
broke down in July 2006, although there had been informal talks in
the interim." This first week was dedicated to plurilateral
meetings between groups of demandeur countries, who were
seeking new market-opening commitments, and groups of
predominantly developing countries, to which the demandeur
countries had submitted collective requests for liberalization in
February 2006.' Although many developing countries were
reluctant open their foreign services markets any further without
seeing more progress in agriculture and industrial tariffs
discussions, some of the major demandeur members of the WTO,
including the EC and the United States, identified key
"breakthrough" sectors where they were "especially eager to see
new liberalization."" According to observers, the plurilateral
negotiations were more focused than they had been in the past,
and benefited from "more thorough preparation by the requesting
[WTO] Members."' "Each of these sector-specific negotiations
[were] coordinated by one sponsor of the collective request, and
each had a structured agenda unlike the more free-wheeling
discussions

in

previous

plurilateral

discussions. "'

The

participating countries were specifically asked whether they would
meet the liberalization commitments set out in the collective
request, and give explanation for their inability to do so."' Each
targeted country was also "asked whether they were prepared to
formally bind the level of liberalization actually applied in practice
in each sector" and, if they were unable to do so, to give an
explanation for this inability. "'
The second week was reserved for bilateral negotiations
between individual WTO countries."2 After a failure to achieve
(last visited July 29, 2007).
605. Services Cluster Finishes with New Focus on "Breakthrough Sectors," BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., May 2, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-05-02/story2.htm.
606. Id.
607. Id.

608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id. In the past, it had proved easier for countries facing requests to take a
defensive approach when they wanted to, by asking the different sponsors a series of
technical questions about precisely what they were seeking. See Services: Demandeurs,
Requested Members Both Content with Initial Plurilaterals,BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS
DIG., Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-04-12/storyl.htm.
612. Services Cluster Finishes with New Focus on "Breakthrough Sectors," supra note
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substantive results via plurilateral talks which took place in the
first half of 2006, the United States, a key demandeur,refocused its
negotiating strategy on the bilateral approach, "where it could
more effectively apply its stronger negotiating leverage against
developing country trading partners. 61 3 The bilateral negotiations
were even more focused than the plurilateral negotiations, as
major demandeurs targeted WTO members on their most critical
export interests. " The EC, for example, identified financial,
telecommunications,
computer-related
services,
maritime
transport, distribution, postal and courier services, construction,
environment, and legal services as its breakthrough sectors.6 5 The
"breakthrough sectors" idea further prompted Mexican
Ambassador Fernando de Mateo, chair of the services negotiating
body, to "adopt a sectoral approach in his continuing series of
'enchilada talks' with a group of ambassadors from about two
dozen selected WTO members.6 1 ' However, this move prompted
debate among a smaller circle of demandeurs, the so-called
"Really Good Friends of Services," over precisely what the
breakthrough sectors should be and how to set the order of their
discussion.' 7 In the view of one delegate, the combination of
bilateral and plurilateral negotiations during the ongoing cluster of
services meetings is a response to the different approaches favored
by various WTO members.

605.
613. Services Clusters Underway with Plurilateral Market Access Talks, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-0418/wtoinbrief.htm.
614. Services Cluster Finishes with New Focus on "Breakthrough Sectors," supra note
605. Among these were Brazil, India, China, and the four big markets within ASEAN Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Id.
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. Id. For some time, it has been obvious that the old Quad (composed of Canada,
the U.S., the EC, and Japan) could no longer play a leading role in providing direction for
international negotiations and then securing support for their position from other
delegations. J. Robert Vastine, Services Negotiations in the Doha Round: Promise and
Reality, GLOBAL ECON. J., 2005, at 10. This was due to the fact that WTO membership has
become very large and unwieldy, and because new blocs of WTO members have formed
to represent regional interests (such as the G-20). Id. In this context, the "Really Good
Friends of Services" was conceived to try to fill this void. Id. However, its membership
grew too large and included members that did not share similar interests. Id.
618. Services Clusters Underway with PlurilateralMarket Access Talks, supra note 613.
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V. IMPACT OF THE NICE, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND LISBON TREATIES
ON SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS

The developments of the Nice Treaty are significant for the
built-in agenda of the WTO negotiations,6 "9 which states that
several areas of trade, including intellectual property rights and
services trade, should be reviewed for further liberalization every
five years. 20 Since the Nice Treaty, the EC's competence to
conclude agreements with third states or international
organizations explicitly covers trade in services and the
commercial aspects of intellectual property rights.62"' Ever since
corporations have demanded further centralization of EC
decision-making in international trade via the Nice Treaty, EU
NGOs have campaigned against providing the EC with a fast-track
system in WTO negotiations.62 Jean-Victor Louis describes the
amended paragraph 5 of Article 133 of the EC Treaty as a way of
extending the EC treaty-making powers in trade policy issues to
Commission Equipped For New WTO Disasters, CORP. EUR.
The GATS,
including its Annexes and Related Instruments, sets out a work program that is normally
referred to as the "built-in" agenda. See id. The program reflects both the fact that not all
services-related negotiations could be concluded within the time frame of the Uruguay
Round, and that Members have already committed themselves, in Article XIX of the
GATS, to successive rounds aimed at achieving a progressively higher level of
liberalization. In addition, various GATS Articles provide for issue-specific negotiations
intended to define rules and disciplines for domestic regulation (Article VI), emergency
safeguards (Article X), government procurement (Article XIII), and subsidies (Article
XV). These negotiations are currently under way. At the sectoral level, negotiations on
basic telecommunications were successfully concluded in February 1997 and negotiations
in the area of financial services in mid-December 1997. In these negotiations, Members
achieved significantly improved commitments with a broader level of participation.
620. Id.
621. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133 5. The Treaty of Amsterdam had already
created an enabling clause for the EU Council to extend the application of the common
commercial policy provisions in Article 133, paragraph 5, to international negotiations and
agreements on services and intellectual property. However, the EC had not yet made use
of this possibility. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union,
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
622. Following the U.S. experience in trade agreements, the EU fast-track procedure
refers to the authority that the EU trade commissioner has to negotiate agreements that
the EU Council can approve or disapprove but cannot amend. The Council agrees on the
mandate, and votes the trade agreement once it has been concluded. The European
Parliament makes recommendations via its avis (simple or conforme) about the mandate
or the course of the negotiations. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, The EU Institutions and Their
Modus Operandi in the World Trading System, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 151-53 (2005).
619. Nice Treaty:

OBSERVER, Apr. 2001, http://www.corporateeurope.org/observer8/nice.html.
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trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual
property rights.623 In other words, the Nice Treaty has created a
communitarian approach to services trade, with the exception of
health, education, and audiovisual services.
The amended paragraph 5 does not affect the right of the EU
Member States to maintain and conclude agreements with third
countries or international organizations insofar as such agreements
comply with Community law and other relevant international
agreements."4 In other words, the competence to negotiate
agreements is not exclusive EC competence and not new to EC
law; shared competence had already been used in Article 111,
paragraph 5, EC on economic and monetary policy,' Article 174,
paragraph 4, EC on environmental policy,62 and Article 181,
paragraph 2, EC on development cooperation" (as inserted by the
Maastricht Treaty). Much case law from the European Court of
Justice, 29 as well as a vast body of literature 3. deals with the
623. Jean-Victor Louis, Le Trait de Nice, 76 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX. DROIT
EUROPEEN 25-34 (2001).

624. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133 $ 5(4).
625. EC Treaty art.111. Article 111, 1 5 EC reads: "Without prejudice to Community
competence and Community agreements as regards economic and monetary union,
Member States may negotiate in international bodies and conclude international
agreements."
626. EC Treaty art. 174. Article 174 (4) EC reads:
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States
shall cooperate with third countries and with the c: "Without prejudice to Community
competence and Community agreements as regards economic and monetary union,
Member States may negotiate in international bodies and conclude international
agreements."
626. Id at art. 174. Article 174 (4) EC reads:
Competent international organizations [sic]. The arrangements for Community
cooperation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the
third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance
with Article 300.
627. Id at art. 174. Article 174 (4) EC reads:
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States
shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organizations
[sic]. The arrangements for Community cooperation may be the subject of agreements
between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and
concluded in accordance with Article 300.
628. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191); Louis, supra note
623.
629. Case C-467-98, Comm'n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9519; Case C- 468/98,
Comm'n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9575; Case C-469/98, Comm'n v. Finland, 2002 E.C.R.
1-9627; Case C-471/98, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9681; Case 472/98, Comm'n v.
Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9741; Case C-475/98, Comm'n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9797;
and Case C-476/98, Comm'n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9855.
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allocation of external competences between the EC and its
member states before Nice.
A. Nature of and Ways to Exercise the Powers
As opposed to the powers in Article 133, paragraphs 1-4 of
the EC Treaty as amended by the Nice Treaty, those in Article
133, paragraphs 5-7 are shared between the EC and its member
states. One scholar, however, argues that these are exclusive
powers and further claims that in Article 133, paragraph 5(4),
631
Another commentator claims
there is a habilitation sp~cifique.

that this provision establishes concurrent powers."'
Article 133, paragraph 5(4) states that paragraph 5 does not
affect the right of the EU Member States to maintain and conclude
agreements with third countries or international organizations
insofar as such agreements comply with EC law and other relevant
international agreements.633 This provision applies to trade in
services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights,
because agreements in this field are not covered by paragraphs 1-4
of Article 133. Paragraph 5 tacitly recognizes shared competence
between the EC and its member states, although there is no
explicit statement of such. Therefore, one would wonder whether
there is a duty to cooperate between the EC and its member states,
as referred to by the ECJ's Opinion 1/94.6"

What appears to be a requirement in the exercise of their
concurrent powers is that EU member states must comply with EC
law. " This means that EU member states must abstain from
630. See, e.g., C. Vedder, Artikel 133 EGV, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN
UNION, KOMMENTAR II, 1-68 (Eberhard Grabitz.et al. eds., 2001); INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASPEcTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Martti Koskenniemi, ed., 1998); THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS (A. Dashwood & C. Hillion eds., 2000); IAN
MACLEOD ET AL., THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(1996).
631. See Eleftherina Neframi, La Politique Commerciale Commune Selon le Traite de
Nice, 37 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 605,626 (2001).

632. See Stefan Griller, Die Gemeinsame Handelspolitik Nach Nizza - Ansatze Eines
Neuen

Aussenwirtschaftsrechts?, in

DIE

EU

NACH

NIZZA.

ERGEBNISSE

UND

PERSPEKTIVEN 167 (S. Griller & W. Hummer eds., 2002).
633. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133. Article 133, paragraph 5.4 reads: "This
paragraph shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude
agreements with third countries or international organisations insofar as such agreements
comply with Community law and other relevant international agreements."
634. Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267 [hereinafter Opinion 1/94].
635. See Von Horst Gunter Krenzler & Christian Pitschas, Fortschritt oder
Stagnation? Die Gemeinsame Handelspolitik Nach Nizza, Europarecht (2001), 442, 455;
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entering into agreements in matters where the EC has enacted
intra-EC rules.636 Article 133, paragraph 6(1) states that the EC
alone cannot conclude agreements if the agreements include
provisions which go beyond the EC's internal powers. 637 Therefore,
a regime of mixed agreements exists because the conclusion of
these agreements would require the signature of the EC and its
member states. 638 This article was introduced to prevent the
adoption of agreements that would go beyond the EC's internal
powers and lead to harmonization in areas where the Treaty
expressly rules this out.639 The next subparagraph corroborates this
interpretation by stating that agreements relating to trade in
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social
and human health services, shall be concluded as mixed
agreements by both the EC and its member states.40
In such situations, the question of who is competent for what
in relation to international agreements where the EC and its
Member States have shared competence is unavoidable.6 1 Some
authors say that shared competence "complicates the allocation of
powers and responsibilities between the EC and the member states
and is thus bound to cause difficulties for both international trade
negotiations and for potentially necessary dispute settlement in the
WTO. 6"2 The inclusion of this derogation took place at the
insistence of the French government, which was worried that
globalization could lead to the disappearance of its national

Von Christoph Hermann, Vom Misslungenen Versuch der Neufassung der Gemeinsamen
Handelspolitik Durch den Vertrag von Nizza, Europiische Zeitschriftfir Wirtschaftsrecht
(2001), 269, 272.
636. Krenzler & Pitschas, supra note 635, at 455; Hermann, supra note 635, at 272.
637. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133. Article 133, paragraph 6.1 reads: "An
agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go
beyond the Community's internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of the
laws or regulations of the Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such
harmonisation."
638. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 78 (1997).

639. See Opinion 1/94, supra note 634, para. 1 (ruling on the EC's competence in
relation to trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, as
well as the relation between external and internal competence with respect to the
harmonization of legislation).
640. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133.
641. See Herm6s Int'l v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3603 (noting
opinion by General Advocate Tesauro).
642. Kim Feus, Substantive Amendments: The Treaty of Nice Explained, in THE
TREATY OF NICE EXPLAINED 33 (Martyn Bond & Kim Feus eds., 2001).
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heritage and culture.6 3 Derogation was important to preclude a
situation where the EC,when exercising its external powers, could
circumvent member states' internal procedures and, therefore,
extend illegitimately the powers conferred to it by the Nice
Treaty."
When negotiating and concluding an agreement on trade in
services or on the commercial aspects of intellectual property
rights, unanimity is required in the Council of Europe in the
following three scenarios: (1) where such an agreement includes
provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of
internal rules (Article 133, paragraph 5 of the Nice Treaty) (For
trade in services, only in a few cases does the adoption of internal
EC rules require unanimity, namely Articles 47"45 and 57 EC);" (2)
where the agreement relates to a field in which the EC has not yet
exercised the powers conferred upon it by the EC Treaty for the
adoption of internal rules647 (Likewise, the ECJ has determined in
its Opinion 1/94 that the EC does not have exclusive competence
to conclude international agreements in fields in which it has not
acted internally); " and, (3) in the case of the negotiation and
conclusion of the so-called horizontalagreements. 9
B. Reflections on the Scope of EC Power in Services Trade
Based on the scope and nature of the EC trade policy powers
in the EC Treaty Article 133, paragraphs 5-7 as amended by the
Nice Treaty and the way in which these are exercised, it is clear
that these powers are about the defense and promotion of the EC
interests in the wider world. Rather than opting for shared
competence between the EC and its member states in services
trade and the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights,
the Nice Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) could have
included these matters within the scope of Article 133 of the EC
Treaty as had been anticipated. The Nice Treaty could have made
the qualitative jump by treating services trade and the commercial

643. Id. at 32.
644. Id. at 33.
645. EC Treaty art. 47. Article 47, paragraph 2.
646. EC Treaty art. 57. Article 57, 2.
647. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133, 5(2).
648. Opinion 1/94, supra note 634, 58-60.
649. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133, T 5(2). By horizontal agreement it is
understood an agreement which deals with several fields.
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aspects of intellectual property rights in the same way as trade in
goods, given the important role of services trade in the EC's
economy, the growing share of services trade in the EC's external
trade, and the current trends in the WTO regarding services trade
negotiations and rule-making.
The services trade and the commercial aspects of intellectual
property rights are of concern because there could be situations
where an EU member state would not be able to solve a trade
matter individually in the most advantageous way. The EC
collectively is in a much better position to negotiate. The Nice IGC
failed to give the EC the important position it needs in the world
trading system by treating services trade differently than goods
trade, and by focusing too much on internal matters of decisionmaking. Thereby, it created potential intra-EU fragmentation.
However, it is empirically true that requirements of unanimity
alone do not necessarily lead to a reduced position of the EC in
the international sphere.5 '
The Nice IGC missed the opportunity to give the EC greater
weight in all issues of international trade negotiations.65' Requiring
unanimity in the EU Council and shared competences may
jeopardize the efficiency and effectiveness of the EC in the world
trading system. In addition, the Nice IGC granted the extension of
EC trade policy powers in the field of services trade and the
commercial aspects of intellectual property rights only at the
conclusion of international agreements, not to the implementation
of such agreements. 2
The EC external powers have been extended insofar as
internal powers in the same field have already been conferred. The
EU Council will be required to decide by unanimity when
exercising the new external powers on two occasions: (1) when the
exercise of parallel internal powers requires unanimity in the
Council of Europe, and (2) when the parallel internal powers have
not yet been exercised.5

650. For example, the EC had a leading role in the Uruguay Round, despite its internal
decision-making rules.
651. See Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art.133 6.
652. Id. art. 133 J 5(1).
653. Id. art. 133 5(2).
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C. Are the Nice Treaty and the ConstitutionalTreaty the Beginning

of the End of Mixed Agreements/Shared Competence?
The evolution of the EC's common commercial policy seems
to empower the EC in trade matters, diminishing the ability of EU
member states to interact in the international trade arena, as
demonstrated in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe, analyzed below.
1. A Note on Mixed Agreements
Mixed agreements ("mixity") are agreements where both the
EC and its member states are contracting parties to an
international agreement with a third party. 654Mixity has been a
topic for scholarly debate.655
Interestingly enough, mixed agreements, important as they
are, were not foreseen in the Treaty of Rome. 6 However, the
concept does appear in the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), 7 and is incidentally
654. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 638.

655. Most of the relevant literature is in the more general context of the EC external
relations. See, for example, Alan Dashwood, Implied External Competence of the EC, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 630, 113, 113-123;
Allan Rosas, Mixed Union - Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF

THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 630, 125, 125-148; Lena Granvik, Incomplete Mixed
Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 630, 255, 255-272;
MCGOLDRICK,

supra note 638, at 78-88; LA COMMUNAUTI EUROPIENNE ET LES

ACCORDS MIXTES, QUELLES PERSPECTIVES?, (Jacques H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1997);
Nanette Neuwahl, Shared Powers or Combined Incompetence? More on Mixity, 33
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 667-68 (1996); MOSHE KANIEL, THE EXCLUSIVE TREATYMAKING POWER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY UP TO THE PERIOD OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN ACT 145-74 (1996); MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630; RACHEL FRID, THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, LEGAL

THEORY AND PRACTICE 111-16 (1995); Nanette Neuwahl, Joint Participation in
International Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and its Member States:
Mixed Agreements, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 717 (1991) [hereinafter Neuwahl, Mixed
Agreements]; A. Conze, Die voelkerrechtliche Haftung der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft
73-87 (1987); JEAN GROUX & PHILIPPE MANIN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 57-88 (1985); J. MAURITS DOLMANS, PROBLEMS OF MIXED
AGREEMENTS: DIVISION OF POWERS WITHIN THE EEC AND THE RIGHT OF THIRD
STATES (1985); MIXED AGREEMENTS (David O'Keefe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983);
ALBERT BLECKMANN, ET AL., DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
(A. Timmermans & E. Volker eds., 1981).

656. Granvik, supra note 655, at 256.
657. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community art. 102, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty]. It is precisely in Article 102, which
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inscribed in Article 133(6) EC as amended by the Nice Treaty.68
As scholar Lena Granvik correctly asserts, "the very same article
[Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the EAEC] has later been659
accepted [by EC law-makers] as a suitable model for the EC.
Following this same line of thought, some scholars also point out
that there is no doubt about the existence and legal validity of the
concept of "mixed agreement."' Their proof lies in Article 102 of
the Euratom Treaty, 6" where "[a] form of mixed agreement is
recognized and which makes explicit provisions for treaties that
are to be concluded by the Community and one or more Member
States." 62 It is nevertheless unfortunate that the Constitutional
Treaty did not expressly recognize mixed agreements in the legal
text.
The legal phenomenon of mixed agreements poses various
complex issues. These agreements must be ratified by all the EU
national parliaments of the countries that are contracting parties to
a given mixed agreement.663 This process creates uncertainty as to
the liability of the EC and its member states to third parties, as
well as the limits of the ECJ's competence to interpret such
agreements.
The mixed procedure as a legal phenomenon has been used
since the 1960s in many policy areas ranging from commercial
policy to environmental policy, from international cooperation to
the management and conservation of the resources of the sea.'
reads:
Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State.. .to which, in addition to
the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into
force until the Commission has been notified by all the Member States
concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in
accordance with the provisions of their respective national laws.
658. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133.
659. Granvik, supra note 655, at 256.
660. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630, at 143.
661. Euratom Treaty, supra note 657. It is precisely in Article 102, which reads:
Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State.. .to which, in addition to
the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into
force until the Commission has been notified by all the Member States
concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in
accordance with the provisions of their respective national laws."
662. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630, at 143-44.
663. Michael Emerson, et al., A New Agreement Between the EU and Russia: Why,
What and When? 5 (Ctr. for Eur. Pol'y Stud. [CEPS], Policy Brief No. 103, 2006),
http://shop.ceps.be/downfree.php?itemid=1331.
664. JONI HELISKOSKI, MIXED AGREEMENTS AS A TECHNIQUE FOR ORGANIZING
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER
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The general trend towards the use of the mixed formula both in
the multilateral and bilateral contexts seems to be continuing.'
There should be no doubt about the general validity or actual
practical significance of the mixed procedure; important EC and
Member States' international relations policy areas are organized
based on the mixed agreements technique. As a matter of
principle, this procedure is no longer contested on any legal
grounds.'
The ECJ has recognized in Ruling 1/78, Opinion 1/78,
Opinion 2/91, and Opinion 1/94 (regarding the WTO Agreement)
inter alia that some agreements require the participation of both
the Community and the member states." From this, one can
deduce that not all Community competence is exclusive. 6"
Furthermore, the concept of mixed agreement is a well-established
part of EC law in the everyday practice of the Community
institutions.' An example of this is Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch
Gmund,67° in which the ECJ used the term "mixed agreement" to
describe the Association Agreement between the Community and
the member states on one side and Turkey on the other."'
Mixed agreements raise difficult and interesting legal and
political issues about the role of the Communities and the EU
Member States in the international arena. 72' Despite the legal
uncertainties, in practice, the Community and the EU Member
States participate together effectively in various international
agreements.673 Mixed agreements in the field of international treaty

STATES 2 (2001).

665. Id. at 2-3. Almost all the EC's association agreements under article 310 EC have
been concluded as mixed agreements, the only exceptions being the agreements with
Cyprus and Malta. Republic of Cyprus, 1973 O.J. (L 133) 2; and Malta, 1971 O.J. (L 61) 2.
666. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630, at 143-44. For previous criticism, see G. Testa,
L'intervention des Etats Membres dans la Procedure de Conclusion des Accords
d'Association de la Communaute Economique Europeenne, 2 Cahiers de Droit Europ~en
429, 502 (1966); John Costonis, The Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic
Community: The Perspective of a Decade, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 421 (1968).

667. Ruling 1/78,1978 E.C.R. 2151 at para. 63; Opinion 1/78, 1979 E.C.R 2871 at para.
63; Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061 at para. 6; Opinion 1/94, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 108.
668. See Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, para. 5 [on the ILO Convention No. 170 on
Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, which is only open to Members of the ILO (Art.
21)].
669. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630, at 144.

670.
671.
672.
673.

Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 1987 E.C.R. 3719.
MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630, at 144.
Id.
Id.
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law reflect the changes that international law has undergone
through the establishment of entities such as the EC."'
In this same vein, Allan Rosas argues:
The European Union being a hybrid conglomerate situated
somewhere between a State and an intergovernmental
organisation, it is only natural that its external relations in
general and treaty practice in particular should not be
straightforward. The phenomenon of mixed agreements [...]
offers a telling illustration of the complex nature of the EU and
the Communities as an international actor.
We speak of complex nature because the agreement must be a
Community and a national agreement at the same time. This
means that Europe has twenty-seven voices (one for each member
state) plus one more voice coming from any of the European
communities.
The phenomenon of mixed agreements is, therefore, not only
deeply interrelated to EC law and its division of powers doctrine,
but also to public international law. Dominic McGoldrick points
out that "each international agreement will require consideration
of its subject matter to determine the allocation of competence
between the EC and the Member States, and the nature of that
competence. 6 1 6 This allocation of competence can evolve over the
lifetime of an agreement. This is so even during the drafting of an
agreement, such as the agreement in Commission v. Council (FAO
Fisheries Agreement),67 7 or a series of agreements. This also has
been the case with the GATT.67 According to public international
law, the rights and obligations that derive from an agreement form
an undivided entity. 79 This does not necessarily mean, however,

674. C. Tomuschat, Liability for Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra
note 655, 125, 125-32.
675. Rosas, supra note 655, at 125 ("The possibility of mixed agreements is expressly
recognized in Article 102 of EURATOM. The expression "mixed agreements" has been
used by the Court of Justice, e.g., in Case 12/86, Demirel [1987] ECJ 3719 at 3751
(paragraph 8)."). See also DOLMANS, supra note 655; Neuwahl, Mixed Agreements, supra
note 655; MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 630, at 142-64.
676. McGOLDRICK, supra note 638, at 78-79.
677. Id. at 79. Case C-25/94, Comm'n v. Council (FAO Fisheries Agreement), 1996
ECR 1-1469.
678. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 638, at 79; see also Ernst U. Petersmann, Participation
of the European Communities in the GATT: International Law and Community Law
Aspects, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 655, 167, 167-98.
679. See generally MCGOLDRICK, supra note 638.
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that the EC and its member states cannot respect the internal
division of competence according to EC law."
2. A Note on Shared Competence
Shared competence between the EC and its Member States
implies the fragmentation of unity in the EC and translates into
less power for the EC in the international arena." Alternatively,
EC exclusive competence facilitates international negotiations,
because the European Commission is the only competent actor in
any given matter. 2 Experience has shown that mixed agreements
can and do cause delays, which can actually worsen negotiating
situations."

Trade is one area where EU Member States have politically
agreed to delegate representation.' However, EU Member States
have started to question the transfer of sovereignty to the EC
level, especially on issues such as services, investment, and
intellectual property rights. 6" Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ clearly
680. Giorgio Gaja, The European Community's Rights and Obligations Under Mixed
Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 655, 133, 133-40.
681. Interview with Richard Wyatt, First Minister of the Delegation of the Eur.
Comm'n to the UN, in New York (June 2001).
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. See EC Treaty art. 300 $1: "[T]he Commission shall make recommendations to
the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with special committees
appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of such
directives as the Council may issue to it."
685.

See generally PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION (2004). Sovereignty is one of the most used and misused concepts of international
affairs and international law. Sometimes, it refers to the role of states in international
organizations. Other times, it refers to internal division of power, or the degree of
government authority toward its citizens. Richard N. Haass has defined sovereignty in the
following manner:
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics:
First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. Second, it is
capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its
foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an
independent entity entitled to freedom from external intervention. These
components of sovereignty were never absolute, but together they offered a
predictable foundation for world order. What is significant today is that each of
these components - internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and
non-intervention - is being challenged in unprecedented ways.
Richard N. Haass, Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at
the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies,
Georgetown University (Jan. 14, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/
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acknowledged that the EC and the EU Member States share
competence in these areas. 6 A few years later, the Amsterdam
Treaty reinforced restrictions on transfers of sovereignty to the EC
level in the area of trade by allowing EU member states to decide
to delegate competence on a case-by-case basis at the end of
negotiations.'
With the new balance between Brussels and national
institutions as well as that between national institutions and
regional and local authorities, a rebellion of sorts has started in
Europe.' As Yves Meny rightly points out, "any attribution of
powers is arbitrary and therefore political; in fact, even if some
criteria of efficiency and rationality are taken into account, it is
mainly on the basis of political criteria that powers are distributed
among the various decision-making... levels." 9 Even if there are
expectations for eliminating overlap in competences between the
EC and its Member States, "[the] economic and social reality is so
extremely complex that the hope of reaching a clear separation of
powers is an illusion."6" It is therefore important to establish the
methods and instruments for the exercise of competences.69
Competences in the EC are joint because member states
prefer to preserve their own national competence. 62 This
approach, which is reflected in the Opinion 2/91,693 weakens the
2003/16648.htm. Most of the time, though, sovereignty actually refers to questions about
the allocation of power, i.e., government decision-making power. For more on
sovereignty, see J.H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION (N.
Walker ed., 2003); I. BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM
(1973).
686. Opinion 1/94 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267.
687. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 621. The Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of
the Intergovernmental Conference launched at the Turin European Council on March 29,
1996. It was adopted at the Amsterdam European Council on June 16 and 17, 1997 and
signed on October 2, 1997 by the Foreign Ministers of the then fifteen EU Member States.
It entered into force on May 1, 1999 (the first day of the second month following
ratification by the last Member State) after ratification by all the Member States in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
688. Yves Meny, The External and Internal Borders of the Great Europe, INTERNAT'L
SPECTATOR, Apr.-June 2002, at 19, 22. Brussels is used to refer to the EU supranational
apparatus of decision-making, where many of the EU institutions reside.
689. Id.
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Editorial Comments, The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or How to Ensure Unity of
Representationfor Joint Competencies, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 385, 386 (1995).
693. Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061.
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constitutional position of the Community in the field of external
relations."' On the other hand, shared competence arguably
increases the leverage of the most protectionist EU countries.
Shared competence implies a strong voice if EU Member States
and the Commission sings as a polyphonic "choir." In mixed
agreements, if there is more than one negotiator other than the
EC, then the EC's negotiating position, (although not necessarily
" As long as the external
that of Member States) is weakened.95
competence is not exclusively EC competence, member states
remain free to enter into multilateral treaty relations either alone
or collectively.696 The tension created by the mixture of
competences between the EC and its member states is seen as an
obstacle to the achievement of Community interests as a whole,
and are a problem for Europe's trade partners. 97 Even though
Article 133 of the EC Treaty gives exclusive competence in
commercial policy to the EC, the treaty also limits this
competence."
According to Jean Groux, it is preferable for third states to
have a mixed procedure because they are not familiar with dealing
with the EC, the competences and responsibilities of which they
" For example, if a third party like the
know only imperfectly. 99
United States has complete information about the member states'
positions, then it is easier to accept that the EC acts with a single
voice.7" For third parties, there are at least three main variables to
take into consideration: (1) secrecy, (2) physical difficulty for a
third party to obtain information, and (3) institutional processes. 1
Secrecy means having the EC represented as a single entity in
international agreements obscures information about an individual
member states' position. 2 Since secrecy causes diminished
70

694. Editorial Comments, supra note 682, at 386.
695. Interview with John Richardson, Head of the Delegation of the European
Commission to the UN, in N.Y, N.Y. (June 16, 2001).
696. Even if de jure this is a plausible situation, de facto it has never happened.
697. See generally MCGOLDRICK, supra note 638, at 86-88 (examining the practical
effects of mixed agreements on the negotiation, conclusion, and implementation of
agreements).
698. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7 1992, 1992 O.J (C 224/1) at
44.

699. Jean Groux, Mixed Negotiations,in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 655, at 91.
700. Id.

701. Id.
702. Id.
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transparency, agreements might be more difficult to reach. 3 The
physical difficulty associated with a third party obtaining
information is linked closely to secrecy. " Having a single voice in
the EC can make it harder for a third party to negotiate.0 5
Furthermore, exclusive EC competence requires a third party to
understand the unique institutional processes that may involve
various Directorates-General of the European Commission, for
example."
Knowing that the presumption in the EC is for collective
action, is there really a "common" European interest? If there is a
common interest, is this interest so great that it creates a
presumption that member states will act with a single voice? Do
Member States truly have enough commonality in their national
interests to act with one voice in the international sphere?
When the EC has had the primary responsibility of
negotiating on behalf of its Member States, third-party states have
overtly put pressure on the Community to use the mixed
negotiation technique."' For example, the negotiations between
the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(Comecon) 0 began in 1975 with a view to normalizing the
relations of the Community with the East European countries.

703. Groux, supra note 655. See also MEP Urges EU Council to Prop up Transparency,
EURACTIV, Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/en/governance/meps-urge-eu-councilprop-transparency/article-152940. The term 'transparency' is often used in a broad sense
to mean openness in the way the Member States' and EU institutions work. EU
institutions are committed to greater openness and are taking steps to improve public
access to information and to produce clearer and more readable documents. See id.
704. Groux, supra note 655, at 91.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. See generally MACLEOD, supra note 638.
708. Comecon was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the U.S.S.R.
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950-1990),
Mongolia (from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with Yugoslavia as an
associat d member. Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. Its establishment was
prompted by the Marshall Plan. Comecon was formally disbanded in June 1991. It was
agreed in 1987 that official relations should be established with the European Community,
and a free-market approach to trading was adopted in 1990. In January 1991 it was agreed
that Comecon should be effectively disbanded. See RICHARD SCHAFFER, BEVERLY
EARLE & FILBERTO AUGUSTI, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT

102 (4th ed. 1999).
709. See Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General
Information, Communication, Culture, The European Community's Relations with
COMECON and its East European Members 1, 76/X/89, Jan. 1989, available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/1681/01/comeconrelations er-1-89.pdf.
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The East European countries, which were somewhat reluctant to
officially recognize the Community, had great difficulty in
accepting the decision of the European Council that negotiations
would be conducted by the Commission alone. They tried in vain
to ensure the participation of the individual Member States." ' In
fact, the EC and Comecon did not establish official relations with
each other until 1988."' That position changed shortly before
Comecon dissolved."2
3. Applying the Nice Treaty:
Services Trade in the Doha Round from an EC Law Perspective
Given that the Constitutional Treaty will not enter into force,
the Nice Treaty provides the current legal framework of analysis."3
Article 133, paragraph 5, of the EC Treaty as amended by the Nice
Treaty, gives the EC exclusive competence in all areas of services
except three: health, education, and audiovisual services and
culture."' If these three exceptions are the basis of any
international trade agreement, the EU Council must act
unanimously in the negotiation and conclusion of such
agreements.7 5' In addition, Article 133, paragraph 4, of the EC
Treaty requires that decisions in the EU Council be made by a
qualified majority."6 In light of the Doha rounds, the exception to
this rule would take effect if the DDA includes the three services
710. MIXED AGREEMENTS (David O'Keefe, ed., & Henry G. Schermers, ed., Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers 1983).
711. Council Decision 88/345, 1988 O.J. (L 157) 34, 34; see generally Wojciech
Morawiecki, Actors and Interests in the Process of Negotiations between the CMEA and the
EEC,LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION, 1989/2, at 1.

712. See generally Commission of the European Communities, supra note 708.
713. See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (June 21-22, 2003),
available at http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/
94932.pdf.

714. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133 T 6. Articles. 133, paragraph 6 reads:
In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5,
agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational
services, and social and human health services, shall fall within the shared
competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in
addition to a Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant
provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements shall require the
common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be
concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States.
715. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133 5.
716. Id. art. 133 4.
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trade exceptions that appear in Article 133, paragraph 6 of the EC
Treaty (health, education, and culture).717 If so, unanimity would
apply, and EU member states could use their veto power in the
EU Council.
The agreements associated with the DDA negotiations can
take the form of a single undertaking, or a series of individual
agreements, organized by subject-matter (the so-called variable
geometry). Given the current state of EC law, one could assume
that some aspects of the Doha Round would be concluded by the
EC alone and other aspects by the EC and its member states
together. However, since the Doha Round (like the Uruguay
Round) will most likely be signed as a package, and certain
services (namely health, education, and culture) are shared
competence in EC law, it would likely result in a mixed agreement
signed by both the EC and its member states.
For services trade in the Doha Round, another possibility
would be for the Doha agreement to be signed as a pure EC
agreement. How it would be signed (whether as a pure EC
agreement or mixed agreement) depends on the analysis and
interpretation of the Nice Treaty with respect to trade in services,
as well as on whether there will be a separate GATS revision
(which would include the three services trade exceptions in Article
133, paragraph 6 of the EC Treaty) or just one global WTO Trade
Agreement. This raises the question whether there will there be
new commitments in the Doha Round for the EC in culture,
education, and health.
It could be argued, then, that the Doha Round could be
signed by the EC and its Member States as a mixed agreement, in
light of the changes introduced by the Nice Treaty to the common
commercial policy. The DDA will not need to be a mixed
agreement, however, unless one includes the three exceptions in
services trade referred to in Article 133 EC. There will be no need
for a mandate from EU Member States, because the EC will have
exclusive competence based on the changes made to Article 133
EC by the Nice Treaty. Such an approach will have implications
for EU national parliaments in that they will not ratify trade
agreements (such as the DDA); instead, the Council will ratify
these agreements. If the Doha Round is not signed as a mixed
agreement, these agreements would not be ratified by national
717. Id.
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parliaments since they would remain only a matter of
supranational nature. Serious questions concerning legitimacy
might surface as a result of this praxis.
Not everyone, however, has the same conception of the legal
consequences of the DDA for EU Member States where the three
exceptions of Article 133, paragraph 6, of the EC Treaty are
excluded from the Doha agenda. Jose Alberto Plaza, Deputy
Director General of International Services Trade and Electronic
Trade at the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Trade,
argues that all EU member states should vote and decide by
unanimity in the EU Council when it comes to such delicate issues
as health, education, and audiovisual services at the national
level."8 The same is true for the so-called Mode 4, which affects
national immigration policies."9 Mode 4 also requires unanimity in
the Council of Europe."' Therefore, according to Plaza, it is not
viable to talk about exclusive competence in trade in services in
the Nice Treaty."' Certain aspects of trade in services cannot be
negotiated by the Commission without consulting EU member
2 In fact, it is not possible to talk about trade in
states, he argues."
services without penetrating the national regulatory system.2 3 For
example, given the different immigration policies among EU
countries, it is unimaginable to have a common EU immigration
policy." For this reason, it is impossible to exclude EU member
states from the ratification process of the Doha Agreement. 5
Furthermore, Plaza argued the regulation and progressive
liberalization of services implies that the legislator must go well
beyond market regulation and the national-treatment principle. 6
Examples include the services directives in the EU, which by law
leave room for EU member states to maneuver because they affect
the national regulatory system.2 Even if international trade is the
subject matter of these directives, we are still dealing with

718. Interview with Jose Plaza, supra note 200.
719.

Id.

720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.

723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id. Plaza noted that Spain would certainly give a different treatment to Latin
American countries than it would to Egypt or Ukraine. Id.
726. Id.

727. Id.
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domestic regulation. In Plaza's opinion, the only mode where the
Commission might avoid EU member states' involvement would
be in Mode 1 (tariffs, etc.), but even there EU member states have
much to say."'
On the other hand, if the three services trade exceptions
presented in Article 133, paragraph 6, of the EC Treaty are
included in the DDA package, then the unanimity/veto power of
EU member states in the Council applies. 29 In other words, legally
speaking, the ability of any EU Member State to veto a final WTO
deal depends on the outline of the final deal, because trade
agreements are in fact subject to qualified majority voting in the
EU Council, unless they cover certain areas, such as those
expressed in Article 133 (6.2), which would then require
unanimity. However, the more likely scenario requiring unanimity
is that the Doha agreement would be concluded as a single
undertaking.
An agreement concluded as a single undertaking would have
a significant impact. During the pre-Hong Kong negotiations on
agriculture, the French government wanted to use its veto power
to protect its agricultural policy in the world trading system - even
though agricultural policy is exclusive EC competence."' The
French argued that if the DDA is to be conceived as a single
undertaking, the inclusion of the three services trade exceptions in
the final package of the DDA would enable France to activate its
veto power across all areas by virtue of having shared competence
with the EC."' This would put France in a position to reject the
DDA as a single undertaking because of its disagreement with the
rest of the world trade community over agriculture. 2 In other
words, France's could use its veto power in the services trade
exceptions to send a political message in order to protect its
agriculture by rejecting the entire DDA due to conflict with other
EU member states over agriculture.
How can the Doha Round be reconciled with the fact that
specific, nationally delicate issues such as culture, education, and

728. Interview with Jose Plaza, supra note 200. For more on Mode 1, see supra notes
142- 143 and accompanying text.
729. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133 6.
730. French WTO Stance Irks EU Trade Chief, EURACriV, Jan. 16, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/french-wto-stance-irks-eu-trade-chief/article-16091 1.
731. Id.
732.

Id.

Resumption of Doha

20071

health are within EU member states' exclusive competence? In the
past, EU Member States have shown their interest in maintaining
their sovereignty in these delicate issues.733 However, even if all EU
Member States are contracting parties to the GATS, the Doha
Round could potentially be concluded as a pure Community
agreement and still be consistent with the legal procedures of the
EC external relations practice.
A pure EC agreement can be consistent with the EC's
external relations practice because since the Nice Treaty, services
trade can be the object of a pure Community agreement with
shared competence." Certainly, there are varied opinions in this
whole debate; the Commission wants to present the Doha agenda
in the EU Council as a package to be signed by qualified majority
vote. 35 In Plaza's view, this will not be possible in services trade,
not even under the EU Constitutional Treaty, which claims to give
exclusive competence to the EU in all areas of the common
policy,"' simply because EU Member States will not
commercial
737
accept

it.

The following diagram explains in a structured format what
has been argued above:
EC's Perspective
on WTO
Agreement
Mixed agreement, if
the inclusion of the
three services trade
exceptions takes
place in the Doha
package

Voting Requirement
in the EU Council

Conception of the
DDA

Unanimity/Veto
Power

Single undertaking

733. See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas, Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common
CommercialPolicy: From Amsterdam to Nice, 30 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 3,
8-9 (2003). See also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Doha Negotiations on Trade in Services:

Consequences of the Nice Treaty Reform and the Constitutional Treaty (The Federalist
Trust for Educ. & Research, Online Paper 22/04, 2004), http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/
uploads/constitution/22_04.pdf (citing Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at Harvard Univ., supra note 220
(noting local and national government sovereignty concerns on the additional issues of
land use, licensing, and environmental health)).
734. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133 5.
735. Interview with Jose Plaza, supra note 200.
736. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310)
[hereinafter Constitutional Treaty].
737. Interview with Jose Plaza, supra note 200.
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Despite the complexities that an agreement signed as a single
undertaking could bring, the Doha Round, as was the case with the
Uruguay Round, will be signed as a mixed agreement, even though
the substance and nature of the services negotiations in the
Uruguay Round and the Doha Round are rather different."' The
Uruguay Round laid the ground rules for trade in services in the
GATS, whereas the Doha Round aims to extend trade
liberalization and to complement those ground rules." There
would probably be no repercussions of the Doha Round on the
EU Member States if it were to be signed as a pure Community
agreement with shared competence between the EC and its
member states in the case of services trade. In the end, the
difference between signing the Doha Round as a pure EC
agreement or as a mixed agreement is merely procedural in nature.
With respect to the practical consequences of mixed
agreements, the current situation is as follows:
[I]f an agreement (also or solely) concerns concessions relating
to services, intellectual property or investments, the general
rules of the [Nice] Treaty apply. Under those rules, agreements
are concluded by qualified majority or unanimously depending
on whether the Community's internal decisions in that area
(services, intellectual property rights) are taken by qualified
majority or unanimously. In addition, Member States often wish
to exercise their residual powers in those fields in which no
internal Community rules apply or do not yet apply. As a result,
trade agreements concerning different fields very often have to
be concluded unanimously, or even by the Community (Council
decision) and by all the Member States as well. This entails

738. See Markus Krajewski, External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards
a Federal and More Democratic Common Commercial Policy?, 42 COMMON MKT. LAW
REV. 91, 97 (2005).

739. That said, some of the controversial issues of the Uruguay Round such as
audiovisual services are still on the negotiating trade agenda. See Bruno de Witte, Trade in
Culture: InternationalLegal Regimes and EU Constitutional Values, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 237-55 (Griinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2001).
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ratification by national bodies ('mixed' agreements).
A practical consequence of mixed agreements is that the
Community's dealings with third countries must be conducted
unanimously. 4' "Statistically, enlargement will increase the risk of
a member state using its veto to prevent the Community from
adopting a common position. This collective weakness'' 4 may work
to the advantage of the Community's trading partners. 1 1
A careful contextual reading of the term "consequently" in
Article 133, paragraph 6(2) of the EC Treaty as modified by the
Nice Treaty could lead to the conclusion that shared competence
necessarily requires a mixed agreement.7 3 That notion, however, is
inconsistent with existing practice by the EC under other external
relations headings.' " Thus, one should understand Article 133,
paragraph 6(2) of the EC Treaty as modified by the Nice Treaty as
a lex specialis for the fields of culture and audiovisual services,
education, and social and human health services.14' As a matter of
law, these fields fall within shared competence between the EC
and its member states and require mixed agreements for reasons
of their particular national sensitivity.74
4. The Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties and International
Services Trade
The ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty failed. It is
somewhat paradoxical that in the period since the collapse of the
Berlin Wall, at precisely the time in which there were few credible
alternatives to liberal democracy, there have been growing doubts
about the capacity of the structures and institutions of liberal
democracy to respond to contemporary problems"'Because the
EU Constitutional Treaty did not enter into force, the European

740. EC, Intergovernmental Conference 2000 Factsheet: Qualified-Majority Voting,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/geninfo/fact-sheets/fact-sheet6/index-en.htm
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
741. Id.
742. Id.
743.

See PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 66 (2006).

744. See id. at 67.
745. See generally id. at 70-74 (commenting on the complexity of the Nice provisions of
Art.133).
746. See generally id. at 137-81 (describing international commitments and mixity).
747. Finn Laursen, The Post-Nice Agenda: Towards a Constitutional Treaty?, in THE
TREATY OF NICE: ACTOR PREFERENCES, BARGAINING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
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Council meeting of June 2007 agreed on a fall-back revision treaty
which confirms much of the substance of the EU Constitutional
Treaty, including the provisions concerning external trade.748
Therefore, an examination of these external trade provisions is
amply justified, since they are still likely to enter into force,
possibly in 2009.
Before the European Council of June 2007, the idea was that
when the EU Constitutional Treaty would enter into force, the EC
Treaty, the EU Treaty, as well as acts and Treaties which have
supplemented or amended them, would have been repealed, as
laid down in the general and final provisions in Part IV of the EU
Constitutional Treaty. The EU Constitutional Treaty was
supposed to enter into force after ratification by all EU Member
States. It was also provided for that the Union would succeed to all
the rights and obligations, whether internal or resulting from
international agreements, which arose before the entry into force
of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The case-law of the ECJ would
have been maintained as a source of Union law interpretation. As
stated in Article 1-6 of the EU Constitutional Treaty, the
Constitution and law adopted by the Union's institutions in
exercising competences conferred on it would have had primacy
over the law of the Member States.
On 23 July 2007, the Portuguese Presidency launched an
intergovernmental conference for the negotiation of a Lisbon
Treaty, embracing a revised Treaty on European Union and a
revised European Community Treaty, which would be called a
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Much if not all
of the content of the new Treaties was agreed at the European
Council meeting in Brussels on 21 and 22 June 2007. The
Portuguese Presidency produced a draft text of the new Treaties
on 23 July 2007, reflecting the agreement at the European Council
in June 2007. In theory therefore, this intergovernmental
conference was meant to be less controversial than its predecessors
which led to the Single European Act and the Maastricht,
Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties, as well as the abandoned EU
Constitutional Treaty. The European Council decided that the
intergovernmental conference would conclude before the end of
2007, so that the Lisbon Treaty could be ratified by all 27 EU
Member States before the European Parliament elections in
748.

Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (June 21/22, 2007).
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November 2009.
The EU Constitutional Treaty has given more competences in
trade policy to the supranational level, which causes problems for
national governments. In practice, the problems arise because
there is no definition or scope of common commercial policy in the
EU Constitutional Treaty."9 Therefore, if a given agreement is on
a subject of national regulation, then it will have to be signed as a
mixed agreement.
Under the EU Constitutional Treaty, the EU may take
coordinating, complementary, or supporting action in public
health, culture, and education. " ' This provision seems to be in
direct conflict with the commitments of the Constitutional Treaty
in international trade policy (Articles 111-314 and 315).
The distinction between a qualified majority and unanimity in
the Council in the Constitutional Treaty depends on the area of
trade policy."' The voting requirements for decision-making in the
EU Council appear in paragraph 4 of Article 111-315 of the
Constitutional Treaty. 52 The idea of the Convention was to
provide for the use of qualified majority voting as a rule.5
However, the Convention version of Article 111-315 did not
specifically mention qualified majorities.
The omission was
rectified by adding a paragraph 4 of Article 111-315: "For the
negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in
paragraph 3, the Council shall act by qualified majority. 55 This
amended provision suggests that only the negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements shall be subject to the
majority rule, but not the adoption of unilateral actions and the

749. See ConstitutionalTreaty, supra note 736, arts. 1-13, 111-314-315.
750. ConstitutionalTreaty, supra note 736, art. 1-17 (a), (c), (e); see also, Constitutional
Treaty, art. 111-278, 1 1.
751. Constitutional Treaty, supra note 736, art. 1-25, 1 (defining qualified majority as
at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and
representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union. A
blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified
majority shall be deemed attained.).
752. ConstitutionalTreaty, supra note 736, art. 111-315, 4.
753. Secretariat, European Convention, Contribution by Andrew Duff, member of the
Convention: Making the Constitution Work: Qualified Majority Voting, Co-Decision and
Executive Accountability - With Proposalsfor ProceduralAmendments to Part 111, at 3,
CONV
838/03
CONTRIB
374,
June
20,
2003,
http://europeanhttp://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvOO/cvOO838enO3.pdf.
754. ConstitutionalTreaty, supra note 736, art. 111-315.
755. Id.
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implementation of agreements. Nevertheless, majority voting is
already in the Nice Treaty's general rule for the exercise of powers
in the field of commercial policy." Thus, the proposed provision
should be interpreted in such a way that majority voting applies as
a general rule, subject to the exceptions provided for in paragraph
4, subparagraphs 2 and 3, of Article 111-315. That said, a trade
agreement that includes issues that require unanimity as well as
qualified majority must be concluded by unanimous vote in the
EU Council according to the Pastis principle.757
The EU Constitutional Treaty has provided more
competences to the EU in trade matters.758 Some may argue that
the following articles protect the rights of EU members to
determine policy on health, education, and cultural/audiovisual
services: Articles 1-17, 111-278 on public health, 111-280 on
culture," ° 111-282 on education,6 1 111-315, paragraph 4 of the
common commercial policy on cultural and audiovisual services, 762
and 111-315, paragraph 5 of the common commercial policy on the
delineation of the competences of Member States as against those
of the EU. 6 ' However, these Articles offer little legal protection

against the provisions of Article 1-13, paragraph 1, which gives the
EU the exclusive right to determine its common commercial
policy, 7
and Article 111-315, paragraph 1 of the common
commercial policy, which includes the right to 65 make "trade
agreements relating to trade in goods and services.1

Article 111-315, paragraph 1 of the common commercial
policy allows the Commission, after a Qualified Majority Vote in
the Council of Ministers, to make deals in the GATS and the

756. Nice Treaty, supra note 8, art. 133,
4 (stating: "in exercising the powers
conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by qualified majority.")
757. See Pascal Lamy, European Comm'r for Trade, Speech in Brussels, Belg. (Feb. 5,
2002), http:// http://europa.eu.int/commlarchives/commission_1999_2004/lamylspeechesarticles/splal46_en.htm (where Lamy argued that "...under the Pastis principle, a little
drop of unanimity can taint the entire glass of QMV [qualified majority vote] water").
758. Constitutional Treaty, supra note 736, art. 1-13. Article 1-13 of the EU
Constitutional Treaty gives exclusive competence to the Union in its common commercial
policy.
759. Id. art. 111-278.
760. Id. art. 111-280.
761. Id., art. 111-282.
762. Id. art. 111-315, 4.
763. Id. art. 111-315, [5.
764. Id. art. 1-13.
765. Id. art. 111-315, J 1.
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WTO Agreement on what the Commission defines as the
commercial aspects of these services. 7' The commercial aspects of
these services are not defined in the EU Constitutional Treaty or
elsewhere. 67 This implies that an EU member state would have to
go to the ECJ to challenge the Commission, arguing that the
Commission was opening trade in non-commercial aspects of these
services. This would be a very difficult legal argument to make,
because many services can be broken into individual functions and
contracted out as seen in Ireland and the UK." In practice, these
articles are but a fig-leaf covering the overriding drive toward
uniform liberalization of trade in services contained in the
common commercial policy. If those who cite these articles are
and
education,
health,
protecting
about
serious
cultural/audiovisual services from commercialization, they should
at least press for the retention of the unanimity requirement in the
Council of Ministers on decisions to open trade in these services.
With regard to culture and audiovisual services, Article III315, paragraph 4, of the EU Constitutional Treaty allows a veto on
changes in the common commercial policy only in the conclusion
of agreements "in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual
services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's
' How such risk is defined, when
cultural and linguistic diversity."769
it is defined, and by whom it is defined, is open to interpretation.
Would a general opening up of the University sector, or of the
primary school sector to unlimited competition (as is happening in
the UK 770 ) pose a threat to cultural and linguistic diversity? For
instance, in the case of Ireland, would the same levels of support to
linguistically specific radio and TV - like TG4"' and the projects it
supports - also have to be given to private commercial channels
766. Id. art. 111-315, 1 1.
767. ConstitutionalTreaty, supra note 736.

768. Europe at the Crossroads: Health and Education as Business Opportunity?
(Peace and Neutrality Alliance, Dublin, Ir.) Dec. 2003, http://www.pana.ie/idn/301203.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
769. ConstitutionalTreaty, supra note 736, art. 111-315, 4(a).
770.

Des Freedman, Who Wants to be a Millionaire?The Politics of Television Exports,

6 INFO., COMM. & SOC., 24 (2003).
771. TG4 is an Irish television channel aimed at Irish language speakers and
established as a wholly owned subsidiary by Radio Telefis Eireann on October 31, 1996. It
was known as Teilifis na Gaeilge or TnaG before a rebranding campaign in 1999. TV3
Ireland is the sole commercial terrestrial television channel in the Republic of Ireland. See
TG4 - Irish language television channel, Teilefis Gaeilge - Corporate, http://www.tg4.ie/
Bearla/Corp/corp.htm.
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like TV3? How would defenders of linguistic diversity establish, in
advance rather then after deals have been made and the damage is
already done, that certain trade agreements pose risks to culture?
The EU Constitutional Treaty does not define who decides on
what constitutes a risk, so those who might see their culture at risk
might not have veto powers."2 Certainly, EU member states will
continue to participate in the EU's trade policy whenever there is
a national regulation sector that the European Commission
neither controls nor knows about when it comes to national
preoccupations. In practice, the ECJ will determine which services
should be protected and which should be commercialized.
VI. EPILOGUE

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the suspension of the multilateral trade talks, EU
Member States should have pressed for a wide-ranging EC
approach to the Doha Round aimed at tackling the main barriers
to trade in services. The EC should overcome the failure of
Cancun and work on a framework for negotiations in order to
secure a successful outcome of the Doha Round. The EC needs to
adapt to the changes taking place in the world trading system and
world trade negotiations. There remains considerable potential for
further liberalization, even if the growth of North-South trade over
the last decade has been quite remarkable. Nevertheless, certain
fields such as culture, education, health and public services remain
a barrier to the current trend of services liberalization.
The Irish poet W.B. Yeats wrote that, when things fall apart,
the center cannot hold."3 A key question if the Doha round falls
apart for good is whether anything can hold the WTO and the
multilateral trading system together. Doha could mark the end of
multilateral negotiating rounds in favor of a swing toward regional
or bilateral trade agreements.
The WTO is in seemingly inevitable drift away from the hard
politics of trade liberalization and the rules that underpin it.
Serious players will switch to preferential trade agreements, and
they will be tempted to disobey existing multilateral rules. In
essence, the WTO suffers from severely diminishing returns. In

772. Europe at the Crossroads:
supra note 767.
773.

W.B. Yeats,

Health and Education as Business Opportunity?,

The Second Coming, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH

LITERATURE 1880-81 (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., Norton, 6th ed. 1993).
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contrast to the GATT, the WTO has a bigger, messier, and
politically more controversial agenda, fraught with multiple and
contradictory objectives. Furthermore, decision-making is crippled
in a general assembly with near-universal membership.
The EU needs to find a more effective way of negotiating
multilaterally. The WTO family has grown substantially, both in its
number of members (at the start of the Uruguay Round, there
were only eighty-six members) and in its agenda in the last few
years. This means that the legal, economic, and political needs and
interests of the various WTO members might differ drastically.
Thus, variable geometry seems to be the most plausible way to
move the multilateral trade agenda forward. The same is true for
the EU's so-called enhanced cooperation. The variable geometry
approach has the advantage of removing the current frustration at
the WTO negotiating table, as well as the sometimes-violent
protests organized by civil society, with its slow negotiating pace.
However, one disadvantage might be that the developing countries
might feel marginalized at the WTO. Furthermore, the WTO
members' ambitions must be scaled back.
Experience has shown that the expectations of the world
trading system's agenda cannot be met by the current multilateral
trade negotiations. It is not possible to get decisive progress
without lowering expectations for the Doha Round. Although
agriculture is key to disentangling the Doha talks, opening up
service markets also remains vital to a successful outcome. Many
developing countries consider the sending of services and supplies
to lucrative markets under Mode 4 of the GATS to be one of the
principal areas of negotiations for the Doha Round. Whether the
development promise of the Doha Round is achieved will depend
on the extent to which the present level of commitments under
Mode 4 is expanded.
With one eye on this round and another on future rounds, this
Article recommends governments push for a strong and timely
conclusion to the trade talks, to talk to their citizens about the
importance of a Doha agreement, and to build the necessary
coalitions among diverse stakeholders to pass a final Doha
agreement. Finally, four major constraints stand in the way of a
strong conclusion to the current trade negotiations: (1) lack of
vision, (2) lack of trust, (3) limited process, and (4) narrow vision
of development.
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Lack of Vision
Leaders are urged to create a new vision for trade agreements
that moves beyond narrow mercantilism to focus on the benefits
for consumers as well as producers. Leaders should talk about the
benefits of service sector reforms and customs procedure
improvements - not just improved market access in agriculture
services,
financial
in
goods. Reforms
and industrial
telecommunications, and customs procedures are essential to
exporters. Leaders also need to explain to their constituents the
role that trade and multilateral institutions can play in improving
security and promoting peace. However, leaders are also urged to
be more forthright about the challenges that come with trade
reforms. Leaders must acknowledge that there are losers from
trade reforms, and must address the dislocations caused by trade
agreements. They must be careful not to oversell the benefits - or
the problems - caused by trade agreements.
Lack of Trust
Some developing countries feel that the Doha Round
resembles the Uruguay Round because it could deliver cuts in the
level of tariffs and subsidies allowed under WTO rules, but not
actual reductions in applied tariffs and current levels of subsidies.
So the Doha Round must result in real improvements in market
access and real reductions in trade distorting subsidies.
Limited Process
The WTO should facilitate informal conversations across
sectors, given the importance of finding balance across agriculture,
industrial products, and services. These conversations cannot wait
until the last minute in the Green Room. For example, China
might be willing to move further in the services negotiations in
exchange for reforms in rules, the United States might be willing
to make deeper cuts in agricultural subsidies in exchange for
improvements in customs clearance in developing countries or in
better enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary rules, and India
might be able to be more forthcoming on agriculture and industrial
products in exchange for more willingness to negotiate on
temporary visas for workers. The WTO should also consider how
best to orchestrate improved offers in services that are essential to
achieving greater movement in industrial products and agriculture.
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Finally, a better outcome might happen if deals on industrial
goods, services, and trade facilitation were hammered out first
before turning to agriculture, instead of the reverse, as has been
happening.
Narrow Vision of Development
The term "development" has been equated with special and
differential treatment, preferences, and aid for trade during the
Doha round. While all of these are important, developing
countries are primarily seeking the right to compete under a fair,
rules-based trading system. Developing countries want developed
countries to remove market barriers as well as distortions in
agriculture and in those industrial products that have been left out
of the trade negotiations for decades. Developing countries cannot
expect - and should not want - a round for free, but neither can
developed countries expect to continue to exempt agriculture and
other highly-protected products from real WTO disciplines. The
fact that this is a development round should be seen as an asset to
getting a good agreement, not a liability.

